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Introduction
Peter Dutton

O

n the wall in the entranceway to the personal offices of the Commander, Pacific
Fleet, there hangs prominently displayed a life-size portrait of Adm. Chester
William Nimitz, the legendary architect of the American naval victory in the Pacific
sixty-five years ago. The painting is specially lit, giving the admiral’s thoughtful gaze a
lifelike glow as if he were present, judging the decisions and actions of his successors in
command as these officers find means to preserve regional peace and guard American
interests. In the painting’s background are the objects of naval war, standing as striking
reminders of the heavy price in American blood and treasure paid for the nearly three
generations since then during which the Pacific Ocean has been an American lake. It has
been this freedom from serious threat that has provided room for American strategic
and operational maneuver during the Korean conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Cold
War, that has afforded an avenue for the movement of forces during conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the capacity to deter conflict in East Asia, the access needed to assure the
security of allies and partners, and the ability to provide support to populations devastated by disaster.
The responsibility to keep peace and find means to secure American interests for future
generations must weigh heavily on each commander as he passes Nimitz’s gaze, and never more so than today. Change is afoot in the Pacific. The Chinese military is developing
the capacity to challenge American freedom of action in and around the Yellow Sea, the
East China Sea, and the South China Sea—China’s “near seas.” China’s naval modernization is efficiently focused on controlling access to these near seas in military crisis.
For instance, China has long possessed one of the largest arsenals of naval mines in the
world. Over the last three decades its navy has also developed a capable submarine fleet,
to challenge the freedom of action of any naval force in the region. More recently, China
has announced programs to develop antiship ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers and
has demonstrated the capacity to employ antisatellite weapons and cyber-disruption. In
short, China is attempting to assemble the technology to challenge the U.S. Navy’s access
to the western reaches of “its” lake and thereby challenge the political access that American naval power now ensures.
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China has also mobilized its lawyers. Its international-law specialists have become
adjunct soldiers in China’s legal campaign to challenge the dominant, access-oriented
norms at sea, especially for military freedoms of navigation in the exclusive economic
zone. This expanse of waters, known as the EEZ, stretches two hundred nautical miles
from a coastal state’s shores and collectively constitutes more than a third of all ocean
space. Because the EEZ is a rich resource zone and a region through which all major
sea-lanes pass, its space is critical to regional political stability, national resource extraction, and global commerce. For the United States, the world’s EEZs are therefore critical
regions in which naval power must be brought to bear in support of two fundamental
sources of stability for the global system: deterrence of international armed conflict and
suppression of nontraditional threats to commerce and other activities. For China, however, its EEZ and other jurisdictional waters are zones in which outside interference is an
unwelcome intrusion into domestic security issues, a zone of competition for resources
with neighboring states that claim overlapping rights, and a region in which national,
not international, maritime power should dominate.
These dichotomous perspectives flow from fundamentally different views about regional
security, and they form the basis of a simmering tension between the Chinese and
American maritime power. That tension occasionally erupts, such as it did in April 2001
during the EP-3 incident and in March 2009 during the USNS Impeccable incident. The
Impeccable incident occurred when a collection of Chinese government and fishing vessels maneuvered in dangerously close quarters around the American survey vessel and
interfered with the performance of its operations in the South China Sea more than seventy miles off China’s nearest coastline.1 The EP-3 incident occurred eight years earlier
in nearly the same location when a Chinese intercept aircraft collided with an American
patrol plane as it performed routine reconnaissance operations in the airspace over the
South China Sea.2
This volume is the product of a workshop held in Newport in July 2009 to discuss the
different perspectives held by the United States and China on the legitimacy of foreign
military activities in a coastal state’s EEZ. The conference, addressing “The Strategic Implications of Military Activities in the EEZ,” was attended by fifty representatives of the
American and Chinese policy, military, legal, and academic communities. Its aims were
to increase mutual understanding of the bases for each state’s perspectives and to add a
dimension of richness to ongoing talks between the two countries under the framework
of the Defense Consultative Agreement and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. Eight papers from workshop participants are reproduced here; during the two
days of substantive discussions each attendee also made other significant contributions
to the success of these objectives. We extend our thanks and gratitude to each of them.

military activities in the eez

3

The workshop, falling as it did just four months after the confrontation between Chinese
civilian and government vessels and the USNS Impeccable, produced for American
participants an extraordinary level of discussion and insight into the Chinese view of its
security interests and China’s perspective on the protections those security interests are
guaranteed by international law. The Impeccable incident, like the 2001 EP-3 incident
before it, focused a spotlight on American survey and intelligence operations in the
South China Sea as a flash point in the larger dispute between the United States and
China over the balance of coastal-state and user-state rights in the EEZ. The statements
of the Chinese government in the aftermath of each of these events, claiming that such
U.S. naval operations were illegal and threatening to China, demonstrate the sharp differences of perspective over what traditional military activities constitute legitimate uses
of those waters.
Although the conflict is generally expressed by both Americans and Chinese in terms of
international law, the friction is not fundamentally about correct legal interpretation of
international law or of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Rather, the legal conflict reflects a larger clash between China’s objective of increasing its control over its near seas and the American interest in maintaining the freedoms of navigation on which the stability and security of the global maritime
commons rely. The language of international law is nonetheless important, because it is
the primary field of battle chosen by the parties to contest their claims.
For this perhaps we should all be grateful, since the ongoing friction and occasional
incidents, tense as they are, are managed and contained by this resort to law rather than
to force. It is important to observe that despite tension in military-to-military relations,
the overall bilateral relationship remains one of productive strategic engagement, even if
strategic cooperation is not entirely achieved. Thus, the dispute about U.S. military operations in China’s near seas has not hampered overall bilateral economic, commercial,
diplomatic, or even military cooperation (antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and
United Nations peacekeeping stand as ongoing examples). This should provide all parties reason for optimism that the friction can continue to be managed without escalation
into larger conflict. That said, the friction remains tactically dangerous. One person—
Chinese pilot Wang Wei, in the EP-3 incident—has already died, and it behooves all
concerned to develop deeper understandings of the nature and sources of conflict so
that, where possible, incidents can be avoided until a new modus vivendi for regional
security can be achieved.
In that regard, the workshop highlighted three fundamental areas of contention between
the United States and China concerning foreign military activities in East Asian seas. The
first relates to China’s rather ambiguously based assertion of jurisdiction over almost all
the waters of the South China Sea, as expressed in the “U-shaped line,” sometimes also
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referred to as the “nine-dashed line” or “Cow’s Tongue” (see figure 1). The second area of
contention touches the American “third rail” of freedom of naval navigation for military
purposes. China’s claim that the balance of coastal-state jurisdiction and international
freedoms for military activities in the EEZ favors the coastal state’s right to limit foreign
military activities presents, as the American authors in this volume describe, an unacceptable narrowing of traditional navigational freedoms. These divergent perspectives
formed the core of discussions at the workshop and are the basis for the majority of
chapters in this volume. The third area of serious debate was the sincerity of the United
States in its desire to develop a more cooperative maritime relationship with China.
While many American security experts accept cooperation almost as an article of faith,
the Chinese participants were agnostic on this point.

The U-Shaped Line
As Peng Guangqian’s chapter points out, the Chinese have long viewed the Bo Hai Gulf,
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—the so-called near seas—as
regions of geostrategic interest and parts of a great defensive perimeter established on
land and at sea to protect China’s major population and economic centers along the
coasts and major rivers. Indeed, in the 1930s China’s Nationalist government formed
the Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee to address concerns about foreign
encroachment on Chinese territories, including the foreign forces that occupied islands
in the South China Sea. The committee reported in 1935 that in the South China Sea
China’s southernmost territorial feature is the James Bank, which sits about fifty nautical
miles off the north coast of Borneo, and that China’s maritime boundary should therefore extend south to approximately four degrees north latitude. By 1947, the government
of the Republic of China had begun to publish maps with a U-shaped dashed line in
the South China Sea to delineate its maritime boundaries.3 The Chinese government
repeated this cartographic feature after the Communist Party came to power in 1949,
and today it remains on maps published in China and Taiwan. However, no Chinese
government has ever specified the nature of the claim over the expanse of water and the
numerous islands, shoals, rocks, and islets contained within the nine dashes of the Ushaped line. Chinese participants at the workshop explained that among Chinese scholars and officials there are four dominant schools of thought as to the line’s meaning,
none of which is especially favored by the government. However, like layers of a cake,
each perspective appears intended to build upon and strengthen the others. These four
schools fall roughly into groups claiming, respectively, that the line denotes sovereignty
interests, historical rights, jurisdictional rights, or security interests.
A review of relevant Chinese literature reveals the broad outline of the argument made
by the sovereignty camp. One group of senior Chinese defense analysts, for instance,
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Figure 1. The U-shaped line formed by the nine dashes reflects China’s claim over the waters and
islands of the South China Sea. Three types of legal disputes arise from the claim: sovereignty
disputes related to the island features, disputes over resource jurisdiction in the surrounding
waters, and disputes over the extent of coastal-state authority to prohibit foreign military
activities. The latter dispute led to the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2009 Impeccable incident, each
of which occurred in China’s EEZ, seventy-five to eighty miles southeast of Hainan Island. (United
Nations, www.un.org)
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describes Chinese offshore interests as “the area extending out from the Chinese mainland coastline between 200 nautical miles (to the east) and 1600 nautical miles (to the
south),” or roughly to the latitude claimed in the 1935 report. They consider these “sea
domains under Chinese jurisdiction . . . [as] the overlaying area of China’s national
sovereignty.”4 Additionally, the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone specifically claims sovereignty over each of the island
groups in the South China Sea—the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), Paracel Islands (Xisha),
Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha). Those who assert that
the line denotes a claim of sovereignty seem to suggest that since these islands groups are
claimed as sovereign, the U-shaped line that surrounds them also defines some form of
sovereignty, perhaps similar to a territorial or archipelagic sea.
The second group views the line as a claim of “historical waters” over which the government has a jurisdictional mandate based on China’s long-standing historical presence in
and power over the sea.5 Reference to China’s historical rights can be found in Chinese
domestic law. The 1998 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, for instance, states that legal developments “shall
not affect the historical rights that the People’s Republic of China enjoys.” More recently,
Chinese officials have asserted “administrative rights” that stem from these claimed
historical rights over the South China Sea. In furtherance of the right to administer
these waters, for instance, on 26 December 2009 the Standing Committee of China’s
National People’s Congress approved the Law on Island Protection. The legislation assigns to various agencies of the Chinese government broad jurisdictional authority over
all Chinese-claimed offshore islands, including enhanced administrative oversight for
uninhabited islands, for the purpose of strengthening ecosystem protection, controlling
use of natural resources, and promoting sustainable development. This law could be the
basis for increased activity noted since 1 April 2010 in the South China Sea by the vessels
of China’s Maritime Surveillance Service, Fisheries Service, Coast Guard, and others.
The third Chinese view is that the U-shaped line reflects an assertion of sovereignty over
all the islands, rocks, sandbars, coral heads, and other land features the line encompasses
and accordingly claims whatever associated jurisdiction that international law of the sea
allows to a coastal state based on its sovereignty over these small bits of land. Indeed,
China’s 1992 and 1998 laws claim sovereignty over the South China Sea’s island groups
and then claim a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf emanating from all of its coastlines. Thus, in combination, these two Chinese laws assert jurisdictional control over nearly the entire South China Sea area within the U-shaped line.
The fourth perspective is that the U-shaped line reflects China’s long-standing maritime
security interests in the South China Sea and that these security interests should have
protection under international law. This perspective is reflected in Xue Guifang’s chapter
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in her discussion of the differences of perspective on maritime issues between developing and developed states. Developing states, she suggests, “appreciate the importance
of the ocean to their national security” and therefore seek stricter control over foreign
military activities off their shores. Yu Zhirong’s chapter also reflects a security-based
legal perspective when it raises the issue of the proper interpretation of the “peaceful
purposes” clauses in UNCLOS. Yu asserts that these clauses were meant to do more than
simply reflect the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations and implies that
intelligence gathering in the EEZ is a nonpeaceful activity. He states that “if a military
survey activity is not undertaken for a peaceful purpose it . . . can be completely prohibited.” An example of this perspective can also be found in Chinese literature that asserts,
“The Navy is just one of the means of protecting our maritime rights and interests . . .
the primary means should be to rely on the law, on international law, and internal legislation.” To enforce these laws and China’s sovereign interests at sea, “in recent years we
have started to carry out periodic patrols to safeguard our rights in the East and South
China Seas.”6 In this sense, the Chinese appear to see international and domestic law
as means of establishing Chinese sovereign control over the near seas in support of the
maritime security buffer discussed in Peng’s chapter.

Exclusive Economic Zone
The second major aspect of the maritime friction between the United States and China
in East Asia stems from the divergent perspectives on the proper balance of rights and
interests in the EEZ between coastal states and user states. This divergence lies at the
heart of the Impeccable incident and the many similar, less publicized incidents that have
threatened East Asian maritime stability.
The EEZ was negotiated as a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of
coastal states in managing and protecting ocean resources and in ensuring high-seas
freedoms of navigation and overflight, including for military purposes. In the exclusive
economic zone the coastal state was granted sovereign rights to resources and given
jurisdiction over several activities, including “marine scientific research.” Perhaps to
bring together a wide variety of negotiating positions, which are well described by Wu
Jilu in his chapter, the definition of just what constitutes marine scientific research was
left unspecified, leaving plenty of room for future legal maneuvering. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the extent of this particular jurisdictional grant to coastal states has formed
the narrative of the legal and operational contest between the United States and China
concerning American naval activities in China’s EEZ. It is also on this specific point that
Chinese participants at the workshop chose to focus their papers.
In his chapter, Wu Jilu traces the history of oceanographic research as a scientific discipline, reviews the negotiation positions of various states in the lead-up to the final draft
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of UNCLOS, and analyzes the text of the convention itself in order to support his argument that the proper understanding of the jurisdictional grant of authority to coastal
states to regulate “marine scientific research” is much broader than mere regulatory
power over resource-related research. Wu concludes that coastal states have regulatory
power over all research in the EEZ, including hydrographic and military surveys. Xue’s
chapter picks up this point where Wu leaves it off, describing in detail the Chinese laws
and regulations that require all “foreign organizations or individuals [to] obtain approval from the competent authorities of the People’s Republic of China for carrying out
marine scientific research in its exclusive economic zone.” Yu’s chapter acknowledges that
such laws cannot be directly enforced against American naval vessels, including survey
vessels, because of their sovereign immune status. But he suggests that the introduction
of sound into the water by survey vessels can be considered a form of pollution and that
the burden of proof is on the United States to demonstrate that such activities are not
harmful. “Responsibility investigations,” as Yu calls them, could be conducted by coastal
states to show “responsibility” for damage, which he asserts is a different concept from
immunity “and cannot be conflated” with it.
Other Chinese sources take a similarly dim view of the legal authority for foreign naval
activities in the waters of their near seas. In a fashion similar to Yu’s argument in his
chapter that the UNCLOS grant of freedom of navigation through the EEZ does not
equate to the freedom to perform military operations, some leading Chinese scholars
assert that in the exclusive economic zone, freedoms of navigation and overflight “do
not include the freedom to conduct military and reconnaissance activities in the [waters
or their] superjacent airspace [since such activities] can be considered a use of force or
a threat to use force against the State.”7 There have even been recent press reports that
China is considering domestic legislation that would purport to make illegal all foreign
surveillance and reconnaissance flights above its exclusive economic zone.8
American representatives to the workshop viewed the Chinese legal perspectives as “misplaced” and without foundation in international law, as Raul Pedrozo’s chapter states. As
a group, the Americans took a broader approach to military freedoms of navigation in
and above the EEZ and prepared chapters explaining the lawfulness of U.S. hydrographic
surveys, military surveys, and aerial reconnaissance and demonstrating the U.S. Navy’s
compliance with environmental standards.
Pedrozo’s chapter makes the case that the EEZ “was established for the sole purpose of
giving coastal states greater control over the resources adjacent to their coasts out to 200
nautical miles.” Accordingly, he concludes, legal protections for “coastal-state security
interests . . . simply do not exist in the EEZ.” Pedrozo analyzes the balance of rights and
interests expressed in the EEZ provisions of UNCLOS and concludes that any military
activity that is lawful on the high seas—including military surveys and surveillance
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activities—is lawful in the EEZ without the coastal state’s consent. Andrew Williams’s
chapter extends the discussion of the freedoms of navigation from the waters of the EEZ
to the airspace above it. Williams reviews the UNCLOS EEZ provisions in light of the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international law and
concludes that “the freedom of overflight is one of the important traditional uses of the
high seas . . . [that] UNCLOS preserves . . . in the EEZ for all aircraft, including military
aircraft.” James Kraska’s chapter makes the case that a coastal state’s enforcement authority for environmental regulations is quite limited and in any case may not be applied
against warships, since such vessels enjoy “comprehensive immunity” under UNCLOS.
Additionally, Kraska points out that the issue raised by Yu of the potential for environmental harm caused by sonar was thoroughly litigated in American courts, which found
that in forty years of use “there was no documented episode of harm to marine mammals under American jurisdiction caused by the use of sonar.”
Pedrozo’s and Yu’s chapters do contain one important point of convergence: both deprecate the use of the term “international waters” to describe the EEZ. Pedrozo recommends against its use because it is easily misunderstood by coastal states as a rejection of
their rights and interests in the zone. From Yu’s perspective the term does indeed imply a
rejection of the coastal state’s interests and jurisdiction in the EEZ, or at least an attempt
to “evade the concept of the EEZ . . . and deny the coastal countries’ rights.” Yu criticizes
as “not persuasive” senior American officials who use it to justify U.S. naval activities.

U.S. Maritime Strategy
That the Chinese doubt American naval intentions, especially in East Asian waters,
was a third area of discussion at the workshop. It is a perception that presents a challenge for enhanced bilateral cooperation in the maritime domain as envisioned by the
“Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations, addressed the Seventeenth
International Seapower Symposium in 2005 and outlined a new maritime strategy for a
new era. The previous naval strategy had been crafted during the Cold War with a particular adversary in mind. Admiral Mullen charged those who would go on to develop
the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” to create for American maritime
power a long-term vision that had no adversary as its focus but instead would serve as an
organizing concept to provide maritime order through international partnerships and
cooperation, deter regional conflict, and secure the seas as a highway for the increasingly
globalized economy.9
Admiral Mullen saw that there would be a continuing need to support friends and allies
and reassure them that American military power would be there if they were threatened
or attacked by another member of the international community. However, he also saw
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that whereas the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was for the United States
perhaps the defining moment of the twentieth century, the twenty-first may be defined
most distinctly by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September
11, 2001. Accordingly, Admiral Mullen charged maritime strategists to consider how
best to bring stability and order to the maritime domain in a world perturbed by both
traditional and nontraditional threats. What followed was a strategy that rests upon five
propositions: that the security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are
increasingly coupled to those of other nations; that our national interests are best served
by fostering a peaceful global system comprising interdependent networks of trade,
finance, information, law, people, and governance; that no one nation has the resources
required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain, for
which reason partnerships of common interest must be formed to counter emerging
threats; that preventing wars is as important as winning wars; and that maritime force
can be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests.
The strategy takes these propositions and articulates two organizing strategic concepts. The first is that defense against nontraditional threats requires “persistent global
presence.” The strategic imperative driving the requirement for globally distributed
maritime forces is not primarily threatening activity by other states but disruptive action by nonstate, or nontraditional, threats. Globally distributed forces are conceived as
“contribut[ing] to homeland defense in depth [by] identifying and neutralizing threats
as far from our shores as possible.” Additionally, they should foster and sustain cooperative relationships with international maritime partners and prevent or contain local
disruptions before they impact the global system. However, global dispersal of forces
relies on legitimate access to all nonsovereign oceanic zones for the purpose of bringing constabulary maritime power to bear. Thus, the stark contrast between Chinese and
American descriptions in this volume of the legitimacy of naval operations in the EEZ
presents a serious challenge to the realization of the strategy’s cooperative security
objectives.
Chinese workshop participants especially challenged the strategy’s second set of organizing principles, which focus on traditional interstate conflict. The strategy requires
American maritime power to be able to limit regional conflict with forward-deployed,
decisive maritime power. It requires maintenance of America’s comparative seapower
advantage in order to deter major-power war and, in time of war, to be prepared to win
by imposing local sea control, overcoming challenges to access and force entry, and projecting and sustaining power ashore. Chinese participants saw in this language a return
to “Cold War thinking,” as General Peng puts it in his chapter. They saw it as treating
China as an unnamed adversary, especially in light of America’s continuing commitment
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to Taiwanese security and to freedom of navigation for surveys and intelligence gathering in the South China Sea.10

The Implications
The contributions to this volume make clear that the United States and China have
fundamentally different views of coastal-state authority in the EEZ and that these views
flow from strategic mistrust and from divergent conceptions of law of the sea and how
law should serve the interests of order on the oceans. Recent history shows that these
divergences create friction at sea, sometimes with serious consequences. China’s broad
claims of jurisdictional protection for security interests in the EEZ are seen by the
United States as tantamount to claims of sovereignty similar to that which a coastal state
enjoys in the territorial sea. Indeed, in the eyes of American participants, the formula
for EEZ passage suggested by Yu Zhirong in his chapter—that the freedom of navigation
enjoyed by other states is one of mere navigation and not of operation—reflects more
the innocent-passage regime applicable to territorial seas than the freedoms associated
with operations on the high seas. As the American authors articulate, such extension of
coastal-state authority is an unacceptable encroachment on a critical national interest—
a stable maritime order supported by broad freedoms of navigation for naval purposes.
Hoping to point toward a more productive future maritime relationship, Alan Wachman
concludes the volume with an essay that sees the friction over military activities in the
EEZ as reflective of the current state of “mutual insecurity and mistrust” and as a symptom of “the ambition each has of exercising [international] leadership.” In this regard,
Wachman believes, “both the United States and the PRC understand that there is a single
international system, but both . . . are struggling to ensure that it reflects values they each
prefer.” He is even willing to consider that “the controversy concerning UNCLOS may be
seen as one battle in the Sino-U.S. war for moral primacy and influence over global institutions.” However, he urges each side to attempt to view the dispute through the eyes of
the other to see more easily the ways in which its policies arouse feelings of insecurity. A
bilateral compromise is possible, he suggests, only if each side is willing to exercise selfrestraint by choosing not to exercise what it may continue to maintain are its rights. The
essential ingredient is political will.
Alternatively, Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff, suggested in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2009 that a
new international consensus is required—neither a Washington nor a Beijing consensus
per se but a mutual consensus based on “fair and rational mutual relation norms [that]
. . . give proper consideration to each other’s . . . vital and significant security interests.”11
Perhaps General Ma is correct. It is worth observing, however, that China’s regional
objectives and activities exist in tension with its own increasing global interests. As a
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rapidly rising economic power, China is one of the primary beneficiaries of the stable
global system brought about by the American concept of maritime order, which in turn
is provided in significant part through the cooperative efforts of naval powers large and
small and is based on a common set of rules and norms guiding the actions of all at sea.
Although Chinese commentators object to the application of these rules and norms
off China’s coasts, the Chinese have yet to articulate how their approach to achieving
regional objectives can be reconciled with the imperatives of managing the global maritime system. Such responsibility attends the leadership to which China aspires—and
clearly, as the Sino-American “dialogue” from the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrates, China desires to exercise a leading regional role. As Ma Xiaotian put it, “Maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China’s interest, and it is also China’s
responsibility.”12 Ma also made clear that the mistrust that characterizes the military
relationship between China and the United States has at its core sixty years of American
support for Taiwan. American policies toward Taiwan are not the topic of this volume,
but in any case they will almost certainly remain a constant in the evolving formula of
Sino-American relations. Nonetheless, if cooperation remains a serious American objective, it falls to the United States, which possesses the only global navy, to exercise serious
leadership by devising ways—political, legal, and operational—to foster in China, with
the world’s fastest-growing navy, a sufficient sense of security on its own shores to alter
the tense dynamics of our relationship. If naval cooperation is truly in the interest of
the United States, it is not enough, as Wachman points out, for Americans to continue
simply to stand on principle and refuse to accommodate China’s concerns in some
way. That course of action will only increase tension and undermine the long-sought
cooperation. Critics may counter that the Chinese do not actually want to cooperate
and are simply keeping us engaged long enough to grow their naval power to the point
where they can dictate events in the western Pacific without reference to the U.S. Navy.
If so, American leaders owe it to future generations to seek the combination of regional
strength and patient engagement that will dissuade the Chinese from this course. War
would be a devastating alternative.
Ideally, the wisdom and strategic foresight with which American naval leaders preserved
order in the Pacific and secured American regional interests for more than sixty-five
years will be available to this generation of leaders as they seek peaceful adjustments to
the Asian security dynamics in response to China’s maritime rise. It is to be hoped too
that Chinese naval leaders will find the same wisdom and will choose to accept the invitation to cooperate with the United States while the opportunity remains open to them.
While this volume cannot even begin to sketch the outlines of a new security paradigm
for the Pacific region, its modest ambition is to help each side see more clearly the nature
of the existing friction. In seeing the nature and source of friction more clearly—even
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through the lenses of the other’s eyes—perhaps wise minds on both sides will be able to
divine cooperative paths to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region for generations
to come.
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China’s Maritime Rights and Interests
Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian, People’s Liberation Army (Ret.)

C

hina is a country with not only vast land territory but also a broad sea area. On the
east side of mainland China and Taiwan Island, China owns five big sea areas from
north to south, respectively named the Bo Hai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South
China Sea, and the Pacific area east of Taiwan. China’s coastline begins at the mouth
of the Yalu River in the north and runs to the mouth of the Beilun River in Guangxi
Autonomous Region in the south, a distance of approximately 18,400 kilometers (about
11,400 miles). The country has more than 6,500 offshore islands of at least five hundred
square kilometers (approximately two hundred square miles), and the total area of the
island territories is 75,400 square kilometers (29,100 square miles). The main islands
among them include Taiwan Island, the Penghus, the Diaoyu Islands, Hainan Island, the
South China Sea Islands, Guangdong’s Nan’ao Island, Fujian’s Pingtan Island, Zhejiang’s
Zhoushan Islands, Shandong’s Long Island, and Liaoning’s Changxing Island.

China’s “Blue Colored” Land
According to the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), China’s “sea territory” includes its territorial waters, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf, which in total are approximately one-third the size of China’s land territory. China’s sea territory, or “blue-colored
land,” is an important part of its entire national territory. Although it is different from
land territory, sea territory is important strategic space for the country in the same way
as land territory. It is the second cradle of the nation, with several strategic values.
First, China’s sea area is the initial strategic barrier for homeland security. The coastal
area was the front line of growth during China’s economic development and the development of Chinese civil society. China’s most developed regions are along the coastline:
the Bo Hai Sea economic zone, which contains big cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, and
Tangshan; the Yangtze River triangle economic zone; the Zhu River triangle economic
zone; the area of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu; and Hong Kong and Macao. The
coastal area also possesses the largest population of any of the country’s regions, the
highest concentration of high-technology industries, and the most modernized culture.
If coastal defense were to fall into danger, China’s politically and economically important
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central regions would be exposed to external threats. In the context of modern warfare,
military skills such as long-range precision strike develop gradually, which makes the
coastal sea area more and more meaningful for homeland defense as a region providing
strategic depth and precious early-warning time. In short, the coastal area is the gateway
for China’s entire national security.
In Chinese modern history, most invasions from powers exterior to China came from
the sea. During China’s history prior to 1949, China suffered 470 invasions from the sea,
including seventy large-scale invasions, such as those during the Opium Wars. From
Dagushan on Liaodong Peninsula to the port of Sanya on Hainan Island, nearly all of
China’s major harbors, ports, and islands suffered external invasions. Taiwan, Penghu,
Hong Kong, Jiulong, Macao, Lüshun, Dalian, Weihaiwei, Jiaozhou Bay, and Guangzhou
Bay were all forcibly ceded or “rented,” becoming springboards and bridgeheads for
exterior powers to attack China’s inland regions. At the same time, the invaders grabbed
coastal trading and navigation rights from China. Therefore, an important conclusion to
be drawn from both history and reality is that China’s coastal area is the linchpin of its
national security.
Second, China’s sea area is important as a channel and strategic pivot for the country
to move outward. The Bo Hai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea are
connected to each other and possess enormous geostrategic value. While China’s Bo Hai
Sea is an inland sea, the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea straddle the key
north–south routes along the marginal seas of the westernmost portions of the North
Pacific Ocean. These three seas provide openings to the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, the
Sea of Japan, and the Philippine Sea. China’s southern coastal areas are accessed through
the North Korea Channel in the northeast, the Bashi and the Ryukyu Islands straits in
the east, and the straits of Malacca and Sunda in the south. These seas are therefore
significant pivots for maritime transportation, connecting Northeast Asia with Southeast
Asia and the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean, and linking Europe, Asia, Africa, and
Oceania.
The vast sea territory to the east of Taiwan Island is the only sea area over which China
claims sovereignty and economic rights in the Pacific. These waters have always been
economically important trading routes. As early as China’s Xi Han dynasty more than
two thousand years ago, the South China Sea was “the maritime Silk Road,” the golden
waterway connecting East and West.
When China undertook its “open door” policy beginning in the late 1970s, it began
striding toward the outside world and building closer relations with other countries.
The Chinese economy is now increasingly dependent on international trade. As a result
of the connectivity of the world’s oceans and the low cost of seagoing freight, most of
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China’s economic trade with other countries is conducted by sea carriage, including the
import of energy and other strategic resources. China’s seagoing freight represents 40
percent of its domestic shipment of goods and 95 percent of its foreign trade. China’s
offshore regions have therefore become a bridge between China and the world and the
lifeline of China’s external communication, transportation, and trade.
Third, China’s sea area is a treasure trove of the strategic resources necessary for the
country’s survival and development. It is one of the largest and richest sea areas in the
world, full of biological resources, energy resources, mineral resources, and seawater
resources. Indeed, the ocean provides China’s most important source of protein for human consumption. China’s maritime regions contain two billion acres of sea area with a
depth of thirty meters or less, amounting to a billion acres of Chinese “farmland.” More
important, the income from one Chinese acre of high-production seawater is equal to
that from the production of ten acres of Chinese farmland. China’s edible sea salt and
industrial sea salt production provide 80 percent of the total national salt output, the
highest percentage of any country in the world. Additionally, Chinese sea areas are a
primary source of hydrocarbons in the Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that the petroleum
reserves under traditional Chinese coastal territories in the South China Sea may reach
twenty or thirty billion tons. Likewise, the natural gas reserves reach several trillion cubic
meters in one of the four biggest maritime oil and gas fields in the world, sometimes
called a “second Persian Gulf.” Recently, the world’s biggest field of natural gas hydrates
(flammable ice) was discovered under the South China Sea, the explored reserve of
which amounts to about half of China’s total oil and gas resources.
In addition, rich manganese nodule deposits, cobalt, and other mineral resources
have been found in China’s sea areas, which also contain manganese, nickel, and
molybdenum—essential raw materials for modern aerospace industrial uses. In recent
times, China’s resource consumption has kept growing while land resources have been
simultaneously shrinking, making marine resources incontrovertibly crucial to China’s
future development. Finally, although China possesses a large sea area, its average length
of coastline per unit of land area ranks only ninety-fourth in the world. The ratio of
China’s sea area to land area is less than one-third of the world’s average, and China’s
average sea area per person is one-tenth of the world’s median level. As such, China is
also a country that possesses a small sea area. Therefore, every inch of “blue-colored
territory” is extremely precious to China.

From Inshore Defense to Offshore Defense
On 23 April 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Yangtze River and
liberated Nanjing. From that point on, the PLA began to build a people’s navy, drawing
China out of the dilemma of “no defense of the sea.” From the 1950s to the 1970s, China
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suffered from containment and was blockaded by exterior powers. Its power on the sea
was weak, and the primary mission of China’s navy was to prepare for combat defense
of inshore waters. Since the 1980s, the Chinese navy has gradually completed a strategic
transition to offshore defense, along with the growth of China’s maritime interests and
naval operational capability. In the twenty-first century, in order to combat nontraditional maritime security threats and to meet the challenge of local war in the information age, the Chinese navy, by adhering to the nation’s offshore defensive strategy, has
strived to develop the capability for cooperating on the open sea, improving her naval
transformation, and gradually developing a modernized naval force with multiarms
capability and combat skills for both nuclear and conventional combat operations. The
Chinese navy’s primary missions are to
•• Defend China’s homeland territory and the national security of China’s maritime
regions by resisting external invasions from the sea
•• Protect China’s territorial integrity and unity and prevent any separatist forces from
splitting the national territory
•• Protect the sovereignty of national maritime territories and guarantee the security of
national waters and their respective islands from invasion
•• Protect national maritime interests and rights and guarantee the security of marine
resources in China’s lawful exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
•• Defend the security and smooth operation of China’s naval sea-lanes, maritime transportation lanes, and maritime trade lanes and guarantee China’s main artery and
lifeline from outward threats
•• Maintain the stability of Chinese sea areas from piracy, maritime smuggling, illegal
narcotics trafficking, transnational crime, and maritime terrorism
•• Provide support for the fair and peaceful resolution of maritime disputes according
to international law
•• Participate in peacekeeping operations, based on United Nations resolutions and
under a UN framework
•• Conduct international maritime security discussions and cooperate in the area of
nontraditional security in order to improve mutual understanding and trust between
the navies of all countries.
Although China has made considerable progress in its naval modernization over the
past several years, the Chinese navy is still a regional naval force, maintaining an activedefense military strategy, taking offshore defense as its substantive characteristic. Three
main points clarify this strategy. First, the nature of China’s naval force has always been
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defensive, and the construction of China’s new naval forces will not surpass, in either
scale or operations, China’s self-defense needs. China will not threaten other countries’
legitimate rights and interests or undertake any invasion or expansion of territory from
the sea. Second, China’s naval forces will undertake operations in China’s offshore waters
as their main area in which to carry out national defense activities. Since the focus of
China’s marine interests is offshore waters, the structure and capabilities of China’s naval
forces will reflect this offshore approach. Nevertheless, China needs to develop certain
open-sea mobility capabilities and to develop cooperation with others, but it will not
patrol around the world. It is not necessary for China to do so, nor is China willing to
compete, or capable of competing, with the United States on the open seas. Third, China
is active and firm in defending its legitimate rights and interests. This is the most basic
right and responsibility of a sovereign state. Given the lessons of history, including being
invaded and divided, China is especially sensitive and firm on issues of sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Chinese government and the Chinese people will not compromise any vital interests related to national sovereignty and security.

The Necessity of Building Mutual Trust between Chinese and American
Maritime Forces
Both China and the United States are big powers in the world. One is the biggest
developing nation, while the other is the biggest developed country. Under the context
of globalization in the post–Cold War era, the interests between China and the United
States keep interpenetrating and merging with growing interdependency. China and
the United States must deal with more and more mutual security threats and security
demands. Both countries are undertaking more responsibility for maintaining regional
stability and world peace, while promoting humanity’s civilization and progress. In dealing with issues such as climate change, the international financial crisis, nonproliferation, the security of international waterways, and antiterrorism, China and the United
States must undertake active, close, and comprehensive security cooperation, including
maritime security cooperation. The development of Chinese maritime forces increases
the possibilities for the United States and China to undertake maritime security cooperation and undertake together the responsibility of international security.
The development of Chinese maritime forces is positive for American maritime interests, not a negative or even a zero-sum game. As Hillary Clinton, U.S. secretary of state,
has stated, “Both sides will make contributions to each other’s development and benefit
from it.” Nevertheless, Sino-U.S. maritime relations are far behind other, more developed aspects of the bilateral relationship—not only behind both parties’ security needs
but behind the development of Sino-U.S. relations in other areas. In a word, they are the
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“short board” in bilateral relations.1 The recent friction in China’s exclusive economic
zone in the South China Sea highlighted this point.
Three problems have to be solved to change this abnormal situation. First, the two
countries need to get past Cold War thinking. Our world is composed of five continents
and four oceans, so U.S. Navy vessels have enough space for sailing. However, it is hard
to understand why American surveillance ships showed up off China’s shores, thousands
of miles from home. The Cold War ended more than twenty years ago, so Cold War
concepts are already outdated. If the United States, in its strategic thinking, still regards
China as the substitute of the former Soviet Union or a potential strategic adversary to
defend against, bilateral military relations will be hard to improve, and bilateral friction
will continue.2
Second, the two countries need to respect and take into account each other’s key national security interests. Although the legal status of the exclusive economic zone is not
exactly the same as territorial waters under international law, the exclusive economic
zone is absolutely not equivalent to the high seas; rather, it is a special area governed by
the coastal state. At the third summit on the law of the sea, a Canadian representative
pointed out that “the exclusive economic zone is not only about the issue of resources,
but also relates to the coastal state’s marine environment and the authority to safeguard
it.” Both the United Nations and the law of the sea share the same mission: peace.
The American surveillance ship USNS Impeccable did not operate on the high seas.
Even if it had, according to UNCLOS, “The high seas should be reserved for peaceful
purposes.”3 The American surveillance vessel did not conduct general oceanographic
research. Even if it had, according to UNCLOS articles 246 and 240, this kind of activity should only be undertaken for “peaceful purposes,” as “the primary principle,” and
consent should be granted by the coastal state six months in advance of the start of the
operations.
Respect for sovereignty and jurisdiction is a basic principle of international law. Although UNCLOS has no special article to define clearly the limits of military activities in
the exclusive economic zones of other countries, the basic legislative purpose and legislative spirit of UNCLOS is that operations may be undertaken “only for peaceful purposes.” Undoubtedly, compared with civilian oceanographic research, all military activities
in the exclusive economic zone of another country should be undertaken with the highest respect for the coastal state’s jurisdiction. Any military activity that is harmful to the
coastal state’s sovereignty or security in the exclusive economic zone is illegal and cannot
be tolerated. To do otherwise would be to mock and blaspheme international law.
It is stated in UNCLOS that other states in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal
state have freedoms of navigation, overflight, and laying submarine cables and
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pipelines. However, the same provisions also specify that all states, in the exercise of these
freedoms, “shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of [the] Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are
not incompatible” with other provisions related to the exclusive economic zone.4 When
a vessel navigates in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, its actions should
be “harmless,” undertaken in “good faith” and with “no abuse of rights.” If a military
surveillance ship conducts military intelligence-gathering activities in another state’s
exclusive economic zone, it is hard to explain this as friendly behavior that is “harmless”
and undertaken in “good faith.” Additionally, if the U.S. Navy does not plan to open its
door for other countries’ surveillance ships to conduct military intelligence-gathering
operations in the sea areas off Norfolk and Newport, why does not the United States
allow China the same?
Third, the two countries need to set rules for maritime activities and to undertake SinoAmerican confidence-building mechanisms. In order to avoid accidents on the sea, deal
effectively with any friction, and prevent escalation of emergencies, it is necessary to set
the rules for maritime activities and to establish Sino-American confidence-building
mechanisms as soon as possible.
These mechanisms should at a minimum include the following several points. First, the
United States and China should build a communication mechanism to provide advance
notification or prompt reporting of maritime activities in order to avoid any misjudgments. Second, the two countries should build a negotiation framework. We should
undertake dialogue and discussion about various issues on various levels regularly or
irregularly, in order to coordinate and resolve problems in military interactions. It is
more important to hold high-level strategic conversations regularly. Third, China and
the United States should build restraint mechanisms. Both countries should restrain
their own behavior, not pushing the envelope intentionally or against the interest of the
other party. Fourth, we should build cooperation mechanisms. The Chinese and U.S.
navies have many areas within the field of nontraditional security within which they can
cooperate, such as the exchange of information, maritime search and rescue, counterpiracy, and antiterrorism.
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Notes
1. Editor’s note: During the conference, General
Peng elaborated on this point by describing the
overall U.S.-Chinese relationship as a barrel filled
with water. Just as water in a barrel can rise only
to the level of its shortest board, so too is a more
cooperative overall U.S.-Chinese relationship
held back by the challenges in military relations
between the two countries.
2. Editor’s note: General Peng told a second story to
elaborate this point. He described a Chinese-style
house surrounded by a wall with few windows
and a gated entrance. A home owner who sees a

man peering in his window suspects him to be a
thief and treats him accordingly, but a man who
comes to the front gate and requests the home
owner to allow him to enter is treated as a friend,
welcomed in, and offered tea. The reference to
U.S. surveillance flights and survey operations
was quite clear.
3. United Nations, United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, effective
16 November 1994, art. 301.
4. Ibid., art. 58.
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Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection
in the Exclusive Economic Zone
U.S. Views
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T

he U.S. Navy Special Mission Program has twenty-five ships that conduct a variety
of missions in foreign exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas,
including oceanographic surveys, underwater surveillance, hydrographic surveys, missile
tracking, and acoustic surveys, to name but a few. All of these activities are conducted
consistently with international law, including the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS), and are not subject to coastal jurisdiction or control in the EEZ.1 The
special-mission ships (SMSs) are either U.S. government owned or operated and are
used only on noncommercial government service; they are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity from coastal-state interference.2 Most of the SMSs are unarmed vessels
(except small arms for self-defense) and are operated by civilian crews who work for
private companies under contract to the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC)—only
three are manned by MSC civil-service mariners. Technical work and communication
support are conducted by embarked military personnel and Department of Defense
civilian technicians.
China’s assertions that it can regulate SMS survey activities in the EEZ and that SMS
activities are equivalent to marine scientific research (MSR) and are therefore subject
to coastal-state jurisdiction are misplaced and have no foundation in international law,
including the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC, otherwise UNCLOS). Similarly, China’s
assertion that SMS activities are inconsistent with the “peaceful purposes” provisions of
the LOSC (i.e., articles 88, 141, and 301) is also not supported by state practice or the
plain language of the convention.

Coastal-State Rights and Jurisdiction in the EEZ
The EEZ was created by UNCLOS and was established for the sole purpose of giving
coastal states greater control over the resources adjacent to their coasts out to two hundred nautical miles. Article 56, which describes the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the
coastal state in the EEZ, does not, however, provide for residual coastal-state security
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interests in the EEZ. In fact, early efforts by a handful of developing nations, like China,
El Salvador, and Peru, to “territorialize” the EEZ in order to broaden coastal-state authority in the new zone to include residual competences and rights (such as security interests) in article 56 were rejected by the majority of the delegations at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).3 What the conference negotiators finally agreed on was articles 55, 56, 58, and 86, which accommodate the various
competing interests of coastal states and other states in the EEZ. Articles 55, 56, and 86
make clear that the EEZ is sui generis and that certain high-seas freedoms relating to
natural resources and MSR do not apply in the EEZ. However, articles 58 and 86 make
equally clear that all other high-seas freedoms (i.e., non–resource related) and other
internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms (e.g., military activities)
apply seaward of the territorial sea and may be exercised by all states in the EEZ without
coastal-state notice or consent.4 In this regard, it is also important to note that China
did not reserve its position on this issue at the time it ratified the convention in 1996. Of
the four statements China made at the time of ratification, only one—a requirement for
prior notice to or consent of the coastal state before warships can transit the territorial
sea in innocent passage—is related to military activities.5 China’s current efforts to use
article 59 to argue that it retains certain residual rights in the EEZ is simply an attempt
to resurrect the argument it made and lost at UNCLOS III regarding security interests
in the EEZ. China’s effort to include security interests in the bundle of rights retained by
the coastal state in the EEZ was rejected at UNCLOS III. Therefore, there is no conflict
with regard to coastal-state security interests to resolve under article 59—such interests
simply do not exist in the EEZ. Moreover, even if the mistaken assumption is accepted
that a coastal state retains residual security rights in the EEZ, since a “freedom” is a
broader species than a “right” under international law, the high-seas freedoms enjoyed
by the international community in the EEZ clearly trump any residual rights that coastal
states may possess in the EEZ.6
The fact that articles 58 and 86 retain much of the “international” character of, and
preserve most high-seas freedoms in, the EEZ should not be confused, however, as nonrecognition of the EEZ regime. This issue was thoroughly discussed during UNCLOS III,
as delegations struggled to define the “high seas” in article 86. By the fourth session, the
emphasis had shifted away from defining the “high seas” and attention focused instead
on ensuring that the regime of the high seas would apply in the EEZ to the extent it was
not incompatible with Part V.7 Discussions during the sixth session resulted in a text
emphasizing that the high seas constituted a separate maritime zone from the EEZ but
preserving certain user-state rights and high-seas freedoms in the EEZ.8 The end result
of this debate was article 86, the first sentence of which makes clear that the EEZ is a sui
generis zone that is not part of the high seas. However, the second sentence indicates
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that nothing in article 86 abridges the “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone in accordance with article 58.” In other words, any activity that is lawful
on the high seas, to include military oceanographic survey and surveillance activities,
can be conducted in the EEZ without coastal-state notice or consent, subject only to the
rights and jurisdiction conferred on the coastal state by Part V of the convention. So,
for example, the high-seas freedoms of fishing, constructing artificial islands and other
installations, and conducting MSR are all subject to coastal-state control in the EEZ.
However, all other customary international law rights, duties, and freedoms reflected in
Part VII—for example, navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
hydrographic surveys, military activities (such as surveillance and reconnaissance operations, oceanographic surveys, military exercises, use of weapons, flight operations, etc.),
immunity of warships and other noncommercial vessels, prohibition of slave trade,
repression of piracy, suppression of unauthorized broadcasting, suppression of narcotics
trafficking, approach and visit, rendering assistance, and hot pursuit—may lawfully be
conducted in the EEZ without coastal-state notice or consent.
The bottom line is that the final text of article 86 recognizes the existence of the new
regimes of the EEZ and archipelagic waters, which were previously considered highseas areas, while at the same time retaining the distinction that had previously existed
between the high seas, on one hand, and the territorial sea and internal waters on the
other.9 The term “sovereign rights” was deliberately chosen to make a clear distinction
between coastal-state rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ and coastal-state authority in
the territorial sea, where coastal states enjoy a much broader and more comprehensive
right of “sovereignty.”10 China has argued that the United States is reluctant to recognize
the existence of the EEZ and continues to refer to the area as “international waters.” Such
an argument is nonsense. The United States has itself claimed an EEZ consistent with
the provisions of UNCLOS since 1983.11 It is the largest EEZ in the world, encompassing
an area over 3.4 million square nautical miles.12 The United States, therefore, has nothing
to gain and everything to lose by denying the existence of the EEZ.
American officials should, however, take note that early efforts in 1972 and 1973 to make
a distinction between waters subject to coastal-state sovereignty (i.e., territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and internal waters) and the high seas by using the term “international
seas” to define ocean areas not subject to coastal-state sovereignty or jurisdiction were
rejected by UNCLOS III. Albeit well-intentioned, the U.S. tendency to use the term “international waters” to describe which navigational rights and freedoms apply in the EEZ
has been misunderstood by China and others to reflect American opposition to the existence of the EEZ. The rejection of this term in 1973 emphasizes the need for the United
States to refrain from using the term “international waters” when referring to legitimate
military activities in foreign EEZs, particularly when referring to U.S. military activities
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in China’s claimed EEZ. Continued use of the term “international waters” appears to be
an attempt by the United States to resurrect the 1970s discussions, clouds the current
debate on this issue, and allows China to divert attention from the real issues—its illegal
maritime claims and its unsafe and aggressive tactics when intercepting U.S. ships and
aircraft engaged in legal activities in and over China’s claimed EEZ.
Within the EEZ, article 56 provides that the coastal state has sovereign rights for the
purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources of the
zone and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of
the zone. The coastal state also has jurisdiction limited to the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations and structures, MSR, and the protection and preservation
of the marine environment.
Article 56 does not, however, provide for coastal jurisdiction over survey activities in
the EEZ. In fact, various provisions of UNCLOS discussed below distinguish between
research and survey activities. With regard to MSR, China correctly points out that it has
the authority to regulate MSR in the EEZ. Article 246 of the convention provides that
MSR in the EEZ and on the continental shelf “shall be conducted with the consent of the
coastal State.”13 However, article 246 further provides that the coastal state shall normally
grant its consent for MSR projects by other states in its EEZ or on its continental shelf.
Consistent with UNCLOS, article 9 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1998) provides that MSR
by any international organization, foreign organization, or individual in the EEZ or the
continental shelf of the PRC “must be subject to the approval of the competent authorities” of the PRC and must conform to the laws and regulations of the PRC.14 Specific
guidelines for submitting MSR requests for approval by Chinese authorities are contained in the Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific
Research.15 Most of these guidelines also appear to be consistent with UNCLOS Part
XIII, which contains, inter alia, detailed provisions on coastal-state jurisdiction over
MSR in the territorial sea, in the EEZ, and on the continental shelf.
In 2002 China adopted the Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of
China.16 Although the law is mostly concerned with terrestrial surveying and mapping,
article 2 provides that all surveying and mapping activities conducted in the domain
of the PRC “and other sea areas under the jurisdiction” of the PRC “shall comply with
this Law.” Article 7 requires foreign organizations and individuals that conduct surveying and mapping in the domain of the PRC “and other sea areas under the jurisdiction”
of the PRC to obtain the approval of the competent administrative department and
competent department of the armed forces. Failure to obtain prior approval can result in
a fine of up to 500,000 yuan and expulsion from the country.17 Surveying and mapping
are broadly defined in article 2 to include “surveying, collection and presentation of the

military activities in the eez

27

shape, size, spatial location and properties of the natural geographic factors or the manmade facilities on the surface, as well as the activities for processing and providing of the
obtained data, information and achievements.”
To the extent that this law purports to regulate hydrographic surveys and U.S. military
activities in the EEZ, to include military oceanographic surveys and surveillance activities, it is inconsistent with customary international law, state practice, and the plain
language of UNCLOS.

Categories of Marine Data Collection
China’s position with regard to coastal-state control over marine data collection in the
EEZ misses one important point—that marine data collection is much broader than just
MSR and includes all types of collection activities at sea, including hydrographic surveys
and military marine data collection (e.g., oceanographic surveys and surveillance activities by SMSs). The use of the term “marine scientific research” was deliberate, intended
to distinguish MSR from other types of marine data collection that are not resource
related, such as hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection.18 International law applies different rules to each of these activities, depending on where the activity
takes place.
UNCLOS article 56 grants coastal states jurisdiction over MSR in the EEZ, but hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection are not MSR and are therefore not
subject to coastal-state jurisdiction in the EEZ. In this regard, the Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, the office within the U.S. State
Department responsible for formulating and implementing American policy with regard
to the conduct of MSR in waters under American jurisdiction, excludes a number of
data-collection activities from the scope of MSR, including hydrographic surveys (for
enhancing the safety of navigation); military activities, including military marine data
collection; environmental monitoring and assessment of marine pollution pursuant to
Part XII of UNCLOS; the collection of marine meteorological data and other routine
ocean observations (including the ocean observation programs of the WMO-IOC
Joint Technical Commission on Oceanography and Marine Meteorology and the Argo
program); and activities related to submerged wrecks or objects of an archaeological and
historical nature.19 Advance consent of the United States to engage in data collection in
waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction is required only for MSR, and then only if any portion
of the MSR is conducted
•• Within the U.S. territorial seas; or
•• Within the U.S. EEZ and involves the study of marine mammals or endangered species; or
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•• Within the U.S. EEZ and requires taking commercial quantities of marine resources;
or
•• Within the U.S. EEZ and involves contact with the U.S. continental shelf.20
All other data-collection activities, including hydrographic surveys and military marine
data-collection activities, can be conducted in the U.S. EEZ without advance notice to or
consent of the United States.
UNCLOS does not define MSR or hydrographic surveys with a great deal of specificity.
However, MSR may be generally defined as “those activities undertaken in the ocean
and coastal waters to expand scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its
processes.”21 It includes physical oceanography, marine chemistry and biology, scientific
ocean drilling and coring, geological and geophysical research, and other activities with
scientific purposes. The data collected are normally shared freely with the public and the
scientific community.
The term hydrographic survey is generally defined as the “obtaining of information for
the making of navigational charts and safety of navigation.”22 It has been defined by the
United Nations as “the science of measuring and depicting those parameters necessary
to describe the precise nature and configuration of the sea-bed and coastal strip, its
geographical relationship to the land-mass, and the characteristics and dynamics of the
sea.”23 Hydrographic surveys involve collection of information about water depth, the
configuration and nature of the natural bottom, the directions and force of currents,
the heights and times of tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation. The data are
collected for the purpose of producing nautical charts and similar products to support
safety of navigation. Hydrographic surveys are, therefore, not the same as MSR, in that
they include the collection and analysis of different types of data and have at their core a
fundamentally different purpose.
Military marine data collection is also not MSR. It refers to marine data collected for
military, not scientific, purposes. The data collected can be either classified or unclassified and are normally not released to the public or the scientific community unless
they are unclassified and were collected on the high seas (i.e., beyond the two-hundrednautical-mile EEZ). Military marine data collection can involve oceanographic, marine
geological and geophysical, chemical, biological, or acoustic data.24
In short, the primary difference between MSR and military marine data collection and
hydrographic surveys is how the data are used once they are collected. Although the
means of data collection may be the same as or similar to that used in MSR, and though
it may be difficult for the coastal state to differentiate between MSR and other datacollection activities, the information obtained during military marine data collection
or a hydrographic survey is intended for use by the military or to promote safety of
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navigation, respectively. It may be that China believes the United States is providing data
collected by its SMSs to Japan to support and bolster the latter’s EEZ and continentalshelf claims in the East China Sea. Or China may believe that data collected in the Yellow
Sea are being shared with South Korea or that data collected in the South China Sea are
being shared with the other Spratly claimants to bolster their maritime and continentalshelf claims in the region. However, nothing could be farther from the truth. While some
of these data may have economic utility, even though they were not collected for that
purpose, military marine data collected by the U.S. armed forces in foreign EEZs are
used exclusively for military purposes and to promote safety of navigation and are not
shared with the general public. Based on these distinctions and the plain language of
UNCLOS, military marine data collection and hydrographic surveys remain high-seas
freedoms and may be conducted in foreign EEZs without coastal-state notice or consent,
consistent with article 58 of UNCLOS.

U.S. Military Marine Data Collection in the EEZ
Military marine data collection by SMSs may be divided into two basic categories—
surveys and surveillance. Both of these missions are lawful military activities that may be
conducted in the EEZ without coastal-state notice or consent.
Surveillance Activities
Five ocean-surveillance ships directly support the Navy by using both passive and active
low-frequency sonar arrays to detect and track submarines. Additionally, these ships
help provide locating data that promote the navigational safety of various undersea
platforms. China has argued that such activities pose a threat to its national security and
are inconsistent with the peaceful-purposes provisions of UNCLOS. China’s position is
not supported by state practice or a plain reading of the convention.
Intelligence collection is addressed in only one article of UNCLOS—article 19. Foreign
ships transiting the territorial sea in innocent passage may not engage in “any act aimed
at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.”
No similar restriction appears in Part V of the convention regarding the EEZ. Under
generally accepted principles of international law, any act that is not specifically prohibited in a treaty is permitted.25 Therefore, intelligence collection by SMSs in the EEZ
without coastal-state consent is implicitly permitted under article 58 of the convention.
With regard to China’s argument that the peaceful-purposes clauses of UNCLOS make
it unlawful for states to collect intelligence in and above a coastal state’s EEZ, article
301 of the convention provides that states shall refrain from “any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
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the United Nations.”26 Similar language can be found in article 2(4) of the UN Charter.27
The convention, however, makes a clear distinction between “threat or use of force”
and other military activities, such as intelligence collection. Article 19(2)(a) mirrors
the language of articles 39 and 301, providing that ships transiting the territorial sea in
innocent passage shall not engage in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.” However, because intelligence collection is not considered a “threat or
use of force,” drafters specifically enumerated additional military activities that would
be considered a violation of innocent passage in the territorial sea. Articles 19(2)(b)–(f)
reflect these additional restrictions. Article 19(2)(c), for instance, specifically restricts
ships transiting the territorial seas in innocent passage from engaging in “any act aimed
at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.”
Intelligence collection is therefore not covered by the peaceful-purposes provisions of
the convention. Rather, beyond the territorial sea it is a lawful, nonaggressive military
activity that is consistent with UNCLOS and the UN Charter. Intelligence collection can
therefore be conducted in the EEZ without coastal-state notice or consent.
State practice supports this conclusion.28 Since the end of World War II, surveillance and
reconnaissance operations (aerial, surface, and subsurface) beyond the territorial sea of
another nation have become a matter of routine. Today, many nations, including China,
engage in such activities on a routine basis. During the height of the Cold War, it was
not uncommon for U.S. and NATO ships departing port to be met by a Soviet surveillance ship (AGI) at the outer edge of the territorial sea. Such activities were acceptable
so long as the Soviet AGIs complied with their obligations under the 1972 International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the U.S.-USSR Prevention
of Incidents on and over the High Seas agreement (INCSEA).29 The United States and its
NATO allies responded to these activities with great tolerance. For example, in February 1974 a Soviet reconnaissance aircraft that was conducting a surveillance mission off
the coast of Alaska ran low on fuel and had to make an emergency landing at Gambell
Airfield in Alaska.30 The crew remained overnight and was provided space heaters and
food by the American personnel. The plane was refueled the next day and allowed to
depart without further incident. Similarly, in March 1994 a Russian surveillance aircraft
monitoring a NATO antisubmarine warfare exercise ran low on fuel and made an emergency landing at Thule Air Base in Greenland.31 Again, the crew was fed and the aircraft
was refueled and allowed to depart without further delay. In short, reconnaissance and
surveillance activities at sea and in the air beyond the twelve-mile limit are nothing new
and are well understood. What is new today is the aggressive, unprofessional action being taken by Chinese ships and aircraft conducting the intercepts.
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Chinese ships and aircraft, in particular, are increasingly operating in foreign EEZs
throughout the Asia-Pacific region as China continues to develop a blue-water naval
capability and expand its submarine fleet. As an example, in 2003, the Japanese government recorded six incursions into Japanese waters by Chinese naval vessels that
were surveying “subsea routes for Chinese submarines to enter the Pacific”; two of the
territorial-sea violations were by Chinese submarines near Kagoshima.32 The number
of Chinese incursions jumped to thirty-four in 2004.33 Similarly, Chinese research ships
have increased their operations in Japan’s EEZ;34 in addition, PLAN submarines are deploying farther from the Chinese coast to conduct survey and reconnaissance missions.35
Other examples of increased Chinese military incursions in foreign EEZs, including
survey and surveillance activities, include
•• On 12 November 2003, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Ming-class submarine was spotted by a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C twentyfive miles east of Kyūshū Island. The submarine transited the Osumi Strait between
Kyūshū and Tanega-Shima. Chinese officials indicated that the submarine had been
engaged in “routine maritime training” at the time.36
•• On 6 July 2004, a Chinese naval survey vessel was spotted within Japan’s EEZ by a
JMSDF P-3C. When asked to explain the presence of the ship in Japan’s EEZ, Chinese
officials indicated that the “ship was engaged in military activities, thus obviating the
need for [prior] notification” to the Japanese government.37
•• On 12 July 2004, a Japanese coast guard P-3C spotted a Chinese maritime research
vessel in Japan’s claimed EEZ south-southwest of Okinotori Island.38
•• On 13 July 2004, the Xiangyanghong (9), a Chinese government research vessel, was
spotted conducting survey operations within Japan’s EEZ by a Japanese coast guard
cutter.39
•• On 20 July 2004, the PLAN ship Dongce (226) was spotted taking soundings in Japan’s
EEZ.40
•• On 21 July 2004, the Xiangyanghong (9) was again spotted in the Japanese claimed
EEZ, southwest of Okinodaito Island, conducting oceanographic surveys and mapping the ocean floor.41
•• From 6 to 9 August 2004, the PLAN survey ship Nandiao (411) was spotted conducting operations in Japan’s EEZ.42
•• On 10 November 2004, a PLAN Han-class submarine spent two hours submerged in
Japanese territorial waters. Chinese officials indicated that the submarine was on a
training mission and had entered the Japanese territorial sea for “technical
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reasons.”43 The submarine is believed to have first deployed to waters near the U.S.
territory of Guam before transiting to Japan.44
•• On 26 October 2006, a Chinese Song submarine shadowed the USS Kitty Hawk (CV
63) and surfaced about five miles from the carrier. The Kitty Hawk battle group was
conducting routine exercises in the vicinity of Okinawa.45
•• In October 2008, two Chinese submarines were detected conducting underwater surveillance of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) off the coast of South Korea.46
•• On 11 June 2009, a Chinese submarine collided with the towed sonar array of USS
John S. McCain (DDG 56) off the Philippine coast approximately 144 nautical miles
from Subic Bay.47
China has argued that its military activities in the East China Sea have occurred in areas
that are in dispute with Japan and that Japan, therefore, cannot accuse China of encroaching on its EEZ, because the two countries have yet to delimit their EEZ boundaries.48 If that is true, however, the United States could also argue that it is not encroaching
on China’s EEZ in the East China Sea because the area is in dispute with Japan, or in
the South China Sea because of the overlapping claims by the five other Spratly Islands
claimants. A similar argument could be made in any EEZ area claimed by China using
its illegal straight baselines, none of which are recognized by the United States. If China
wishes to rely on this argument, it must be prepared to accept reciprocal arguments by
the United States and Japan in all of these contested waters.
Military Oceanographic Surveys
The Navy operates six multipurpose oceanographic survey ships that perform acoustic,
biological, physical, and geophysical surveys to enhance its information on the marine
environment. These ships use multibeam, wide-angle, precision sonar systems that allow them to chart broad areas of the ocean floor. A seventh oceanographic survey ship
collects in coastal regions around the world data that are used to improve technology in
undersea warfare, enemy ship detection, and charting of the world’s coastlines. These
vessels do not engage in MSR. Data collected by these ships are used exclusively by the
U.S. armed forces for military purposes.

Restrictions on Marine Data Collection
Various provisions of UNCLOS place restrictions on marine data collection. However,
these provisions also clearly distinguish between research activities, on the one hand,
and survey activities, on the other. Article 19(2)(j) provides that carrying out “research
or survey activities” is inconsistent with innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Similarly, article 40 provides that ships engaged in transit passage, “including marine

military activities in the eez

33

scientific research and hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authorization of the States bordering straits.” The same
restrictions apply to ships engaged in archipelagic sea-lanes passage (article 54) or ships
transiting archipelagic waters in innocent passage (article 52). Article 56, on the other
hand, grants coastal states jurisdiction in the EEZ only over MSR—survey activities are
not mentioned in article 56. Similarly, Part XIII of the convention applies only to MSR,
not to other “survey” activities.
Based on these provisions, it is clear that coastal-state consent is required for MSR and
survey activities in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, as well as for MSR and
survey activities in international straits and archipelagic sea-lanes. Coastal-state consent
is required for MSR in the EEZ. It is equally clear, however, that coastal-state consent is
not required for survey activities, including hydrographic and military oceanographic
surveys, in the EEZ. These activities remain high-seas freedoms that may be exercised
freely in the EEZ, without coastal-state interference, consistent with UNCLOS article 58.
China’s position on the legality of military activities in the EEZ, including oceanographic
surveys and surveillance activities, clearly represents the minority view. Of the 192 member states of the United Nations, only sixteen support China’s position—twenty-three,
if one counts the seven nations that claim territorial seas in excess of twelve nautical
miles.49 Of these twenty-three nations, despite the fact that American SMSs have charted
over three-fourths of the world’s coastlines, only China has operationally interfered
with U.S. military marine data-collection activities in the EEZ.50 State practice therefore
clearly supports the American position that military activities that are consistent with
the UN Charter may be conducted in the EEZ without prior notice to, or consent of, the
coastal state.

Conclusion
The EEZ encompasses nearly 38 percent of the world’s oceans, an expanse that twentyfive years ago was considered to be high seas. If the PRC argument that military activities
in general and military marine data collection in particular are prohibited in the EEZ
without coastal-state consent were to become generally accepted, SMSs would be denied
access to all of the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan,
the Philippine Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Caribbean Sea, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea,
the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, most of Oceania,
and large swaths of the Indian Ocean. Such a result was clearly not envisioned during
the UNCLOS negotiations and would never have been accepted by the maritime powers.
As noted above, China’s attempt to assert more security jurisdiction was specifically
rejected during the UNCLOS negotiations. The position accepted by the overwhelming
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majority of the delegations present at UNCLOS III was clearly articulated by the American delegation in 1983:
All States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations,
exercises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea.
The right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone.51

China can therefore expect the United States to continue to conduct oceanographic
surveys and surveillance activities in any state’s EEZ, including China’s, without prior
notice or consent.
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C HAPTER THREE

Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Military Surveys
in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries
Yu Zhirong

S

ince the beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Navy has constantly sent
ships of all kinds to the national sea waters of many coastal countries to perform
military surveys.1 This has provoked strong repercussions and deep concerns among the
countries in whose waters the surveys are performed and has drawn close scrutiny from
the international community as well. With the passage of time, the U.S. Navy has carried
out more and more frequent military surveys in coastal countries’ exclusive economic
zones that involve wider regions and longer periods. The coastal countries have sent
ships or airplanes to warn the U.S. naval ships verbally against approaching or sent
diplomatic notes to ask for reasonable explanations, but the efforts have had little effect,
and the U.S. Navy has continued to carry out what it calls military survey activities.2
Therefore, it is common to see confrontations or even friction between the U.S. side and
the coastal countries concerned, which later gives rise to hype in the press and to public
outcry. This has greatly affected normal bilateral ties between the nations.
For instance, regarding the USNS Impeccable incident that occurred in the South China
Sea in part of China’s exclusive economic zone, China and the United States have quite
different understandings concerning the incident to date. Top U.S. military officers,
including Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defended the
Impeccable’s activities.3 Mullen said that exclusive economic zones extend to two hundred nautical miles and every state has the right to enter them. He added that Impeccable
was carrying out activities in “international waters,” which in his view was quite in line
with international law.4
Huang Xueping, the spokesman from China’s Ministry of National Defense, refuted
Mullen’s argument. He said the U.S. surveillance ships conducted illegal surveys in China’s exclusive economic zone without obtaining prior permission from the Chinese side,
which went against relevant regulations provided in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China, and the Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research.5
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This shows that the Chinese side differs from the U.S. side concerning its perspectives on
the correct law governing the incident.
More than arousing significant attention from the military circles of both sides, the
Impeccable incident caused a stir between top Chinese and U.S. leaders. Foreign ministers from both countries held special talks on the issue. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton said that U.S.-Chinese military relations are expected to strengthen to ensure
that no unpredictable consequences result from such incidents.6 Regarding the Impeccable incident, President Obama stressed in his talks with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
on 12 March 2009 that the U.S.-Chinese military dialogues need to be improved either
in level or in frequency to prevent such incidents from recurring.7 It can be seen that top
government officials from both sides have very positive attitudes and expect no more
such unhappy incidents. But goodwill does not necessarily lead to good results.
The USNS Victorious incident, which was similar in nature to the Impeccable incident,
occurred in the Yellow Sea in May 2009.8 Why did the common understanding reached
between the two sides go up in smoke? High-level officials hoped this kind of incident
would not happen again, but it happened again within two months. And why did such
an incident recur and will perhaps continue to occur? The major reason lies in the fact
that neither the U.S. side, nor the Chinese side, nor the international community has
conducted an in-depth jurisprudential analysis according to international law of the sea
of the U.S. Navy’s so-called military surveys in the exclusive economic zones of coastal
countries. Additionally, no fair, impartial understanding or opinion has been expressed
based on correct, objective, and scientific definitions of the activity. Though both Chinese and U.S. top officials show positive attitudes toward the development of solutions
and some level of agreement has been reached, jurisprudential assessments of the nature
of such incidents remain at a very basic level of understanding. Discussions on the topic
will definitely result in a variety of views. Therefore, it is time to launch a round of extensive and in-depth discussion in the academic world on foreign ships’ military surveys
in coastal countries’ exclusive economic zones.
Since the U.S. Naval Ship Bowditch carried out its survey in China’s Yellow Sea in 2001,
activities that were considered by the Chinese side to be unlawful U.S. naval incursions
into China’s exclusive economic zone, the author has conducted studies on the so-called
military surveys carried out by maritime powers. The author has reviewed press releases,
government statements, actual marine military surveys of the countries concerned, and
related information. The author has conducted an in-depth analysis of these materials
and then developed unique ideas based on international law of the sea, particularly the
coastal countries’ two “sovereign rights” and three “exclusive jurisdictions” described
in UNCLOS.9 Additionally, the author has two favorable experiences useful for studies
and discussions of the said issue. First, the author has frequently participated in cruises
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undertaken by China’s surveillance organizations to observe military surveys conducted by U.S. naval ships in China’s sea areas and obtained a large number of firsthand
materials. This has helped increase the author’s perceptual understanding, thus greatly
reducing the role of imagination or guesswork in analysis and making the author’s
conclusions more objective, correct, and in line with the facts. Second, on 26 April 2001,
the writer led a team to go on board R/V Roger Revelle, a U.S.-operated ship that carried
out marine scientific research in China’s sea areas with prior permission from the Chinese side.10 This has helped improve the writer’s knowledge and understanding toward
marine scientific research and of the relationship between marine scientific research and
military surveys.
At present, the Chinese side and U.S. side still hold different opinions on military survey
activities carried out by foreign ships in sea areas under the jurisdiction of coastal
countries. The differences mainly involve three aspects: different understandings of the
law governing the areas under the jurisdiction of coastal countries; different perspectives
on the nature of military surveys; and different ideas about ways of addressing military
surveys.

Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Claim to Be Operating in
“International Waters”
Every time a Chinese marine surveillance ship or airplane has found a U.S. naval ship
operating in China’s sea areas and asked for an explanation of its activities, the U.S. ship
always replies that it is a U.S. naval ship that enjoys the right of immunity and that it is
carrying out military surveys in “international waters.” Admiral Mullen also claimed, as
noted above, in the wake of the Impeccable incident in the South China Sea, that exclusive economic zones extend out to two hundred nautical miles and every country has the
right to enter them. He further claimed that Impeccable was operating in international
waters and therefore did not break any international laws. So it can be concluded that
the U.S. naval operations in coastal countries’ exclusive economic zones are carefully
planned, or at least involve great efforts to study such international law of the sea as
UNCLOS. The U.S. Navy called the coastal countries’ exclusive economic zones, in which
their ships were carrying out military surveys, “international waters” but did not publicly
explain what the term “international waters” means. This suggests that the U.S. Navy’s
intent is clearly to evade the concept of the exclusive economic zone as explicitly stipulated in UNCLOS and thus to deny the coastal countries’ rights under the convention.
It is widely known that the law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS was shaped following fifteen sessions of eleven general meetings that spanned a whole decade and
that UNCLOS was the result of discussion and compromise among over 150 states,
including the United States.11 Its provisions have been recognized and accepted by
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an overwhelming majority of the countries across the world and have been taken as
the common code of a new maritime order.12 The system of exclusive economic zones
is particularly well known and accepted worldwide. Though the United States has not
acceded to UNCLOS, it has the responsibility and obligation to observe all of its provisions. International law of the sea certainly requires the development of practices by
all states that will help enrich and improve the law itself, and the law requires further
development as well, but no practices are lawful if they go against or even conflict with
the fundamental rules of UNCLOS. The convention classifies the whole ocean into
numerous regions: internal waters (article 8), territorial seas (articles 2, 3), contiguous
zones (article 33), exclusive economic zones (article 55), continental shelves (article
76), the high seas (article 86), and international seabed areas (article 1[1]). No “international waters” can be found in UNCLOS, and the only term that is even a little close
to the phrase “international waters” is “strait used for international navigation” (article
37). The latter, however, definitely has no relationship with the former concerning the
locations in which the U.S. military surveys are conducted. Since 2001, the U.S. naval
ships’ military survey operations discovered by Chinese marine surveillance airplanes or
ships have all been carried out in waters within the Chinese exclusive economic zone; the
closest location was only twenty-four nautical miles from China’s territorial-sea baseline.
Therefore, the U.S. argument that the coastal countries’ exclusive economic zones are
“international waters” is only a lame excuse for its attempt to evade the coastal countries’
rights of jurisdictional competency.
The U.S. perspective is in apparent conflict with the provisions under UNCLOS and
is unconvincing from a jurisprudential perspective. The United States, as a maritime
power, has the obligation to help improve the legal system of the exclusive economic
zone through its practice. But it brazenly replaced the “exclusive economic zone” with
“international waters,” ignoring or denying the rights of jurisdictional competency of
the coastal states and even depriving them of the rights they deserve, which is not advisable at all. As a matter of fact, it is ironic that the United States denies the existence of exclusive economic zones, for the existence of the exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf systems have their roots in the U.S. practices, specifically the two “declarations on
marine policies” released by President Truman on 28 September 1945 to protect fishery
resources and the oil resources under the continental seabed.13 These U.S. maritime
policies were not only significant advancements in American domestic legislation but
pushed forward the development of international law of the sea as well.
In fact, the U.S. Navy’s position is very clear that the authority of UNCLOS will not be
shaken even if exclusive economic zones are defined as “international waters,” which is
only an excuse for avoiding the coastal states’ inspection of its illegal actions. Admiral
Mullen’s explanation was self-contradictory and weak. He claimed first that Impeccable
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was in international waters and acting in accordance with international laws. He then
stated that any country has the right to enter the exclusive economic zone of another
country, an area that extends two hundred nautical miles from the coastline. He stressed
the legality of military surveys. My views are very definite: international waters do not
exist in UNCLOS and are not generally accepted. The American policy of conducting
unauthorized military surveys in sea areas under the jurisdiction of another coastal state
should be scrutinized for its illegality. So how can Admiral Mullen say these operations
are completely in accordance with international law? Moreover, the statements that
the exclusive economic zone is two hundred nautical miles wide and that any country
has the right to access are, taken separately, true. The exclusive economic zone is free
for navigation, overflight, and laying seabed cables.14 However, the activities of the
U.S. Navy’s military survey ship do not belong to the categories mentioned above. An
investigation of the activities of Impeccable as it undertook military surveys in China’s
exclusive economic zone determined that the U.S. ship displayed at the mainmast the
ball-diamond-ball operations signal during the day and shined the red-white-red operations signal light at night indicating that it was restricted in maneuvering, undertaking
operations instead of merely navigating.15 So Admiral Mullen’s explanation is selfcontradictory, lacks a serious legal basis, and is not persuasive. His excuses make no contribution to proving the lawfulness of the U.S. military ship’s military survey operations
in waters under the jurisdiction of coastal states but completely expose the illegality of
the vessel’s conduct.

Jurisprudential Analysis of the Nature of Military Surveys
One of China’s concerns about military surveys is that they cause pollution to the ocean
environment. In at least one such case, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised
this concern to the American government. Specifically, on 20 September 2006, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China issued a note to the U.S.
embassy in China that on 8 August of the same year, China’s sea surveillance aircraft and
ships observed four American navy ships undertaking military surveys in waters under
Chinese jurisdiction in the East China Sea without authorization from the Chinese
government, seriously infringing upon the ocean rights and interests of China as the
relevant coastal country, and requested reasonable explanations from the American
ambassador. The ambassador promised to give feedback after getting information. As
had been done after the USNS Impeccable incident occurred on 5 March 2009 in an area
under Chinese jurisdiction in the South China Sea, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu said that the U.S. Navy ship’s unauthorized access into waters in the
East China Sea under the jurisdiction of China for the purpose of undertaking military
surveys violated UNCLOS and China’s laws.16
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In his remarks, Ma pointed out that there is a jurisprudential basis available to conclude that the U.S. military ship’s unauthorized operations to perform military surveys
in waters under the jurisdiction of China is illegal. According to UNCLOS, “‘pollution
of the marine environment’ means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or
is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities.”17 USNS Impeccable is a catamaran with an operating speed of four to six
knots, hanging or burning operational and signal lights in the mainmast when operating, with a shielded cable at the aft end of the vessel, and a survey sensor tied at the cable
tip.18 The ship does not issue navigation notices concerning its random operation areas,
sometimes navigating on the sea routes and sometimes among fisheries. This is sufficient to conclude that military survey operations by the U.S. Navy’s sea surveillance ship
constitute pollution of the marine environment.
Additionally, the definition of pollution of the marine environment in UNCLOS
favors the coastal states in its general description. “The introduction by man, directly
or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment” quite matches the
operations mode of USNS Impeccable, which introduces a shielded cable into the sea
and emits sound waves in order to investigate underwater targets, conduct surveys,
undertake instrument experiments, or investigate the ocean’s environment.19 If the
United States argues that military surveys do not cause such deleterious effects as harm
to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, impairment of quality for
use of seawater, and reduction of amenities, the United States must undertake the onus
probandi and provide a persuasive explanation to the satisfaction of the coastal state.
Once the U.S. Navy ship’s military survey is defined as pollution of the marine environment, unless the surveys can otherwise be exempted from the definition of pollution of
the marine environment, the coastal states may make claims against the United States
for pollution of the marine environment, in addition to diplomatic negotiations in accordance with relevant regulations in UNCLOS. This is my understanding of the point
made by China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma that the military surveys conducted
by the U.S. Navy’s surveillance ship violated relevant UNCLOS provisions.
The media reported that the USNS Impeccable used water hoses to warn off the Chinese
fishing boats during the March incident;20 in May USNS Victorious did the same, using
the excuse that the close maneuvering of the Chinese vessels hindered the Victorious’s
operations.21 The United States said that the Chinese operations reflect “an intentional
and dangerous strategy” and that the “Chinese actions are not professional.”22 However,
the jurisprudential analysis above clearly indicates that the U.S. Navy’s ships entered

military activities in the eez

43

into Chinese waters to perform a military survey without approval or authorization,
seized the sea route, occupied the fishery and seriously hindered the fishermen’s normal
fishing operation, and caused pollution to the marine environment, all of which are
self-evidently illegal activities. When their fishery was occupied and their legal interests
and rights were seriously infringed, it was unavoidable that the fishermen responded as
necessary. However, the U.S. Navy’s ships caused the incidents and should accept fundamental responsibility for them. The United States should realize that it has breached
the provisions of UNCLOS and should take timely corrective actions by following the
provisions of UNCLOS and stopping any illegal activities. The United States should not
blame the Chinese fishing boats. Instead, it should apologize to Chinese fishermen and
guarantee that no similar mistakes will occur in the future. It should also compensate
the loss incurred by the Chinese fishermen, if necessary.
In addition to concerns about environmental pollution caused by military surveys, a second concern relates to the definition of “marine science.” At present, UNCLOS and the
laws and regulations of coastal countries fail to define clearly what constitutes marine
scientific research and fail to define clearly what military survey activities are permissible. The U.S. Navy does not attempt to define marine scientific research in a way that
favors its country. Instead, it differentiates its activities from marine scientific research by
labeling them military survey activities and thereby attempts to evade the jurisdiction of
coastal countries.
Over many years devoted to the practice of marine management, the author has conducted substantial research and study of international maritime law. Thus, the author
has profound knowledge of the term “marine scientific research” and defines it as
follows:
•• Marine scientific research involves the use of various vessels to investigate the marine
environment or to survey the marine environment, in specific waters and at a specific
time, by means of modern scientific and technical approaches, including academic
study and the study of integrated applications of the information collected.
•• The “military survey activities” that U.S. Navy vessels conduct in waters under the
jurisdiction of coastal countries bear no essential differences from marine scientific
research in working form or content. Thus, the so-called military survey activities are
completely subsumed under the category of study called marine scientific research.
It is therefore an illegal activity to conduct military survey activities in the exclusive
economic zone of a coastal country without its approval. This conclusion may seem arbitrary, but actually it is much to the point, fully reflecting the objective facts. If military
survey activities do have any obvious differences from marine scientific research, the
differences mainly lie, seemingly, in the different attributes of the vehicles and vessels
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used. So-called military survey activities generally use military vessels. Of course, it is
not essential to identify whether the activities undertaken fall within the category of
marine scientific research, the definition of which bears no relation to the attributes
of the vessels performing it. At present, not a single law or regulation clearly specifies
that marine environmental investigations and survey operations using military vessels
are military survey activities or that the military survey activities do not fall under the
category of marine scientific research and thus are not subject to the coastal-state laws
and regulations.
By contrast, the author, in his experience in marine management, has observed typical
cases in which U.S. naval vessels conducted marine scientific research, offering powerful
support to the idea that military survey activities do indeed fall within the study category
of marine scientific research and thus are subject to the provisions of UNCLOS and the
laws and regulations of the coastal states. On 26 April 2001, the author was ordered to
board and inspect R/V Roger Revelle, a U.S. maritime research vessel, which performed
acoustic tomography tests in the shallow waters of the East China Sea in collaboration
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and operated from Shanghai. Although the vessel was marked “Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California,” it was
owned by the U.S. Navy, and its use had to be approved by the U.S. Navy.23
R/V Roger Revelle is therefore typical of U.S. Navy research vessels, and the studies it
conducted were also typical of military survey activities. The vessel’s activities were
approved before it arrived and operated in waters under the jurisdiction of China. All
its activities during this research period were subject to the provisions of UNCLOS and
China’s laws and regulations on marine scientific research and to Chinese management.
This proves again that even though R/V Roger Revelle is a military vessel, the marine
environmental investigations or marine environmental surveys it made were military
survey activities and that the argument holding they do not belong to the category of
marine scientific research is wrong. It is improper to categorize and name marine environmental investigations or marine environmental surveys conducted by military vessels
as military survey activities. The argument that purposely excludes such activities from
the study category of marine scientific research in order to evade the legal constraints
imposed by coastal states is also inappropriate. Any country has the right to advance
explanations of the law that favor its own interests, but it cannot break the principles
and tenets of UNCLOS and act inconsistently with them.

Clarification of Several Vague Topics
One vague topic that needs clarification is the “peaceful purposes” principle. In the
above section the author presented his view that military survey activities are in fact
within the category of marine scientific research, based on his experience in the practice
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of marine management, and enumerated typical examples. A question remains, however.
Although UNCLOS fails to define the study of marine scientific research, it establishes
general principles. For instance, it establishes that the study of marine scientific research
shall be undertaken for peaceful purposes.24 That is to say, if a military survey activity is not undertaken for a peaceful purpose, it does not meet the criteria for the study
of marine scientific research and thus can be completely prohibited. However, to date,
not a single U.S. official or military authority has ever stated in public that its military
survey activities made in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal countries are made
for nonpeaceful purposes. This offers powerful support for the idea that military survey
activities are within the category of marine scientific research. Of course, it cannot be
excluded that the military survey activities could be deliberately explained as having the
purpose of preparing for future war and are not for a peaceful purpose, thus making
them at odds with UNCLOS. In this case, the nature of the issue would change completely. It would no longer be an issue of the law; it would turn into an issue of national
defense, and coastal countries could seek solutions from a political perspective. With a
powerful enemy in front of it, a country will make war preparations and will use force to
crack down on military survey activities made by foreign vessels that raise a threat to its
national security.
In addition, some people may ask a sharp and astonishing question concerning the
concept of sovereign immunity. So far, the vessels that have entered the waters under the
jurisdiction of coastal countries and conducted military survey activities have all been
military vessels in the service of the U.S. Navy with sovereign immunity. Then, why are
their activities considered illegal? If these people who put forward the question are not
deliberately trying to confound right and wrong or call white as black, they must have a
problem understanding international law of the sea. The sovereign immunity of military
vessels means that even though a military vessel with immunity has undertaken illegal
conduct, the concerned coastal country has no right to board and inspect it and the
coastal state can only negotiate a diplomatic resolution. But a proper understanding of
the facts based on a “responsibility investigation,” conducted according to legal procedures, reveals that immunity and the findings of an investigation into illegal conduct
and responsibility are two different concepts and cannot be conflated. When the vessels
and planes of China’s Marine Surveillance Force communicate with the U.S. vessels at
sea, the U.S. vessels always first say, “This is U.S. naval vessel XXX with sovereign immunity.” In fact, their announcement of immunity makes no sense except to show their
guilty conscience.
A third area that needs clarification concerns the rights and obligations under UNCLOS
of nonsignatory states. There are also some people who may paradoxically propose that
since the United States has not acceded to UNCLOS, it is not subject to the provisions of
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UNCLOS. This perspective suggests that even though a U.S. naval vessel intrudes in the
exclusive economic zone of a coastal country and undertakes military survey activities,
which is at odds with the provisions of UNCLOS and violates the laws of the coastal
country, it can be free from investigation into its legal responsibility just because the
United States is not a state party. This is a perspective based in ignorance. As a treaty,
UNCLOS, which now has more than 150 states parties, was concluded after long-term
preparations, discussions, and compromises that included U.S. participation. Its provisions have become universally accepted law for the purpose of safeguarding the new
maritime order. In consequence, both the signatory states and nonsignatory states must
follow and abide by its provisions. Of course, all countries have the responsibility and
obligation to enrich and improve the meaning of UNCLOS through state practice, but
they cannot violate the convention’s elementary principles and tenets. They can offer explanations in favor of their own interests, but they cannot argue irrationally or resort to
force to justify illegal conduct. Fortunately, U.S. high officials have stated that the United
States will respect and abide by the regulations of UNCLOS, although it is still not a state
party. As a result, the above worry is unnecessary.

Conclusion
In summary, when U.S. naval vessels enter the exclusive economic zone of coastal
countries and undertake military survey activities, their actions should be considered
within the category of marine scientific research and must therefore be subject to the
relevant regulations of UNCLOS and the laws and regulations of the coastal country.
Military survey activities undertaken without approval are illegal conduct and shall
be investigated for legal responsibility. It violates the regulations of UNCLOS that
the oceanic surveillance vessels of the U.S. Navy enter waters under the jurisdiction
of coastal countries and boldly conduct survey activities, which also result in marine
environmental pollution. Once the illegal fact is confirmed, the United States should
take legal responsibility and pay compensation for its pollution of the marine environment. If the state undertaking the survey activities does not accept the existence of
pollution as an effect of its operations, it must provide convincing proof. Although
the United States is not a state party of UNCLOS, it must abide by the common rules
recognized by most countries in the world. Every country can advance explanations of
the provisions of UNCLOS that favor its own interests, but the explanations and innovation must not violate the convention’s principles and tenets or be at odds with it. The
U.S. forces insist that their military survey activities are undertaken in “international
waters.” They take this perspective with the goal of evading the jurisdiction of coastal
countries. In fact, the U.S. forces are penny-wise and pound-foolish. Their speech and
conduct have violated China’s maritime rights and interests. Moreover, they ignore
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and deny in public the exclusive-economic-zone system, which is universally recognized by countries around the world. They have violated the regulations of UNCLOS
and go against the international community. This significantly affects the U.S. image as
a civilized maritime power and also spoils the outstanding contributions that President
Truman made for the establishment of the exclusive-economic-zone system sixty-five
years ago.
If the United States desires to conduct marine scientific research in the exclusive
economic zone of a coastal country, the best way is to first apply to the coastal country
concerned and then to conduct the study after approval is given, just as in the case of
the R/V Roger Revelle. In addition, another easy and feasible way forward is to conduct
the study jointly with the coastal country, which avoids unwanted cases of maritime
confrontation and conflict between the two parties and fully eases the differences and
contradictions concerning the correct understanding of international maritime law.
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C HAPTER F O UR

Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the
Exclusive Economic Zone
Lt. Col. Andrew S. Williams, U.S. Air Force

T

he United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created a new
zone—the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)—with its own legal regime.1 Although
prior to the completion of the convention in 1982 some states had already claimed twohundred-nautical-mile exclusive fishery zones, the EEZ as such had not previously been
recognized in international law. As the history of the development of the EEZ demonstrates, the zone’s legal regime seeks to balance the rights and interests of the coastal state
with the rights and interests of all other states in the EEZ. The coastal state’s rights and
duties relate to preservation and exploitation of the natural resources in the EEZ (arts.
56, 60–73). The rights of all other states in the EEZ relate to the traditional uses of the
high seas (art. 58).
The freedom of overflight is one of the important traditional uses of the high seas mentioned in UNCLOS. UNCLOS preserves this right of overflight in the EEZ for all aircraft,
including military aircraft. Article 58(1) of UNCLOS states:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject
to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of
navigation and overflight . . . and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships and aircraft . . . , and
compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.

The cross-reference to article 87 makes clear that the freedom of overflight in the EEZ
is the same as it is over the high seas. The phrase “and other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to these freedoms” means that there are other, unspecified freedoms in
addition to the ones listed in article 58(1). This latter phrase makes clear that the right
of overflight is not limited to mere transit over the EEZ but that aircraft may perform
operations previously permitted under international law.
Under UNCLOS, all aircraft also enjoy the right of transit passage over international
straits and archipelagic sea-lanes.2 Such passage is available for travel “between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone” (arts. 38[2], 53[3]).3 UNCLOS specifically requires
military aircraft to comply with certain safety measures during transit passage, thereby
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confirming that military aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage in addition to the
right of overflight in the EEZ (arts. 39[3], 54).
Moreover, UNCLOS specifically authorizes certain military activities in the EEZ. Article
58(2) makes a general cross-reference to articles 88–115, stating that those high seas provisions and “other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.” Some cross-referenced provisions describe the rights, duties, and immunities of warships and military aircraft. For
example, military aircraft may exercise the right of visit and the right of hot pursuit over
the high seas (arts. 110–11). The cross-reference to these provisions in article 58(2) indicates that military aircraft may exercise these same rights in the EEZ. Hence, UNCLOS
sanctions at least some types of foreign military activity in the EEZ. Article 56(2) would
encompass foreign military activity when it requires the coastal state to have due regard
for the rights and duties of other states in its EEZ.
UNCLOS thus expressly authorizes the presence of military aircraft in the EEZ and it
expressly allows certain military operations in the EEZ, just as it does in the airspace
over the high seas. The remaining issue is whether aerial reconnaissance of coastal-state
activities by foreign military aircraft remains a permitted use of the airspace above the
EEZ under international law.

Due Regard for Coastal-State Interests
Although UNCLOS preserves in the EEZ the freedom of overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to the operation of aircraft, there are at least two
limitations on this freedom. The first is found in article 58(3), which requires states to
show due regard for the rights and interests of the coastal state. Article 58(3) states:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State
and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they
are not incompatible with this Part.

This provision means, at a minimum, that foreign military activity in the EEZ may not
unduly interfere with the rights and interests of the coastal state in the marine environment and its natural resources. Examples of military activities that would run afoul of
this provision include weapons exercises that cause significant damage to a valuable
resource being exploited by the coastal state, that deny access to traditional fishing
grounds, or that create hazards to commercial fishing.4
The second limitation is stated in article 56(1)(b)(ii), which confers jurisdiction on the
coastal state to regulate marine scientific research in the EEZ.5 Even with this limitation,
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intelligence-gathering activities of a military nature are not prohibited, since they would
not affect the marine environment or resources. Hydrographic surveys, for example, are
not subject to coastal-state regulation.6 These two limitations on the high-seas freedom
of overflight provide the essential differences between the legal regimes of the EEZ and
the high seas. In all other senses, the EEZ remains a portion of the high seas for purposes
of the freedoms of overflight.
Nonetheless, some argue that the “due regard” clause of article 58(3) also means that
states must have due regard for the security interests of the coastal state and that, for
this reason, no aerial reconnaissance of the coastal state may be conducted in the EEZ.7
UNCLOS addresses the security interests of coastal states by specifying the rights and
duties they enjoy in distinct and successive maritime zones that emanate seaward from
their land territories. Coastal states enjoy the highest degree of legally protected security
interests in the zone closest to their land territory—the territorial sea—and fewer legally
protected security rights in the outer zones. UNCLOS expanded the breadth of the
territorial sea to a distance of twelve nautical miles. Most states previously recognized
territorial seas of only three nautical miles, prompting some states during the negotiations to express concern that three nautical miles was no longer adequate for their
security;8 this is especially the case in the age of airpower, where the edge of the territorial sea marks the limits of its national airspace.9 Even in the contiguous zone the coastal
state’s jurisdiction is limited in the convention to only four specific areas: customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws. Opposition to extending contiguous zone rights to cover
security interests reflected concern during the negotiations “that security zones represent
a particular threat to the freedom of navigation.”10 Because the contiguous zone is not
part of the territorial sea, the high-seas freedom of overflight for military aircraft that
applies in the EEZ is also applicable in the contiguous zone.11
States may establish air-defense identification zones (ADIZs) beyond national airspace;
however, ADIZs are merely a reporting and identification regime for aircraft bound for
coastal and island states. Although there are no relevant provisions in UNCLOS, ADIZs
are recognized under customary international law and state practice and are legally
justified on the basis that a state has the right to establish reasonable conditions of entry
into its national airspace. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching national airspace may be
required to identify itself while in international airspace as a condition of entry approval.
Were a state to attempt to require all aircraft penetrating an ADIZ to comply with ADIZ
procedures, whether or not the aircraft intended to enter national airspace, such regulations would violate international freedoms of navigation and could be ignored. International law does not recognize the right of a coastal state to apply its ADIZ procedures
to foreign aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, military aircraft not intending
to enter national airspace need not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ
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procedures established by other nations.12 International law does not recognize the right
of coastal states to exclude or regulate the activities of foreign military aircraft in areas
outside their national airspace.
Chinese scholars have tried to assert “security interests” as a protected coastal-state interest in the EEZ, even though earlier efforts to have such interests included in UNCLOS
failed.13 In particular, they have tried to prohibit military exercises, weapons practice,
and maneuvers in the EEZ. These efforts have been operationally challenged. Yet it is
noteworthy that the negotiating history of UNCLOS does not record any specific objection to aerial surveillance or reconnaissance of the coastal state in the EEZ.14

The EEZ and ICAO
China’s arguments in favor of a coastal state’s right to curtail international military freedoms in the airspace above the EEZ have been considered and rejected by the community of states. With the introduction of a new legal regime in the EEZ, Brazil requested
that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) examine the EEZ’s impact
on international air law and consider treating the EEZ the same as national airspace
with respect to overflight.15 ICAO is a specialized United Nations (UN) agency created
by the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and is designed to promote
the safety of air navigation.16 Its executive body—the ICAO Council—has exclusive and
plenary authority to adopt international standards, known as “Rules of the Air,” for flight
over the high seas.17
Before UNCLOS was negotiated, the world’s airspace was generally classified as either
national (that over the state’s land areas and territorial waters) or international (that over
areas traditionally considered high seas). This classic division of the world’s airspace
is reflected in the Chicago Convention, within which each state is granted complete
and exclusive sovereignty over its territorial airspace but by which over “the high seas”
(which now includes the EEZ) civil aircraft are subject to the Rules of the Air adopted by
ICAO.18
The Rules of the Air apply to all international civil aviation, without exception.19 The
binding nature of these rules over the high seas is derived from article 12 of the Chicago
Convention: “Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this
Convention.”20 If a civil aircraft cannot comply with ICAO standards, the aircraft may
not legally fly over the high seas. Moreover, every state has an international obligation
“to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable.”21 In the
words of Professor Michael Milde, “It is a unique feature in international law-making
that an executive body of an international organization can legislate . . . with binding
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effect for all 156 [now 190] contracting States with respect to the Rules of the Air applicable over the high seas which cover some 70 percent of the surface of the earth.”22
Brazil’s request in effect sought to remove ICAO’s jurisdiction to legislate binding Rules
of the Air for the airspace above the EEZ, which previously had been a portion of the
high seas. In evaluating Brazil’s request, ICAO had to determine whether for purposes
of the Rules of the Air the EEZ is still part of the high seas (with new additional rights of
the coastal state relating to the natural resources) or a jurisdictional zone of the coastal
state (that retains high-seas freedoms but would be subject to substantial coastal-state
regulation, much like the innocent-passage regime). If it is the former, ICAO retains
exclusive jurisdiction to legislate Rules of the Air. If it is the latter, national laws and
regulations would apply in the EEZ.
The ICAO Legal Committee directed the ICAO Secretariat in 1983 to prepare a detailed
study to consider the possible impact of UNCLOS on the application of the Chicago
Convention and other international air law instruments. The results of this study were
published in 1987 and reached an important conclusion with respect to the airspace
above the EEZ.23 The study declared:
19.4 Exclusive economic zone: full freedom of navigation and overflight is to be enjoyed by
all States and the coastal States cannot impose their aeronautical laws and regulations in
that zone; for greater certainty about the general legal status of the EEZ, it would appear
desirable if the ICAO member States were to reach a consensus and accept an interpretative determination that, for the purpose of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other
international air law instruments, the exclusive economic zone is deemed to have the same
legal status as the high seas and any reference in these instruments to the high seas should
be deemed to encompass the exclusive economic zone.24

The desired consensus with respect to the legal status of the EEZ’s airspace was instantly
reached, in practice if not in a formal declaration. The study’s results have not been challenged, disputed, or superseded. ICAO did not further pursue the matter, and the study’s
results inform ICAO’s governance to this day. ICAO’s jurisdiction to legislate Rules of
the Air over all areas previously considered high seas, to include the EEZ, continues
unabated. Coastal states remain without authority to subject foreign civil aircraft transiting the EEZ to their domestic air regulations as they could do for civil aircraft flying over
their territory.25 For its part, ICAO continues to employ the term “high seas” when referring to the airspace above the EEZ.26 In this sense, the EEZ has the same legal status as
the high seas. Although ICAO’s competence in the EEZ is limited to prescribing Rules of
the Air for civil aircraft, its conclusion as to the EEZ’s legal status as a portion of the high
seas is also consistent with state practice with regard to the treatment of military aircraft
in this same airspace.
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International law applies this same division of the world’s airspace to military aircraft.
The Chicago Convention contains two provisions applicable to military aircraft. The
first concerns national airspace, whereby the military aircraft are prohibited from entering another state’s territorial airspace without special authorization or diplomatic clearance.27 The second deals generally with international airspace, in which military aircraft
must exercise due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.28 The Chicago
Convention does not otherwise regulate military aircraft.29

UNCLOS Contributions to the Treatment of Military Aircraft
UNCLOS’s treatment of military aircraft in international airspace is not only consistent
with the Chicago Convention’s treatment of these aircraft but makes several important
contributions to international law. First, UNCLOS confirms that military aircraft enjoy
sovereign immunity.30 The only other multilateral treaty to recognize expressly the
sovereign immunity of military aircraft was the 1919 Paris Convention, which provides
that military aircraft are entitled to “the privileges which are customarily accorded to
foreign ships of war.”31 Because this provision was not carried forward in the Chicago
Convention, Professor John Cobbs Cooper, the chairman of the committee that drafted
and reported article 3 of the Chicago Convention, stated: “It is felt that the rule stated in
the Paris Convention that aircraft engaged in military services should, in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary, be given the privileges of foreign warships when in national
port is sound and may be considered as still part of international air law even though
not restated in the Chicago Convention.”32 UNCLOS thus reaffirms the customary law
concerning the privileges and immunities of military aircraft.
Second, UNCLOS recognizes that military aircraft enjoy certain constabulary powers in
the EEZ and over the high seas, such as the rights of visit and of hot pursuit.33 Military
aircraft play an important role in ensuring the public order of the oceans.
Third, UNCLOS expressly reaffirms that all aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the
freedom of overflight in international airspace, a general principle of international law
that was only implied in the Chicago Convention.34 In national airspace, military aircraft
likewise enjoy the right of transit passage over international straits and archipelagic sealanes, the same as civil aircraft.35 Transit passage over international straits or archipelagic
sea-lanes is treated as similar to passage through international airspace, in that civil
aircraft must comply with ICAO Rules of the Air, while military aircraft need only monitor certain emergency radio frequencies and have due regard for the safety of navigation
of other aircraft.
Fourth, UNCLOS requires all aircraft to have due regard for the safety of navigation of
all other aircraft.36 The Chicago Convention requires only that military aircraft exercise
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due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.37 It does not require military
aircraft of one state to have due regard for the safety of military aircraft of other states.
Thus, under UNCLOS, a coastal state may dispatch military aircraft to shadow foreign
military aircraft approaching its territorial airspace for the purpose of safeguarding
national security;38 however, it is also clear that the coastal state must not endanger the
foreign military aircraft, except in self-defense. To endanger another state’s military aircraft would be contrary to the coastal state’s obligation to have due regard for the rights
and duties of the foreign state in the EEZ.

The ICAO Manual on Military Activities
Shortly after publishing the study on the EEZ’s impact on international air law, ICAO in
1990 published the Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations.39 Since ICAO does not have authority to
regulate the activities of military aircraft, the guidance material is advisory in nature—
that is, not binding on any state.40 However, its key assumptions are especially noteworthy, because the manual was developed by the ICAO Secretariat with the assistance of an
air navigation study group consisting of both civil air traffic services and military experts
from seven contracting states and three international organizations.41
The guidance material carries forward the traditional air-law perspective on the two
types of airspace. The manual calls for the coordination of military activities with the
appropriate air traffic services authorities “whether over the territory of a State or over
the high seas,” with no mention of the EEZ.42 The manual provides that coordination
of military activities should be effected “whether the military and the ATS [air traffic
services] authorities belong to the same or different states.”43
This latter stipulation reflects ICAO’s recognition that military activities may occur in
areas outside of the coastal state’s territory, where the coastal state provides air traffic and flight services for international civil aviation. Such services are usually part of
a flight information region (FIR). FIRs are allocated to coastal states by ICAO for the
safety of civil aviation and encompass both national and international airspace. FIRs
often extend to the airspace beyond the territorial sea and into the EEZ.
The manual further anticipates that military activities may be carried out in the FIR
of a coastal state without the coastal state’s consent. The manual advises that military
activities in international airspace administered by the coastal state should be coordinated “even if the States whose military organization and ATS authorities concerned
find themselves temporarily in diplomatic disagreement.”44 This last statement confirms
ICAO’s understanding that the coastal state’s consent is not required.
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If direct coordination with the appropriate ATS authorities via aeronautical or diplomatic channels is not possible, the coordination should be effected with the assistance
of the appropriate regional office of ICAO or the ATS authorities of another state.45 The
manual suggests that the state whose military organization is planning the potentially
hazardous activities should initiate the coordination process with the appropriate ATS
authorities:
For example, a naval force of State A, operating in the FIR of (friendly) State B, plans a
potentially hazardous activity in the FIR of State C and States A and B agree through prior
arrangements, the ATS authority of State B may coordinate the potentially hazardous activity directly with the ATS authority of State C. The ATS authority will be able to provide
information and assistance in achieving coordination with all appropriate ATS authorities
and ATS units and to give advice as to the impact which the planned activity is likely to
have on civil aircraft operations in the area.46

The implication of the manual’s example is clear—international law permits military
activities to be conducted in a FIR administered by a foreign state even when those
activities are unwelcome. The EEZ is an area within the FIR where military activities can
be conducted without the coastal state’s consent. The legal regime of the airspace over
the EEZ remains what it was before the EEZ was created—international airspace.
Finally, although military aircraft enjoy the high-seas freedom to fly in the EEZ, the
manual does identify military activities that could pose a threat to civil aircraft and that
should be coordinated with ATS authorities.47 Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance
were not included in this list. Accordingly, there is no duty to notify a coastal state of
upcoming surveillance and reconnaissance flights in a FIR beyond its national airspace.

UNIDIR on Aerial Reconnaissance
In 1990, after UNCLOS was opened for signature and ICAO had published the results
of its study on the legal status of the EEZ’s airspace, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) published a document in which the UN agency expressed
the view that aerial reconnaissance conducted in international airspace—or “peripheral
reconnaissance”—is legally permissible:
There is nothing illegal per se in aerial reconnaissance. In time of peace its legality depends
upon whether it is being conducted in national or international airspace. If reconnaissance
aircraft of State A is flying in international airspace, at no time entering the territorial
airspace of State B whose territory it is photographing or otherwise monitoring, then State
A commits no offense. This is termed “peripheral reconnaissance.” In contrast, should
the aircraft of State A stray into the territorial airspace of State B, although it performs the
same act, its locus converts this into an illegal activity, provided it has not obtained the
prior consent of State B. The latter is termed “penetrative reconnaissance.”48
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UNIDIR cited two incidents in 1960 to support its views about “peripheral” and
“penetrative” reconnaissance. The first incident concerned a U-2 aircraft shot down in
1960 deep in Soviet airspace. The Soviet Union captured the U-2 pilot and convicted
him of espionage. The United States did not deny that the U-2 pilot had violated Soviet
airspace, and it did not protest the Soviet prosecution of its pilot.
The second incident occurred two months after the first incident. A Soviet fighter shot
down an RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft over the Barents Sea in international airspace.
The United States strenuously protested the shoot-down, noting that the RB-47 aircraft
had at all times remained outside the territorial sea of the Soviet Union and arguing
that its destruction was a clear breach of international law. The Soviet Union implicitly
admitted its error by expeditiously repatriating the survivors without charging them
with espionage, even though the RB-47 had flown close to its territory and was conducting military reconnaissance.49 The distinguishing feature of this last incident was the
aircraft’s presence in international airspace.
Although the legal views expressed by UNIDIR do not bind UN member states, these
views have persuasive value in that they accurately reflect the prior acceptance within the
international community of “peripheral reconnaissance” as a lawful use of the sea. The
aircraft’s presence in international airspace determines whether its activities are legally
permitted.
In this way, aerial reconnaissance in the EEZ is like space-based reconnaissance and
surveillance. Although space-based reconnaissance and surveillance may be directed at
the surface of the earth, the right to conduct them is generally accepted. Such activity
originates in outer space, an area that is beyond the sovereignty of any state and is open
for use by all states. Just as outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, “no state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty,” a provision that applies equally to the EEZ by virtue of article 58(2) of
UNCLOS.50

The Debate over “Peaceful Purposes”
Some critics nevertheless oppose aerial reconnaissance in the EEZ by calling for a
complete demilitarization of the seas.51 These critics usually cite four provisions in
UNCLOS—articles 19, 58, 88, and 301.
Article 19(2) of UNCLOS lists activities prohibited during “innocent passage” by ships
in the coastal state’s territorial sea. One such activity is “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State.”52 The critics stress
that under UNCLOS collecting information on a coastal state in its territorial sea can be
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prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state, thus rendering a
ship’s passage in the territorial sea as not “innocent.”
Additionally, article 88 of UNCLOS provides that “the high seas shall be reserved for
peaceful purposes.” Article 58(2) incorporates by reference this provision into the EEZ’s
legal regime. Finally, article 301 concerns the peaceful uses of the seas: “In exercising
their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”
In citing these provisions, the critics reason that “an activity considered to violate innocent passage in the territorial sea cannot be considered to be a ‘peaceful activity’ in
the EEZ.”53 These critics argue that intelligence gathering, no matter where it occurs, is
prejudicial to the coastal state’s security, because it constitutes a threat or use of force
against the coastal state. They conclude that UNCLOS prohibits aerial reconnaissance in
the EEZ.
The difficulty with this logic, however, is that it would lead to the complete demilitarization of the seas, as some critics acknowledge.54 The peaceful-purposes clauses do not
impose any blanket restrictions on military activities at sea. The term “peaceful purposes” is not defined anywhere. Intelligence-gathering activities have historically constituted
one of the traditional uses of the sea and until recently were undertaken without protest
from coastal states. Many states have flown aerial reconnaissance missions in the EEZ,
including China and Russia.55
The Real Meaning of “Peaceful Purposes”
Article 301 of UNCLOS provides the most plausible explanation of what is meant by
“peaceful purposes.” Article 301 was clearly inspired by article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
repeating verbatim the latter’s ban on the threat or use of force.56 It should be noted,
however, that the UN Charter does not prohibit just any threat or use of force.57 It must
be a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a
state or otherwise be inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in
the charter.
For example, the concentration of naval forces in the EEZ of another state accompanied by certain political demands against that state would violate the UN Charter. A
coastal state could consider foreign military maneuvers in its EEZ a threat of force, if
the maneuvers were conducted in an atmosphere of high political tension and accompanied by tacit or overt demands.58 The point is that the threat or use of force must be
accompanied by a coercive intent to intimidate the other state into taking or not taking
certain action, and the threat must be directed against the territorial integrity or political
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independence of that state in a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.59 It is difficult
to understand how aerial reconnaissance by an unarmed military aircraft in international airspace would on its own constitute a threat or use of force in violation of the UN
Charter. State practice reveals a high degree of tolerance toward mere reconnaissance or
surveillance of the coastal state from international airspace.
Misapplication of the Innocent-Passage Regime
The critics’ argument misapplies the innocent-passage regime to aircraft. Innocent passage is available only to ships, not to aircraft. No aircraft of any type—state or civil—
can claim a customary right of “innocent passage” through any part of another state’s
national airspace, except for transit passage over international straits and archipelagic
sea-lanes. Civil aircraft fly over, and land in, the territory of other states only because a
privilege is conferred by the Chicago Convention or other treaty.60 The privilege to fly
over another state or land in its territory may be suspended in time of armed conflict
or national emergency.61 When an aircraft makes an unwelcome intrusion into national
airspace, the mere violation of national airspace may be viewed as a direct threat to
the state’s security, especially when the destructive power of a nuclear weapon or other
weapon of mass destruction potentially on board an aircraft is taken into consideration.
The coastal state cannot always know whether the aerial intrusion is deliberate and with
illicit intent or innocent and essentially harmless. On the other hand, an aircraft’s mere
flight in international airspace does not in itself constitute a threat to the coastal state.
Moreover, the critics’ argument ignores the territorial sea’s proximity to the coastal
state as well as the legal distinctions in UNCLOS between the various zones emanating
outward from the territory. To appreciate this distinction, one need only consider other
activities that are also expressly proscribed during innocent passage in the territorial
sea—such as the launching, landing, or taking on board of aircraft on a ship. Yet this
activity is lawful when done outside the territorial sea or during transit passage over international straits or archipelagic sea-lanes. In fact, military aircraft may fly in formation
during transit passage. The exclusion of certain activities from the territorial sea—the
zone closest to a coastal state—suggests that these activities are permitted elsewhere.
Otherwise, UNCLOS would flatly prohibit these activities no matter where they occur.

Aerial Reconnaissance of Coastal States Promotes International Peace and
Security
Information about the coastal state collected from the EEZ can apprise neighbors and
interested states about the coastal state’s ambitions or potential to threaten the region or
beyond. Additionally, the UN Security Council, which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, does not have its own intelligence service. It depends on
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information it receives from UN member states. Yet new threats to international peace
and security continue to arise, including from a number of coastal states, especially
states that are secretive and closed.
Recent examples of coastal states with programs that pose grave concern to other
states include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of
Iran. North Korea recently conducted a second nuclear test in defiance of UN Security
Council resolutions.62 This test came shortly after North Korea launched from within
its territory a long-range rocket, also in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.63
Additionally, the Islamic Republic of Iran is reportedly developing a nuclear weapons
program and is itself the subject of several UN Security Council resolutions.64
Without reliable information, the UN Security Council cannot reach agreement on appropriate and effective collective action to respond to threats. Through aerial reconnaissance, the international community may refine its strategic assessment of a country and
acquire a better understanding of the threat it may pose. The collection of intelligence
can protect against surprise attack and reduce tension.

Conclusion
UNCLOS preserves in the EEZ the right of overflight as well as other “internationally
lawful uses of the sea” related to the operation of aircraft. Historically, aerial reconnaissance constituted an internationally lawful use of the sea. In this respect, UNCLOS
makes important contributions to international law by clarifying the treatment of
military aircraft in international airspace. UNCLOS confirms that military aircraft enjoy
sovereign immunity, and it recognizes the right of military aircraft to enter into another
state’s EEZ and to exercise rights and duties within it—in particular, the rights of visit
and hot pursuit. UNCLOS requires coastal states to exercise due regard for the rights and
duties of other states in the EEZ.
Other states must likewise have due regard for the rights and duties of the coastal state
in the EEZ. However, the coastal state’s rights, duties, and jurisdiction in the EEZ relate
solely to the natural resources and the maritime environment. UNCLOS does not
identify the security interests of the coastal state in the EEZ as a legitimate area for legal
protection and does not favor the security interests of the coastal state over the security
interests of other states in the EEZ.
Because UNCLOS created a new legal regime, ICAO examined the potential impact
of UNCLOS on air-law instruments—in particular, the Chicago Convention. ICAO
determined that for purposes of international civil aviation the legal status of the EEZ’s
airspace remains essentially the same as it was before UNCLOS was negotiated, and it
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concluded that no coastal state may impose its aeronautical regulations in the EEZ on
international civil aviation.
ICAO continues to refer in its publications to only two kinds of airspace: territorial
airspace and airspace “over the high seas.” ICAO has also published recommendations
on the coordination that should occur between a state’s military authorities and the
coastal state’s ATS authorities when the coastal state administers the FIR where military
activities occur. This coordination should occur even if the two states are in temporary
diplomatic disagreement but is not necessary for reconnaissance and surveillance.
Aside from the “due regard” provisions relating to the EEZ’s natural resources, the only
limitation imposed by UNCLOS on military activities is that they be peaceful—that
they not violate the UN Charter’s prohibition against the threat or use of force against
a state’s political independence or territorial integrity. Although aerial reconnaissance
may be unwelcome, intelligence gathering in the EEZ involves neither the threat nor the
use of force prohibited by the UN Charter. In fact, aerial reconnaissance can be vital to
international peace and security.
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C HAPTER F IV E

The Concept of Marine Scientific Research
Wu Jilu

T

he United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit
other states to conduct marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) without the permission of the coastal state. However, UNCLOS does not define
“marine scientific research” or some related terms, such as “hydrographic survey” or
“military survey.” The United States maintains that hydrographic and military surveys
do not relate to coastal-state resources and are not for scientific purposes and are therefore high-seas freedoms retained by all states in the EEZ therefore outside the jurisdiction of coastal states.1 China holds the view that hydrographic surveying is part of
marine scientific research and has specific laws governing both marine scientific research
and hydrographic surveying.2 To understand which position reflects the current state of
international law, it is necessary to analyze the concept of “marine scientific research”
(MSR) and related terms.

The History of Marine Scientific Research as a Scientific Concept
As a scientific discipline, MSR, or oceanography, developed over the past 150 years or
so. The first significant step in this development was the cruise of the British research
vessel HMS Challenger in 1872–76.3 The ship, a corvette-type military vessel, departed
Portsmouth, England, on 21 December 1872 and traveled for more than three years
circumnavigating the globe and studying the scientific characteristics of the ocean. During the voyage, HMS Challenger visited every continent, including Antarctica, allowing
scientists to take depth soundings, collect deep-sea water, take sea-bottom and biological
samples, investigate deepwater motion, and measure temperatures at all depths and in
all the world’s oceans.4 It was on this expedition that the existence of manganese nodules
on the deep-sea bed was first noted. The results from the expedition were staggering and
filled fifty volumes, leading to increased scientific study of the oceans and to the use of
the terms “marine science” and “oceanic research” as scientific disciplines. Oceanography
as a modern science is generally considered to have begun with the cruise of HMS Challenger, which set the pattern for all expeditions for the next fifty years.
The major scientific emphasis of HMS Challenger’s cruise was on marine biology, and
in this field significant progress was made during the early days of marine scientific
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research. After this initial period, the emphasis of MSR shifted gradually from biological to physical oceanography.5 World War II marked the beginning of “postmodern”
oceanography, and after the war oceanography grew rapidly.6 There are three factors that
contributed to this rapid growth. The first and probably the most important factor was a
boost in terms of technology and knowledge enhancement caused by military necessity.
The second was the need to satisfy the world’s growing requirements for resource extraction from the oceans, maritime transportation, and naval strategy. The third factor was
the increase in scientific capacity itself.7 The emphasis during the postwar period has
been on geological and geographical studies. In recent years, global climate change and
the environmental problems of the oceans have strengthened the position of oceanography as an interdisciplinary science. Valuable input has come from an unlikely source—
previously classified data from military observations and systematic surveys that are now
available to the general public.8
U.S. oceanography grew rapidly after World War II, and in the years immediately after
the war the Office of Naval Research (ONR), which was established in 1946, provided
most of the support and much of the leadership. The Bureau of Ships and other naval
operations groups supplied significant funds for a variety of research activities related
to their military mission, but ONR funded research activities at the Scripps and Woods
Hole institutes and thereby fostered a broader research agenda.9 One federal report for
fiscal year 1969 shows that the U.S. Navy’s contractual oceanographic program was 40
percent larger than the program of the National Science Foundation. Another report
shows them essentially equal. The current structure of the science of oceanography—
which involves an interdisciplinary grouping of marine physicists, biologists, engineers,
chemists, and geologists—was largely created by the U.S. Navy to meet its specific
needs.10 During the past century, and especially since World War II, the major provider
of technological capabilities was the U.S. Navy, resulting in a long and distinguished list
of scientific accomplishments derived from Navy-developed instruments and technologies.11 The development of oceanography in the United States grew in large part as a
result of increased national security interests, with the U.S. Navy taking overall responsibility for marine scientific research and supporting extensive scientific investigations to
provide a more complete understanding of the ocean environment.12
Marine scientific research in China lags behind that in the United States. Nonetheless,
at an early stage of the development of marine surveys and marine scientific research as
scientific disciplines, the Chinese navy played an important role. In 1953, the Chinese
navy headquarters and other departments set up China’s first ocean-wave observatory, in Qingdao.13 In 1956, the navy compiled a tide table of China.14 In July 1957 the
Chinese navy and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, with other government agencies
and academic institutes, began to carry out multivessel, simultaneous observations in
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the Bo Hai Sea and the northwestern Yellow Sea over the period of one year, which was
the beginning of China’s large-scale comprehensive marine survey program.15 Before
1964, China’s marine survey and scientific research was conducted under the guidance
of the Marine Group in the State Science and Technology Commission, organized and
implemented by the navy.16 In 1964, China established the National Bureau of Oceanography (which was later translated as “the State Oceanic Administration”), whose
principal function was to organize marine surveys. Initially, the State Oceanic Administration was under the People’s Liberation Army Navy until it was returned to control of
the State Science Commission in 1980. The results of marine scientific research in China
have been widely used in resource development and protection, enhance the safety of
maritime navigation, protect national security, and support military activities at sea.
Recalling the history of the development of marine scientific research, the broad disciplines it encompasses, and the many purposes for which it was undertaken, marine
scientific research or oceanography, generally speaking, can be defined as any study or
related experimental work designed to increase humankind’s knowledge of the marine environment. As a discipline it consists of a number of subdisciplines, which are
concerned respectively with the physical, chemical, biological, geological, and other
features of the oceans. The many purposes for which marine scientific research can be
undertaken include protection of maritime safety, the study of marine living and nonliving resources, and support to military activities at sea. Thus, the purpose for which
the oceanographic research is undertaken cannot be used as the basis for determining
whether an activity constitutes marine scientific research for the purposes of UNCLOS,
nor does the publication or nonpublication of research results determine whether specific research falls within the UNCLOS definition.

Defining Marine Scientific Research
In the 1950s, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf introduced the concept of
“fundamental oceanographic research” as distinct from marine exploration for resources:17
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must
not result in . . . any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
research carried out with the intention of open publication. . . . [Art. 5(1)]
[Additionally, the] consent of the coastal state shall be obtained in respect of any research
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal state shall
not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution
with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or biological characteristics of the
continental shelf, subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so
desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any event the results
shall be published. [Art. 5(8)]
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After the 1970s, the term “marine scientific research” began to earn currency in the
debates of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the final draft of
UNCLOS adopted the term, without defining it, to provide coastal-state jurisdiction to
regulate the conduct of non-resource-related oceanographic research in the exclusive
economic zone.18
The Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction held three sessions in 1968. In the course
of its work reference was made to the increasing role of marine science and technology in the exploration and exploitation of the seabed. Some members of the committee
pointed out that a distinction should be made between fundamental, or pure, scientific
research and resource-oriented, or applied, research.19 The distinction between “fundamental” (or “pure” or “basic”) scientific research and “applied” scientific research was
the source of major conflict at these sessions. The proponents of this distinction insisted
that fundamental research in the EEZ be carried out in accordance with the principle of
the freedom of scientific investigation on the high seas. The opposing view was that it
would be extremely difficult to draw distinctions between the various kinds of research,
since any data acquired from scientific investigations could be used for commercial or
other practical purposes.20 In the course of the debates in the following years, it proved
extremely difficult to develop a consensus definition of marine scientific research. The
emphasis in the discussions shifted from the development of distinctive criteria to the
development of rules to govern the conduct of such research.
Still, three official proposals discussed the definition of marine scientific research. A
Canadian working paper defined marine scientific research and its objectives:
2. Marine scientific research is any study, whether fundamental or applied, intended to
increase knowledge about the marine environment, including all its resources and living
organisms, and embraces all related scientific activity.
3. The objectives of marine scientific research include achievement of a level of understanding which allows accurate assessment and prediction of oceanic processes and
provide the basis for the development of a management policy which will ensure that the
quality and resources of the marine environment are not impaired, and for the rational use
of this environment, in the service of human welfare, international equity and economic
progress, and in the interest of peace and international cooperation among States.21

Four Eastern European states jointly proposed that MSR could be defined as follows:
Scientific research in the world ocean means any fundamental or applied research and
related experimental work, conducted by States and their juridical and physical persons, as
well as by international organizations, which does not aim directly at industrial exploitation but is designed to obtain knowledge of all aspects of the natural processes and
phenomena occurring in ocean space, on the seabed and in the subsoil thereof, which is
necessary for the peaceful activity of States for the further development of navigation and
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other forms of utilization of the sea and also utilization of the air space above the world
ocean.22

Finally, article I of a proposal submitted by Malta read, “In these articles the term
scientific research means any systematic investigation, whether fundamental or applied,
and related experimental work the primary aim of which is to increase knowledge of the
marine environment for peaceful purposes.”23
The Working Group on Marine Scientific Research and Transfer of Technology produced a text containing a draft definition of marine scientific research: “Marine scientific
research is any study and related experimental work, excluding industrial exploration
and other activities aimed at the direct exploitation of marine resources, designed to
increase mankind’s scientific knowledge of the marine environment and conducted for
peaceful purposes.”24
It should be noted that the above definitions of marine scientific research contain elements indicating the nature and objectives of the research activity, in order to distinguish marine scientific research from resource exploration.25 But two proposals submitted during the third session of the conference (UNCLOS III, 1975) did not contain an
indication of the nature of the research. The definition in the proposal submitted by
a group of nine Eastern European states reads, “Marine scientific research means any
study of, or related experimental work in, the marine environment that is designed to
increase man’s knowledge and is conducted for peaceful purposes.”26
Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nigeria submitted the following draft: “For the
purpose of this Convention, marine scientific research means any study and related experimental work conducted in the marine environment designed to increase mankind’s
knowledge thereof.”27
It seems that the term “marine scientific research” as defined in these two texts included
not only research activities unrelated to resource exploration but also research activities
related to resource exploration. However, both proposals made a distinction between
these two categories of marine scientific research in their substantive provisions. According to these provisions different rules would apply to the two kinds of research. As
a result, the problem of establishing criteria to define the scope of scientific research
activities to which the substantive provisions would apply was shifted from the discussions on the definitional article to the discussions on the substantive provisions. At the
fourth session of the conference (spring 1976), consensus was reached to abandon the
definition of marine scientific research—at least not to consider the question for the
time being.28 Consequently, the definition was absent from the final text of UNCLOS
and remains absent today.
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Marine Scientific Research in UNCLOS
UNCLOS does not contain a definition of marine scientific research because there was
a consensus at the conference that the substantive provisions of the convention clearly
establish the meaning intended, making a definition of the term unnecessary.29 Examining the substantive provisions related to marine scientific research in the various regimes
established by UNCLOS, it can be found that the activities that can be regarded as marine scientific research vary in the various maritime zones established by the convention,
although the term might otherwise seem to have a clear ordinary meaning, as discussed
above.
Under the regime of the high seas, the term “marine scientific research” can be understood in a general sense. According to article 87, scientific research is one of the six
fundamental freedoms that can be exercised under the conditions laid down by
UNCLOS and by other rules of international law.30 The marine scientific research activities within the high seas can be either fundamental or applied. The results can be used
either for civilian purposes or for military activities. The research can either have no
direct links with resource development and environmental protection, or it can have as
its main objective the protection of the marine environment or marine-resource exploration and development. The only exception is that scientific research on the high seas
cannot be related to the development of the resources of the continental shelf beyond a
coastal state’s exclusive economic zone.31
The “Area” regime is a new system established under the convention to regulate mineral
resource development activities on the seabed of the high seas so as to protect these
resources as the “common heritage of mankind.”32 The provisions of UNCLOS Part IX
dealing with the Area (i.e., the seabed under the high seas) seem to have as their main
purpose the regulation of the activities of states in investigating, researching, and developing the resources in the Area. How to protect the environment in the Area while states
carry out the development of its resources has recently become an important issue.
The meaning of research and the activities under the jurisdiction of coastal states are
also different, depending on the maritime zone. In the territorial sea, the general meaning of research is used in UNCLOS, which specifies that research and survey activities
are a violation of the innocent-passage regime in the territorial sea.33 Hydrographic
surveys and military surveys for the safety of navigation can be seen as applied scientific
research.
In the EEZ regime, coastal states exercise sovereign rights over exploration, development,
conservation, and management of marine resources and exercise jurisdiction over marine environmental protection and marine scientific research.34 It is very clear that in the
exclusive economic zone, the convention treats activities related to resource development
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and environmental protection separately from marine scientific research, which is in
sharp contrast with the convention’s approach to the issue in the high seas and the Area.
Thus, within the EEZ research activities directly related to resource development and environmental protection are not marine scientific research. All remaining activities, including hydrographic and military survey activities, are therefore considered part of marine scientific research, subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state.
Since in the relevant provisions of the EEZ regime survey activities were not distinguished from marine scientific research, Sam Bateman concludes that “marine scientific
research, hydrographic surveying and military surveys all overlap to some extent. Some
so-called military surveys, particularly military oceanographic research, are virtually the
same as marine scientific research.”35
As for intelligence collection, if the collection is limited to the activities of warships,
submarines, etc., of the coastal states in order to increase understanding of their performance and to activities and not directly related to the marine environment research, it
cannot be considered marine scientific research. However, that is a problem beyond the
scope of this paper.

Conclusion
Although UNCLOS does not fully and finally define marine scientific research, such
activities are generally divided into fundamental research and applied scientific research.
Having examined the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, we can find that marine scientific
research has different usages depending on whether it is directly related to the activities
of resource exploration and development and of environmental protection.
Under the regime of high seas, the term “marine scientific research” has its most expansive meaning. In the Area, the main purpose of marine scientific research activities
is exploration and development of the resources of the Area and the protection of the
environment of the Area. In the territorial seas, marine scientific research can be seen as
fundamental research that is different from hydrographic survey.
Under the regimes of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, the exploration, development, conservation, and management of marine resources are considered
to be the sovereign right of coastal states, and the coastal states exercise jurisdiction over
marine environmental protection and marine scientific research activities. Here, marine
survey and research activities directly related to resource development and environmental protection are not considered marine scientific research. As for the hydrographic and
military surveys in the exclusive economic zone, they are within the scope of activities
over which the coastal state has the right to exercise jurisdiction, because they fall under
the definition of marine scientific research for those zones.
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C HAPTER S IX

Resources Rights and Environmental Protection in the
Exclusive Economic Zone
The Functional Approach to Naval Operations
Cdr. James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy

T

he 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is perhaps
the most comprehensive environmental treaty ever adopted.1 As an umbrella or
framework treaty, UNCLOS contains broad guidelines for addressing preservation of the
marine environment. During its negotiation, the United States and other states sought
to create a treaty that would promote preservation of the marine environment without
impairing legitimate ocean activities, and this objective was accomplished.2 Nevertheless,
the enforcement rights demanded by some coastal states in the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) raised the specter of the creation of national lakes, where no foreign-flagged maritime activity could occur without the permission of the coastal state. Before the negotiation of UNCLOS struck a balance between coastal-state and user-state interests, creeping
jurisdiction threatened to upend completely the existing global system of marine
transportation. Some feared that such a jurisdictional change could effectively terminate
world maritime commerce, especially if the world’s coastal states began to enforce widely
divergent rules or demand the payment of some form of compensation, tribute, or rent
by foreign-flagged vessels to transit through their offshore waters.3

A workable balance, however, was reached. UNCLOS obligates states parties to take
measures necessary to protect and preserve fragile marine ecosystems;4 it also, however,
provides that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) may “establish rules and
standards to prevent and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels.”5
States have a general obligation to act through the IMO or a general diplomatic conference to establish international rules and standards regarding vessel-source pollution and
to reexamine them from time to time as necessary.6 More specifically, UNCLOS provides
that in cases in which generally accepted standards are inadequate to protect the environment, member states may work through the IMO to obtain consensus and approval
for special measures to control vessel-source pollution within the EEZ.7
Some UNCLOS provisions are to be read as directly operative, immediately applicable,
and complementary to other IMO instruments. For example, the provisions on
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navigational rights and freedoms are complete and should be implemented by all states
as operative provisions. The individual articles contain specific rules that are binding on states and require no additional implementing authority. Similarly, some of the
environmental provisions of the convention contain operative language as well. The
provisions contained in article 226 on investigation of foreign vessels, for example, may
be compared with regulations in article 5 of MARPOL 73/78. Both articles indicate how
certificates should be inspected and what measures are to be taken when vessels do not
have proper certificates.8
UNCLOS recognizes that where international rules are inadequate to meet special
circumstances and a coastal state has reasonable grounds to believe that a particularly
defined area in the EEZ is required “for recognized technical reasons in relation to its
oceanographic and ecological conditions,” the coastal state may work through the IMO
to adopt special rules applicable in the area.9 The special rules may apply to “certain
clearly defined” areas of the EEZ, which suggests that they are not intended to apply throughout the entire EEZ of a coastal state. To justify adoption of such measures,
evidence must suggest that the existing international rules and standards are inadequate
for the special circumstances occurring within the limited area. The designation process
requires an IMO determination that the conditions in a particular area correspond to
the special measures being requested by the coastal state. The coastal state should consult
with the IMO and other states concerned, and proposals for mandatory measures should
be supported by scientific and technical evidence and information on reception facilities. Any such rules, moreover, shall not require vessels to observe construction, design,
equipping, and manning (CDEM) rules that depart from “generally accepted international rules and standards.”10 UNCLOS adopted a bright-line rule against coastal-state
enforcement of national CDEM standards in the EEZ, the prospect of which “struck terror” into the hearts of ship operators.11 If coastal states had been permitted individually
to enforce separate CDEM standards, the commercial shipping industry and flag-state
registries would have been unable to build ships in accordance with uniform design,
creating an enormous artificial inefficiency in the world transportation system.
The greatest consideration for understanding coastal-state enforcement within the rules
of UNCLOS, however, is the distinction between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement authority. The authority of the coastal state to prescribe environmental regulations
in the EEZ is broader than the coastal-state authority to enforce such regulations. That
is, there is no natural corresponding balance of authority by the coastal state between
prescription and enforcement. Coastal states have authority to prescribe laws and regulations in the EEZ under article 56 of the convention, provided those rules comply with
the other rules of the treaty (such as articles 58 and 87, which protect the rights of all
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states to enjoy high-seas freedoms in the zone). But coastal states do not enjoy a broad
enforcement mandate in the zone.

Coastal-State Prescription and Enforcement
The architecture for coastal-state enforcement of environmental rules is set forth in
UNCLOS article 220. In order to bypass its more stringent rules, since 1990 states have
begun advocating establishment of particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs), which are
IMO-recognized marine sanctuaries beyond the territorial sea of a coastal state. The
United States, for example, obtained IMO approval for an enormous PSSA in the northwestern Hawaiian Islands in 2008, even though the area has no discernible international
shipping and no record of foreign-flagged vessels connected to environmental incidents
in the area. The PSSA process may be thought of as a shortcut, bypassing UNCLOS
and other instruments like MARPOL 73/78. This and other treaty-based regimes also
provide authority for creation of special areas or marine environmental sanctuaries but,
due to their legally binding nature, require greater procedural fidelity at IMO. The PSSA,
on the other hand, sometimes captures the same purpose without the burdens of treaty
negotiations.
It is important to note that PSSA designation of a particular area does not provide any
additional authority for coastal-state enforcement of environmental regulation in the
EEZ beyond what is provided in article 220. That is, informal and nontreaty processes
of the PSSA, driven by IMO’s consensus procedures and “spirit of cooperation,” cannot
usurp the rights of all states to freedoms of the seas that are protected in UNCLOS.
In other words, UNCLOS established an environmental framework that affords certain
rights and duties to the coastal state, and the fact that a coastal state has secured a PSSA
designation does not undo that part of the bargain. UNCLOS provides that in cases
in which a coastal state has “clear grounds” (based on “reasonable suspicion”) that a
foreign-flagged vessel in its territorial sea has violated laws and regulations adopted in
accordance with the convention or other applicable international rules and standards,
the coastal state may undertake physical inspection of the vessel in relation to the suspected violation.12 It is important to note that this provision contains a two-part test for
launching a physical inspection of the vessel: the coastal state must have clear grounds
or reasonable suspicion of a violation of its laws, and more important, those laws must
have been adopted in accordance with the guidance set forth in the convention. Coastalstate laws that are inconsistent with those contained in UNCLOS, such as Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, are not eligible for coastal-state assertion of enforcement authority under the convention.13 The coastal state may also, where the evidence
so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention.14 This action by the coastal state,
however, triggers the convention’s provisions for prompt release.15
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Where a coastal state has “clear grounds” that such a violation has occurred in the EEZ,
the coastal state may require the foreign-flagged vessel to provide information regarding its identity and port of registry, last and next ports of call, and “other relevant
information” in order to make a final determination as to “whether a violation actually occurred” (art. 220[3]). In cases in which a state has clear grounds of a “substantial
discharge causing or threatening significant pollution” in the EEZ, that coastal state may
initiate a physical inspection of the foreign-flagged ship if the vessel refuses to provide
relevant information or if the information provided turns out to be “manifestly at variance” with the facts (art. 220[5]).
In cases presenting “clear objective evidence” that a foreign-flagged vessel in the EEZ
or territorial seas has committed a violation of laws consistent with UNCLOS, thereby
causing “major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline” or marine resource,
the coastal state may institute proceedings against the ship. This may involve detention
of the vessel, seizing it in rem (art. 220[6]). Such a course of action taken by the coastal
state, however, once again would set in motion the provisions for the posting of a bond
or surety and prompt release (art. 220[7]).

Transport of Radioactive Material
When judiciously applied, the environmental provisions of UNCLOS are not inconsistent with the broad mandate of navigational freedoms, also reflected in the treaty.
For example, the treaty entitles ships carrying hazardous cargoes to navigate freely
throughout the territorial sea and the EEZ. In innocent passage, for example, article 23
states, “foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently
dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special precautionary measures
established for such ships by international agreements.”
Article 23 is important because it presupposes the right to transit a coastal state’s territorial sea with radioactive material and the idea that such transit should be in accordance
with internationally developed standards rather than unilateral, coastal-state rules.
UNCLOS is quite clear that coastal states lack competence to circumscribe passage of
vessels carrying hazardous or nuclear materials merely because of the type of cargo,
class of vessel, or flag of registry. In this respect, the outcome of the negotiations shows
evidence of a preference for the protection of navigational freedoms over unilateral
coastal-state environmental authority. The negotiators avoided—or at least reduced—
the mischief that flows from the politicization of coastal-state environmental regulations
or the purported imposition of environmental regulations by coastal states to achieve
nonenvironmental purposes (such as asserting political control over an offshore area).
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Exclusive Flag-State Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional framework reflected in UNCLOS for prescription and enforcement
of safety rules and standards is based on exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. The concept is
further implemented by IMO, through which complementary regulations are adopted
concerning construction, design, equipment, seaworthiness, and manning of ships used
for international voyages. The exercise of flag-state jurisdiction is the primary mechanism for control of shipping. Some other areas, including signals, communications,
prevention of collisions, ship-routing measures, and recommendatory or mandatory
ship reporting, involve shared flag-state and coastal-state jurisdiction. Article 94 contains
the basic obligations imposed on the flag states, requiring adoption of safety measures to
reflect “generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices.”16 Because
of their worldwide acceptance, the IMO considers the following instruments to fulfill the
“generally accepted” requirement: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974); the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Protocol 1978); the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load Lines 1966); the International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships, 1969 (TONNAGE 1969); the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREG 1972); International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
(STCW 1978); and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR
1979).17 The effort to broaden enforcement of IMO safety and marine pollution standards was further strengthened by the incorporation into SOLAS of the International
Safety Management Code, under which shipping firms are subject to a safe management
system administered by the flag state.
It has long been recognized that some flag states have not lived up to their responsibility
to implement and enforce generally accepted international standards on vessels flying
their flags. The “flags of convenience” or “open registries,” such as those of Panama and
Liberia, have been particularly vulnerable to the charge. In order to strengthen flagstate efforts, the IMO adopted Guidelines to Assist Flag States in the Implementation of
IMO Instruments.18 The resolution provides flag states with more refined direction on
establishing and maintaining application and enforcement of a range of IMO treaties.19
A subsequent IMO resolution assists flag states in conducting self-assessments of their
performance.20 Finally, IMO’s Measures to Further Strengthen Flag State Implementation provide guidance for more rigorous flag-state implementation of IMO standards.21
The IMO Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) was established in 1992
upon the recommendation of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) for a stricter and
more uniform application of existing regulations. The move followed several high-profile
marine accidents, including the Exxon Valdez. Since its creation, additional marine
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disasters have reinforced the importance of strengthening flag-state implementation of
IMO standards. The FSI seeks to identify measures needed to ensure consistent global
instruments. Many of the shortfalls are related to a lack of capacity, particularly in
developing states, and the FSI has contributed to increased training among flag states.
In November 2003, the IMO Assembly adopted the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit
Scheme.22 The goal of the scheme is to enhance the performance of member states in
implementing the IMO instruments relating to maritime safety and the prevention of
vessel-source pollution. Significantly, the IMO Assembly adoption of a voluntary scheme
specifically did not foreclose the possibility that in the future it could become mandatory.
This regulatory architecture means that except in rare cases, usually involving port-state
interests, flag states bear exclusive responsibility for enforcement of international standards.23 Port states may elect to impose port-state control measures, but such regulations
may be implemented only against foreign-flagged vessels that are bound for a port of
the coastal state.24 Despite the broad and liberal regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea, some coastal states purport to prescribe and enforce special environmental
measures against vessels exercising their right of navigation.25 More onerous still, coastal
states are becoming increasingly willing to impair the enjoyment of high-seas freedoms
of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, often purportedly for environmental purposes.
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mauritius, New
Zealand, and South Africa, for example, all have sought to exclude foreign-flagged vessels
carrying radioactive “ultra-hazardous” cargo through their EEZs.26 In several examples
in the 1990s, vessels carrying highly radioactive material attracted widespread protest.
The voyages of Pacific Pintail, Pacific Teal, Pacific Swan, and Akatsuki Maru drew protest
on several continents. In 1992 the Akatsuki Maru, a refitted tanker, left Cherbourg,
France, with a cargo of 2,200 pounds of plutonium oxide bound for Japan for use in an
experimental breeder reactor. The twenty-seven-thousand-kilometer journey wound
around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, dipped south of Australia, then headed north
toward Japan.27 Greenpeace targeted the ship, and the transit became a global sensation.28 Such policies are plainly inconsistent with the plain terms of UNCLOS.

Zoning the Zone
In other circumstances, coastal states abuse their pollution-control jurisdiction by trying to use it as a mechanism for extracting prior notification or imposing coastal-state
consent requirements for foreign-flagged ships.29 One of the principal tools emerging for
tightening coastal-state control over the EEZ is intra-EEZ zoning.
These efforts, often cloaked in environmental idiom, are troublesome. Even as they attempt to push the boundaries of environmental protection, they are also inconsistent
with the Rio Declaration, one of five agreements adopted at the 1992 “Earth Summit”
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in Rio de Janeiro. Although the Rio Declaration is a nonbinding instrument of international law, it is regarded as an expression of important principles concerning international environmental protection and sustainable development. Principle 12 of Rio says,
“Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.”30 Thus, states asserting excessive environmental prescription and
enforcement authority in the EEZ may be viewed not as champions at the forefront of
a vanguard movement but as willful actors, proceeding in a direction contrary to basic
precepts of international environmental law. Governments risk overreaching and creating a backlash against legitimate and consensus-based efforts to achieve stronger marine
environmental protection.

Sovereign Immunity
Additionally, coastal-state environmental regulations in the EEZ should have no effect
on naval operations, as UNCLOS provides comprehensive immunity for warships and
other public vessels. Article 95 underlies the principle of complete immunity in its first
sentence, which corresponds with article 8(1) of the 1958 High Seas Convention.31 Article 96 of UNCLOS, setting forth the broad categories of exempt vessels, is derived from
article 9 of the High Seas Convention and is consistent with article 3 of the Chicago
Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944.32 Notwithstanding the enjoyment of sovereign
immunity, the flag states of registry for warships and other public vessels and state
aircraft have obligations to ensure that their platforms act in a manner that is consistent
with UNCLOS.33 The article is subject to two qualifications that ensure the vessels and
aircraft are not deterred in mission accomplishment—the operational capabilities of the
platforms cannot be impaired, and compliance with the rules of UNCLOS is required
only insofar as is “reasonable and practicable.” Similarly, article 236 states:
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine
environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned
or operated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial
service. However, each state shall ensure, by adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated
by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and
practicable, with this Convention.

Despite the provisions of articles 95, 96, and 236, a handful of coastal states are adding environmental protection to their quiver of arguments for trying to deny foreign
military vessels access to their EEZs. China is one of the leading offenders in this regard,
suggesting that concern for the environment is one of the bases for impeding the transit
of sovereign immune vessels.34
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Due Regard
The term “due regard” appears again and again in UNCLOS.35 During the drafting of
the convention, the term “reasonable regard” evolved first to “due consideration” before
settling at “due regard.”36 The U.S. Navy views the “reasonable regard” and “due regard”
standards as essentially identical. The Navy adds fidelity to the definition, asserting that
the “reasonable regard” of the High Seas Convention and the “due regard” of the Law of
the Sea Convention “are one and the same and require any using nation to be cognizant
of the interests of others in using a high seas area, and to abstain from nonessential,
exclusive uses which substantially interfere with the exercise of other nations’ high seas
freedoms.”37
Naval forces still are required to exercise due regard in the EEZ, just as coastal states have
a due-regard requirement. There are instances when a warship inside the EEZ might
choose not to conduct certain operations because of due regard for the natural environment. For example, a gunnery exercise intentionally targeting a whale migration would
display a lack of due regard for economic and environmental interests of the coastal
state. Similarly, a proposed weapons exercise in close proximity to an active offshore
oil platform also could be expected to violate the principle of due regard.38 But as Raul
Pedrozo has said, “these situations are the exception, not the rule, and cannot be dictated
unilaterally by the coastal state.”39
The U.S. Navy, for example, conducts naval maneuvers using low- and midfrequency
sonar systems around the world. In order to mitigate any potential impact from these
exercises, the Navy voluntarily applies marine-mammal mitigation measures that were
developed by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and that take into account
operational imperatives, as well as the best available science on the effect of sonar on
marine mammals. In January 2007, the Navy instituted a series of twenty-nine mitigation measures to avoid the possibility of interfering with marine mammals.40 Scientific
research now suggests that there is no evidence that the Navy’s sonar use, when protective measures are applied, affects either marine mammals or fish.41 The U.S. Navy’s
practices have been subjected to litigation and ultimately to review by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In the case, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the NRDC sued the Secretary of the Navy over sonar use during military maneuvers and exercises. The Supreme
Court found that in forty years of sonar training there was no documented episode of
harm to marine mammals under American jurisdiction caused by the use of sonar.42
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention employs the phrase “reasonable regard” as a rule
applicable to the exercise of high-seas freedom, which “shall be exercised by all States
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom
of the high seas.” The 1958 High Seas Convention also uses the term “due regard” in

military activities in the eez

83

article 26, requiring the coastal state to pay “due regard” to cables and pipelines already
positioned on the seabed. The term is also reflected in article 24 of the Territorial Sea
Convention and article 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention.43 The International
Court of Justice has determined that the provision of “reasonable regard” is declaratory
of customary international law.44
Article 58(3) of UNCLOS provides that in exercising their rights and performing their
duties in the EEZ, states have complementary obligations to exercise due regard for the
rights and duties of the coastal state. Specifically, article 58(3) provides, “In exercising
their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are
not incompatible with this Part.”
Article 56(2), in turn, requires the coastal state to have due regard to the rights and
duties of other states operating in the EEZ. That article sets forth the complementary
standard: “In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in
the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.”
Furthermore, volume 3 of the authoritative University of Virginia Commentary on
UNCLOS explains the “due regard” requirement as a
qualification of the rights of States in exercising freedoms of the high seas. The standard
“due regard” requires all States, in exercising their high seas freedoms, to be aware of and
consider the interests of other States in using the high seas. As the [International Law
Commission] stated in its Commentary in 1956, “States are bound to refrain from any acts
that might adversely affect the use of the high seas by nationals of other States.” The construction in paragraph 2 recognized that all States have the right to exercise high seas freedoms, and balances consideration for the rights and interests of all States in this regard.45

In sum, in the EEZ, coastal states shall have due regard for the rights and freedoms of
the other states, and in turn other states shall have due regard for the rights and duties
of the coastal state. In the exercise of these rights and in performing their duties, states
conducting military activities in a coastal state’s EEZ shall observe “due regard” for the
rights and duties of the coastal state. Moreover, because of the protections provided
by sovereign immunity, the flag state, not the coastal state, has the sole right to enforce
upon its naval vessels the obligation to exercise “due regard.”46
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The “Dueling Due Regards”
The existence of “dueling due regards” that apply to the exercise of concurrent rights,
duties, and jurisdiction demonstrates that UNCLOS reflects a functional rather than an
exclusive model. Articles 58(3), 87(2), and 56(2) reflect identical language. “Due regard”
consists of two elements: first, an awareness of and consideration for other states’ interests, and second, a weighting of those interests or sources of authority.47 Since “freedom”
is a broader genus than “right,” freedom of navigation may logically be said to trump
some coastal-state rights.48
In light of this analysis, the definition proposed by Professor George K. Walker, of the
Law of the Sea Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association,
is the best restatement of the term “due regard.”
“Due regard” as used in the 1982 LOS Convention, art. 87, is a qualification of the rights
of states in exercising the freedoms of the high seas. “Due regard” requires all states, in
exercising their high seas freedoms, to be aware of and consider the interests of other states
in using the high seas, and to refrain from activities that interfere with the exercise by other
states of the freedom of the high seas. States are bound to refrain from any acts that might
adversely affect the use of the high seas by nationals of other states. Article 87 recognizes
that all states have the right to exercise high seas freedoms, and balances consideration for
the rights and interests of all states in this regard.49

The coastal state is in an equal position vis-à-vis the flag state in this regard only in
cases in which it is weighing under article 234 the right of coastal-state regulation over
foreign-flagged shipping in ice-covered areas. Article 234 departs from normal practice,
or the typical rules that apply in the EEZ, and permits a heightened level of authority
for the coastal state. In ice-covered areas of the EEZ coastal states may adopt and enforce
nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for preventing, reducing, and controlling marine pollution from ships. In this case, such laws “shall have due regard to navigation and
the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”50
The terms also have application in the law of international aviation and the law of naval
warfare. The Chicago Convention requires state parties to ensure that their state aircraft
exercise “due regard” for the navigational safety of civil aircraft.51 Within the context of
the law of naval warfare, “due regard” is used as a principle for regulating belligerent
rights and duties.52
Chinese scholars suggest the “two due regards” do not automatically cancel the other and
that they should be read as providing the coastal state with the superior right.53 Since
coastal states enjoy sovereign rights of ownership, exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of natural resources, jurisdiction over protection of the marine
environment, control of access to the zone for marine environmental research, and the
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establishment of artificial islands and installations, Chinese international lawyers argue
that the actions of other states are subordinate to these rights.
The claim is that the sovereign rights of the coastal state in the economic sphere create a higher right generally for the coastal state vis-à-vis all other activities in the EEZ.
Specifically, these scholars assert that the coastal state has “indisputable” superiority
when conflicts arise between the rights of the coastal state and those of other states.54
A more sophisticated, and correct, interpretation, however, is that the sovereign rights
and jurisdiction of the coastal state in the zone are superior only in matters pertaining
to its exclusive economic status and its sovereign rights in the zone. The rights of the
international community are superior in matters pertaining to freedom of navigation
and overflight and “other lawful uses” of the area. The coastal state indeed has a superior
right, but only to those competencies specifically cut from the high seas and granted by
UNCLOS to the coastal nation.

Due Regard Is a Procedural Obligation
Perhaps more important, the term “due regard” is a procedural right. It does not create
any substantive new legal right—it requires only that states observe the legitimate and
existing rights of other parties. Otherwise, the term simply becomes an empty vessel,
requiring the international community to observe as “due regard” any rule imposed by
the coastal state, no matter how unreasonable.
Warships and military aircraft operating in China’s EEZ are exercising “due regard” so
long as they do not attempt to diminish China’s exclusive rights and jurisdiction to its
oceanic living and nonliving resources, such as intentionally interfering with a fishing
vessel or hazarding an oil platform. In evaluating what constitutes an actual interference
with the coastal state’s exploitation of the resources of the EEZ, one has to apply a test of
reasonableness. For example, it would not be reasonable to suggest that a foreign-flagged
submarine transiting submerged through a coastal state’s EEZ might injure marine
mammals and is therefore failing to exercise “due regard” for the coastal state’s interests in the living resources and as a result is not permitted to pass without coastal-state
permission.
It is important not to become carried away with theoretical effects of foreign-flagged
vessels and aircraft on the resources of the EEZ, effects that are so remotely insignificant that their proximate connection to causative fact becomes extremely doubtful.
The inquiry becomes progressively more hopeless in proportion to the degree to which
the coastal state’s claim of enjoyment and exploitation of the living and nonliving resources of the EEZ hinges on the “horseshoe nail” or “butterfly” effects of foreign military activities.55 Thus, an occurrence that is possible but likely to be irrelevant, such

86

china maritime studies

as a foreign-flagged submarine striking a marine mammal in a coastal state’s EEZ, does
not justify coastal-state regulations that trump age-old high-seas freedoms. On the other
hand, it is equally specious for the coastal state to posit that foreign military activities in
the EEZ risk something that is at once highly portentous but nearly impossible. For example, the fact that a foreign-flagged nuclear submarine transiting the EEZ might be an
instrument of nuclear war—and thereby invite nuclear retaliation that would devastate
marine resources—would not justify coastal-state regulation of such submarines.

Conclusion
Environmental aspects of creeping coastal-state jurisdiction are being misapplied in
order to obtain greater authority over foreign-flagged offshore shipping. Most coastal
states succumb to the temptation to attempt to regulate offshore foreign-flagged shipping, a trend that threatens to unravel the package deal of the 1982 convention. The
United States has often taken a relatively cautious approach in asserting environmental
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels, doing so usually only as a condition of port
entry. The United States is inclined to rely on conditions of port entry and port-state
control measures to protect the marine environment rather than attempting to assert
coastal-state jurisdiction in waters beyond the territorial sea, because it seeks to strengthen the UNCLOS framework.
Furthermore, a feature of U.S. marine environmental laws, the “international law savings
clause,” protects the rights and freedom of navigation of foreign-flagged vessels, notwithstanding other provisions of the statute that might otherwise impair those rights.
Foreign-flagged vessels transport more than 90 percent of international commercial
freight entering and departing ports of the United States.56 Foreign-controlled shipping
accounts for 95 percent of passenger ships and 75 percent of cargo ships operating in
U.S. waters.57 As one of the beneficiaries of a globalized economy, the United States understands that it needs foreign-flagged shipping, and its laws accommodate such ships in
accordance with UNCLOS. Typically, American law exempts foreign-flagged vessels from
regulatory requirements that interfere with innocent passage in the territorial sea, transit
passage through the Bering Strait, or the exercise of freedom of navigation and other
high-seas freedoms throughout the exclusive economic zone. In these ways, the United
States acts responsibly to respect the rights of all states at sea, while also undertaking its
obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment.
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C HAPTER S EV EN

Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ
Issues and Prospects
Xue Guifang (Julia)

T

he advancement of science and technology requires adjustments in state practices regarding the appropriate interpretation of provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to address current inadequacies in the international framework. With today’s ever-changing circumstances, more
survey activities conducted in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) should be included in
the jurisdictional scope of coastal-state authority to regulate marine scientific research
(MSR) under UNCLOS article 56. Additionally, researching states should be expected
to implement faithfully the coastal state’s MSR regime, and coastal states should make
an effort to facilitate research and survey activities that have peaceful purposes. Moreover, the development of practical procedures and guidelines for research and surveys
in the EEZ may be a useful development to avoid the potential for conflict and to foster
cooperation.

The UNCLOS Regime
UNCLOS, also called “the Ocean Constitution,” was concluded in 1982 and formally entered into force in 1994.1 It provides a general regime, set forth dominantly in Part XIII
of UNCLOS, articles 238 through 265, to regulate the conduct of MSR activities in the
world’s oceans. Within this regime all states, irrespective of their geographical location,
and competent international research organizations have the right to conduct MSR subject to the rights and duties of other states (art. 238). States are obliged to promote and
facilitate the development and conduct of MSR (art. 239); MSR is to be conducted for
peaceful purposes only, with appropriate scientific methods compatible with UNCLOS,
is not to interfere unjustifiably with other legitimate uses of the sea, and is to be in accordance with national regulations adopted in conformity with UNCLOS, including those
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (art. 240). MSR activities
shall not constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment
or its resources (art. 241).
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UNCLOS also sets forth particular provisions for MSR conducted in various maritime
zones, including the territorial sea (art. 245), international straits (art. 40), and archipelagic waters (art. 54). UNCLOS further provides that a coastal state can regulate MSR
and hydrographic surveys in its territorial seas (art. 21[1][g]). Access and the conditions
of access to the territorial sea for these activities are under the exclusive control of the
coastal state (art. 245); during transit passage of international straits and archipelagic
sea-lanes MSR and hydrographic survey ships “may not carry out research or survey
activity without the prior authorization of the States bordering the straits” (arts. 54, 40,
respectively). MSR may be carried out on the high seas and in the Area (the seabed of
the high seas), but exclusively for peaceful purposes.2
The EEZ regime is the most creative part of UNCLOS, and much attention is given by
coastal states to their sovereign rights and jurisdiction in it. Coastal states are granted
sovereign rights over resource-related matters and exclusive jurisdiction over artificial islands, MSR, and the protection of the marine environment out to two hundred nautical
miles (art. 56). Part XIII of UNCLOS, plus some provisions of Part V, provides a regime
for MSR in the EEZ and on the continental shelf (arts. 246–53). Coastal states may at
their discretion decide whether to grant or withhold their consent for MSR activities in
their EEZs. Coastal states enjoy the right to formulate and implement relevant national
laws and regulations and the right to exercise supervision over or to board and monitor any MSR platforms in their EEZs and on the continental shelf (art. 246). Access for
MSR by other states or competent international organizations to a coastal state’s EEZ
and continental shelf is subject to the consent of that state. Coastal states are normally
required to grant consent for MSR projects carried out in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment
for the benefit of all humankind.
There are five situations when the coastal state may at its discretion withhold consent to
certain MSR activities. Consent from the coastal states may be denied if the MSR is of
direct significance for resource exploration or exploitation, whether living or nonliving;
involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives, or the introduction of
harmful substances into the marine environment; or involves the construction, operation, or use of artificial islands, installations, or structures (art. 246). Consent may also
be withheld if inaccurate information regarding the nature and objectives of the project
was supplied to the coastal state or if the researching state or international organization
has outstanding obligations to the coastal state from a prior research project (art. 246).
UNCLOS thus emphasizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state over MSR in the
EEZ and on the continental shelf.
The consent of the coastal state may be either expressed or implied. Four months after
the request by an international organization of which the coastal state is a member (art.
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247), or six months after a request by a foreign state (art. 252), if no objection is lodged
by the coastal state concerned, consent is implied. When conducting MSR in a coastal
state’s EEZ, the foreign state has the obligation to provide information to the coastal
state (art. 248), to comply with certain conditions (art. 249), and to be responsible and
liable for any damage resulting from MSR activities (art. 263).
It is noted that “survey activities” are primarily dealt with in UNCLOS Parts II, III, and
XI and Annex III, rather than in Part XIII. This may be taken as an indication that survey activities do not fall under the MSR regime, although as discussed above it is clear
that a coastal state’s permission is required for both MSR and survey activities in the territorial sea, straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic sea-lanes passage.
Nevertheless, views differ concerning whether hydrographic surveys in the EEZ need the
prior authorization of the coastal state. Uncertainties and different interpretations also
arise concerning whether the MSR regime applies to military surveys. Some believe that
not all marine data-collection activities are regulated by the MSR regime in Part XIII;
others oppose that view.3

Contentious Issues
It is obvious that international law encourages the performance of MSR in order to
enrich knowledge of the world oceans, a right granted to all states by the provisions and
requirements of UNCLOS.4 However, the debates during the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) failed to provide agreement on a definition
of the term “marine scientific research.” Even today, UNCLOS does not provide a legal
definition regarding that term or other marine data-collecting activities, such as surveys,
which has resulted in divergent views and conflicting positions regarding a coastal state’s
jurisdictional control over research and survey activities in the EEZ. Clarification is provided below for these terms and the various aspects of their application.
In general, “marine scientific research” refers to any activity undertaken in the ocean and
coastal waters with the purpose of expanding scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its processes.5 MSR activities include physical and chemical oceanography, marine biology and chemistry, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and coring, geological and geophysical surveying, and any other activity having a scientific purpose. MSR
is of great significance as an important component of contemporary natural science, and
it plays a key role in supporting the long-term use of marine resources and sustainable
ocean development. The results of MSR are generally made publicly available.
MSR has been an important trigger for legal development, supporting states in advancing their political and economic interests in the ocean domain. Emerging issues have
brought forth legal implications of the MSR regime in recent years. Such issues relate to
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the implementation of some provisions of Part XIII, such as the confusion as to which
marine data-collection activities come within its scope. UNCLOS gives coastal states
jurisdiction to regulate MSR in their EEZs but fails to provide specific provisions on
jurisdiction over survey activities.
Survey activities may be further categorized into two kinds, hydrographic and military.6
The former were mostly left untreated as MSR, but developments in recent years have
complicated matters. Hydrographic surveys are activities with the purpose of collecting
data for the production of navigational charts to support safety of navigation. Data collected from hydrographic survey activities may include the depth of water, configuration
and nature of the natural bottom, directions and force of currents, heights and times of
tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation.7
Military surveys are generally activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters
involving classified and unclassified marine data collection conducted by military
vessels for military purposes. Military surveys can include collection of oceanographic,
hydrographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological, acoustic, and related
data that may not be normally available to the public. There is hot debate over the term
“military survey” and its legal implications. However, the term is not found in either
international or national law. Some believe that military surveys fundamentally bear the
same nature as MSR and should be regulated by the MSR regime of UNCLOS. Others
argue that military surveys should not be regarded as MSR, since they are conducted for
military, not scientific, purposes.8 Disagreement regarding military surveys conducted in
the EEZ of a coastal state is wide.
Again, although UNCLOS provides some treatment of surveys, it does not define the
term. Because there are no universally accepted, unambiguous definitions of MSR or
surveys that take into account the nature of these activities, their operational methods, and means used or that establish objective criteria to determine the purposes and
motivations for undertaking them, many issues have arisen over how to put the relevant
provisions of UNCLOS into practice. These issues relate to the application of the regime,
particularly in the EEZ. There has been heated debate about the relationship between
MSR and hydrographic surveys, including surveys conducted by military vessels. The
crucial part of the debate concerns whether the latter conducted in the EEZ should be
treated as MSR and put under the jurisdiction of the coastal state.
The root cause of the debate is related to differing perspectives on the EEZ. Two trends
are noticeable. One is the territorialization of the EEZ, as represented by the developing
coastal states. These states appreciate the importance of the ocean to their national security and the sustainable development of their social and economic institutions. Limited
by such factors as technology, human resources, and national strength, their capacities to
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undertake research and surveys are not on par with those of developed states. They cherish the waters under their jurisdiction and hope to become able to explore and exploit
them in the future. These states have expressed concern that their interests are not sufficiently taken into consideration during the planning and execution of research projects
and are suspicious that they will not benefit from the research results. They tend to seek
stricter control over the research and survey activities in their EEZs than international
law currently grants.
Not surprisingly, another trend is the internationalization of the EEZ by developed costal states. Most MSR projects are undertaken by a relatively small number of developed
states, in many cases off the coasts of developing states. However, since the EEZ was originally high seas, some states find it difficult to accept that MSR is now within the scope
of coastal-state jurisdiction. These states are reluctant to admit the legal status of the
EEZ and even call it “international waters.” They hold the view that the residual rights of
high-sea freedoms are applicable to the EEZ, except for resource-related activities. These
states rely on the incorporation in the EEZ by UNCLOS article 58(2) of the provisions
of articles 88–115, which relate to high-seas freedoms. As researching states, they refuse
to abide by the conditions established by coastal states.9 Some of their research and
survey activities may also conflict with coastal states’ national interests. Friction can easily lead to conflict and “lose-lose” situations. A balance needs to be struck between the
proponents of maximum freedom for research and surveys and maximum coastal-state
control over the same activities.
Practical problems arise from the distinction between research and surveys involving
the determination of the intended use of the data collected. Based on UNCLOS Part
XIII, some argue that the methods of the data collected and their motives or intended use
constitute the primary differences among MSR, hydrographic surveys, and military
surveys and thus determine whether a particular marine data-collection activity is MSR
and what therefore are the applicable rules. This presents difficult questions, such as how
the motives for MSR, hydrographic surveys, or military surveys are to be determined.
What constitutes a “scientific purpose” or a “military purpose,” and who determines
that? When does the gathering of information to “make navigational charts and [ensure]
safety of navigation” become a military survey and not a hydrographic survey? These
questions are especially difficult to answer in a general climate of mistrust and suspicion.
Ultimately, it is difficult to distinguish hydrographic and military surveys from MSR
as the methods of data collection are often the same, regardless of the data type and
intended use.10
In many cases, the same data collected from the marine environment may be used for
more than one purpose.11 For instance, the data from a hydrographic survey can be applied to much wider uses than making navigational charts for safety of navigation. Some
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are also used for the monitoring and forecasting of ocean-state estimates and weather
and climate prediction. Some are used for military purposes. Others are used for the
exploration and exploitation of living or nonliving natural resources. In these cases,
hydrographic data collected in an EEZ have clear economic value to a coastal state and
should therefore be subject to the coastal state’s MSR laws.12
Along with the advancement of technology in recent decades, tremendous capabilities
have been employed to collect large amounts of marine data using various instruments
deployed from ships, such as balloons, profiling floats, moored and drifting buoys,
remotely operated vehicles, and offshore or near-offshore fixed platforms. The data for
MSR can also be collected by satellite or by equipment on civilian or military aircraft or
ships. More and more research projects use remote-sensing technologies on platforms
located outside the jurisdictional waters of coastal states. The coastal state can find attempting to distinguish among hydrographic surveys, military surveys, and MSR in its
EEZ very frustrating. This state of affairs may eventually lead to a collapse of the present
MSR regime in the EEZ.

General State Practice and the Chinese Approach
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of the UN Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), an organization that deals with the
implementation of the MSR regime through its Advisory Body of Experts on the Law
of the Sea (ABE-LOS), has produced several documents in recent years reviewing the
general practices of its member states with respect to MSR.13
According to these reports, considerable ambiguities exist in the interpretation and
implementation of UNCLOS provisions regarding research and survey activities in the
EEZs of coastal states.14 Some countries have yet to enact national legislation to prescribe
the application procedures for foreign or international organizations to conduct MSR,
not to mention the publication and management of available research data so as to
advance marine science and marine technology.15
Nonetheless, as far as implementation is concerned, state practice in general is consistent
with the UNCLOS regime on MSR. Many states have set up standard procedures for foreignrelated MSR application. For example, Australia adopted the 1996 Foreign Research
Vessel Guidelines, which authorize the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to determine whether a vessel enjoys public vessel status.16 The Australian guidelines provide
detailed information in support of a request by a foreign research vessel to conduct marine scientific research within the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, fishing zone,
and on the continental shelf (including research involving a port visit). The department
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normally grants public-vessel status to foreign research vessels entering Australian ports.
In addition, Australia also has well-established procedures for military vessels.
To implement the UNCLOS regime on MSR and to regulate research and survey activities under its jurisdictional waters, China too has adopted a series of national laws and
regulations. China maintains records of coastal research and oceanography surveys,
most of them performed in its territorial seas. Deep-ocean surveys began only in the
early 1980s, as a result of the initiation of multiship programs.17 In recent years, China
has made further efforts to develop marine sciences and technologies and has amended
its law and policy to promote the advancement of research and surveys.
China signed UNCLOS on 10 December 1982 and ratified it on 15 May 1996.18 China
implemented its regimes by declaring maritime zones and enacting or revising national
maritime laws in accordance with UNCLOS provisions. In the field of MSR management, the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Exclusive Economic Zone
and the Continental Shelf enacted in 1998 (known as the 1998 EEZ/CS Law) has been
the most important legal document setting up the basic stance and fundamental regulations of the Chinese government in this area.19 With its sixteen articles the 1998 EEZ/CS
Law not only ensures China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf and safeguards its national interests but also provides the framework policy
directives concerning MSR.20 In particular, article 3 of this law echoes the provision of
article 56 of UNCLOS regarding sovereign rights over natural resources and jurisdiction
over matters in the EEZ, including MSR.
The 1998 EEZ/CS Law provides that “all international organizations, foreign organizations or individuals shall obtain approval from the competent authorities of the People’s
Republic of China for carrying out marine scientific research in its exclusive economic
zone and on its continental shelf, and shall comply with the laws and regulations of the
People’s Republic of China” (art. 9). It also reaffirms the residual rights of all states to
high-seas freedoms in the Chinese EEZ relating to navigation, overflight, and laying
submarine cables and pipelines (art. 11).
China emphasizes its enforcement authority over the EEZ in paragraph 2 of article 12,
which provides that “the People’s Republic of China shall have the right to take necessary measures against violations of its laws and regulations in the exclusive economic
zone and on the continental shelf.”21 The 1998 EEZ/CS Law thereby improved China’s
maritime legislation and provided a legal basis for China to control research and survey
activities in its EEZ. Analysis of the provisions of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law and China’s EEZ
practice indicates that China’s implementation of international law is consistent with the
general principles of the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provisions. For instance, articles 2, 3,
and 5 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law are virtually a verbatim copy of articles 56(1) and 77(1)
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of the LOSC. Article 10 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law specifies that China is to prevent and
control marine pollution.
The 1998 EEZ/CS Law is, however, rather brief and contains only skeletal provisions.
It would be difficult to implement such legislation without detailed regulations. The
better to regulate MSR activities, China adopted the Regulations of the PRC on Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research in 1996 (known as the MSR
Regulations).22 The fifteen articles of the MSR Regulations lay out specific application
procedures and major requirements for foreign-related MSR projects in China’s jurisdictional waters. Its opening provision spells out the motivations for such legislation: to
improve the management of foreign-related research activities, to promote international
exchange and cooperation in MSR, and to safeguard China’s national security and maritime rights and interests.
From the listed motives, it is clear that China allows MSR in its jurisdictional waters but
emphasizes its national security and maritime interests. The text of the MSR Regulations sets out conditions for foreign-related research applicable to all waters under the
jurisdiction of the Chinese government. Approval of an MSR application depends on
whether the research project is of a fundamental nature or related to the resources of
the sea area (mineral resources, fisheries resources, or wild marine creatures). Research
activities with a resource orientation are subject to more strict control.23
The MSR Regulations also contain provisions specifying the duty of a researching
state to provide information to the authorizing agency of China, namely, the State
Oceanographic Administration (SOA).24 SOA will inform the researching state of any
conditions, which may include Chinese participation or representation in the research
projects, provision of preliminary and final reports to China, and access for Chinese
representatives to data and samples collected and assistance in their assessment. If these
conditions are not met during the conduct of the research, China may require suspension or even termination of the project.
According to article 5 of the MSR Regulations, a written application to conduct research
projects must be made through official channels at least six months in advance of the expected starting date of the project. Consent or denial of the application can be expected
within four months.25 If any violations occur during the ongoing research, the designated Chinese authority for MSR management has the right to terminate the operations;
it may also confiscate all the research instruments and equipment involved and the data
and samples obtained or impose a fine, or both.26 For serious cases, criminal liabilities
may apply, according to the relevant laws of the PRC.
To facilitate the applications of foreign researchers or states, SOA, as the authority
responsible for MSR operational management, has promulgated additional working
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procedures that supplement the MSR Regulations. They provide a “Flow Diagram of
Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research Projects,” with the following steps: first, submit the application to SOA six months before the project starts; second, submit to SOA
the “Application Form for Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research Projects,” with all
required information; third, the application is processed by the SOA; fourth, SOA consults with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military department concerned; and
finally, a decision for approval or denial is made by SOA within four months of submission of the application.
When an application is approved, the researching states or individuals are required to
submit the operational plan of the research vessel to SOA two months before the cruise
starts. The “Application Form of At-Sea Operational Plan for Foreign-Related Marine
Scientific Research Projects” must also be filled out.
These publicized regulations guarantee the flow of communication through clearly
identified official channels, as required by article 250 of UNCLOS. It may be observed
from the provisions of China’s MSR Regulations and its practice that China has made
an effort to fulfill its obligations to implement an MSR regime in accordance with the
UNCLOS framework of Part XIII in its jurisdictional waters.27
Nevertheless, there have been problems in applying the legal framework of MSR because
of the lack of agreed definitions and specific distinctions between MSR and hydrographic and military surveys. One particular example of this difficulty occurred between
the United States and China. The United States has been a world leader in most areas of
global affairs, including expanding and strengthening its MSR globally. In recent years,
U.S. naval vessels have engaged in military activities involving operation of research
and survey equipment in the EEZ of China, causing serious arguments between the two
countries.28 This has also caused heated debate in international arenas concerning the
nature of a coastal state’s jurisdiction over MSR, hydrographic surveys, and military
activities.29
Partially in response to the frequent appearance of American military vessels conducting survey activities in its jurisdictional waters, China has updated its laws and regulations to manage various aspects of foreign-related survey activities in its EEZ.30 These
include amendment of the Law of the PRC on Surveying and Mapping in 2002 at the
29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress.31
The amended Surveying and Mapping Law takes more strict measures to control survey
activities in China’s jurisdictional waters.32 Article 1 of this law stresses its threefold purpose: first to ensure the smooth conduct of surveying and mapping, second to promote
national economic development, and third to build up national defense and scientific
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research. Article 2 highlights that this law applies to all surveying and mapping activities
conducted in Chinese national airspace, land, and sea areas.
Article 7 of the Surveying and Mapping Law permits survey activities in the sea areas
under the Chinese jurisdiction, subject to the approval by the competent authorities of
the State Council and the relevant military department and in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations of China. This article also stipulates that any foreign-related
surveying and mapping must be carried out in the form of a joint venture or in cooperation with a Chinese partner and cannot involve state secrets or harm state security.
According to article 51 of the law, it is a violation for a foreign organization or individual
to conduct surveying and mapping activities without the approval of the Chinese government. It is also a violation for a foreign organization or individual to conduct surveying and mapping activities alone in areas under China’s jurisdiction, and severe criminal
penalties are authorized if the results obtained from any survey involve state secrets.
To adapt to the changed circumstances and to implement better the Surveying and
Mapping Law, China also updated the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on
the Management of Surveying and Mapping Results.33 This new law asserts the ownership by China of the results of all surveying and mapping activities conducted jointly or
cooperatively in areas under the sovereignty of China.34 In the case of surveys conducted
in nonsovereign areas under China’s jurisdiction, duplicate copies of the results are to
be submitted to the competent department for surveying and mapping administration
under the State Council.35 In a similar manner, China declared Regulations of the PRC
on the Protection of Surveying Markers.36
On 19 January 2007, China adopted Temporary Management Measures on Surveying
and Mapping Activities Conducted by Foreign Organizations or Individuals in China.37
Article 1 of the Management Measures states the threefold purposes of this law: to
enhance control over survey activities conducted in areas under Chinese sovereignty or
jurisdiction by a foreign organization or individual (that is, foreign surveying in Chinese
areas), to safeguard national security and interests, and to promote international communication and cooperation in areas of economy and science.
Article 3 articulates three principles to be observed by foreign surveying vessels within
the Chinese areas: they must comply with the Chinese laws, regulations, and relevant
rules; their activities may not involve state secrets of China; and they may not damage
China’s national security.
Articles 4 and 5 designate the competent agencies for administration of foreign-related
surveying and mapping activities. Article 6 specifies avenues for a foreign organization
or individual to apply for a surveying permit, namely, in joint-venture or cooperative
form with departments or organizations of China. Even under the two forms, article
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7 prohibits certain activities, including ocean surveying and mapping. Articles 8 and 9
detail the conditions and documentation required to apply for a permit. Article 10 lists
the procedures and communication channels for permit processing, including filing the
application; initial assessment within twenty working days; further investigation by a
higher administrative authority, involving the relevant military department; release of
the result within eight working days; and finally the issuing of a permit. The rest of the
articles deal with the management of survey results (art. 15), periodic inspections during
the conduct of the survey (art. 16), and legal liability for violations (arts. 17, 18, and 19).
The State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, which is under the same ministry as SOA,
is the competent authority for survey management. It has established an International
Department to handle foreign-related surveys. To facilitate the implementation of
the Surveying Law, it issued Regulations on Scenic Spots and Historic Sites and other
detailed regulations. To give effect to the above-mentioned laws, the bureau issued
Directives on the Procedures for Administrative Punishment regarding Surveying and
Mapping.38
To implement these national laws and regulations, a total of twenty-three provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government have
subsequently revised local measures for surveying and mapping management after the
Surveying and Mapping Law was put into effect in 2002.39 These instruments require
Chinese agencies to carry out their responsibilities fully, adopt proper measures, and
ensure forceful supervision of survey activities in the areas under Chinese jurisdiction.
In this way, the Chinese legal system for overseeing surveying and mapping was further
improved and consolidated.
In the international arena, China has been active in participating in international
organizations related to MSR promotion, such as the North Pacific Marine Science
Organization (PICES). China has also signed bilateral and multilateral agreements with
the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Russia, Spain, Japan, the two Koreas, and
India, among others, regarding cooperation in the development of marine science and
technology. These actions are indicative of China’s positive attitude toward MSR-related
activities.

Implications and Suggestions
Many changes have occurred in international law and state practice since the entry into
force of UNCLOS. The uncertainty and limited details of the UNCLOS regime regarding jurisdictional rights to MSR and hydrographic and military surveys have resulted in
many cases of disagreement over practices and concepts.
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In today’s active media environment, for a government to refuse to deal with wellpublicized matters is not a viable strategy. Even though there are no clear-cut boundaries between research and survey activities, some states intentionally make distinctions
between these terms so as to avoid the jurisdiction of a coastal state. They claim surveys
to be high-seas freedoms separate from MSR and not subject to coastal-state regulations
applicable to MSR in foreign EEZs and on foreign continental shelves. The international
community has a common understanding of the concept of sovereign rights and jurisdiction, but not all states accept this interpretation.
If “hydrographic surveys” or “military surveys” were to be excluded from the scope of
MSR, “hydrographic surveys” and “military surveys” could be carried out in the EEZs
of coastal states without any restrictions. Eventually, this would lead to the collapse of
the present MSR regime, particularly in the EEZ. This was certainly not what UNCLOS
intended. The increased importance of EEZ management and state practice suggest that
hydrographic and military surveys in the EEZ should be under the jurisdiction of the
coastal state.
Further, MSR activities are very diverse. The numerous processes, operations, characteristics, and goals of MSR cannot be adequately captured by this simple term. From the
perspective of coastal states, it is difficult to differentiate MSR from hydrographic and
military surveys. Additionally, the technology of MSR is advancing. The development
of aerial and space-based remote-sensing platforms will make it more challenging for
coastal states to apply their jurisdiction and control over MSR in the EEZ.
Moreover, it is true that the EEZ was previously considered high seas, but UNCLOS now
separates the EEZ from the high seas, and residual freedoms in the EEZ are no longer
the same as freedoms of the high seas in the traditional sense. UNCLOS, as a “package
deal,” reaffirms the centuries-old principle of freedom of the seas and maintains such
freedoms as navigation and overflight in the EEZ (art. 58). The compromises reflect the
substantial conceptual change in freedoms of the seas and the balance of jurisdictional
functions among states. There is also allowance for constant modification to resolve
newly developing problems. UNCLOS achieves a balance between ocean enclosure by
coastal states, on the one hand, and traditional freedoms, on the other. UNCLOS also
balances the rights and duties of developing costal states with those of maritime powers.40 Maritime powers emphasize the principle of freedom of the seas and hope to maximize these freedoms, while developing coastal states stress sovereignty and security.41
Although criticized for maintaining excessive expectations of the MSR regime, over the
years coastal states have expanded their control over their EEZs by exercising jurisdiction
over non-resource-related activities, including many military activities. More restrictions
have also been imposed on the freedom of the seas by the international community
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through UNCLOS and other rules of international law.42 When states exercise these freedoms in a foreign EEZ, they are required by UNCLOS article 58 not to contravene the
regime of the EEZ but to have “due regard” for the rights and duties of the coastal state
and to comply with the laws and regulations established by the coastal state.
Over time, the uses of data collected during surveys have changed dramatically. Data
obtained from hydrographic survey can be used not only for navigation safety but also
for resource exploration and exploitation, defining maritime boundaries for jurisdictional control, and coastal-zone management. In this context, hydrographic surveys and
military surveys should be included within the scope of MSR, regulated by the same
MSR regime, and subjected to coastal-state jurisdiction.
Until an acceptable and fair regime on research and survey is established, practical
guidelines need to be worked out to promote international cooperation. A precautionary
approach has been adopted in many areas, such as the management of fisheries resources
and protection of the marine environment. It may also be helpful to adopt the precautionary approach to control research and survey activities in order to avoid potential
conflicts caused by the widely divergent views of coastal states and maritime states.

Concluding Remarks
The sea is a medium of navigation and communication, a vital link in the earth’s lifesupport system. Today, mankind looks toward the seas for sustenance more than ever
before, as growing populations and higher living standards have intensified demands
for sources of food, fuel, and other resources, including expansion of national space.
Through advances in science and technology the once-unexplored ocean depths are now
within mankind’s reach. The need to obtain more knowledge about the marine environment will only increase.
In many important respects, the provisions of UNCLOS were regarded as reflecting
customary international law even before its entry into force, and this has been confirmed
by subsequent state practice. However, some of its provisions were not regarded as such,
or their status was unclear. Moreover, any legal regime is subject to change because of
new developments.
According to UNCLOS, the EEZ is an area of shared rights and responsibilities between
the coastal state and all other states.43 China holds the view that a coastal state is entitled
to control its EEZ more strictly according to its needs.44 The EEZ is subject to a special
regime. It is neither territorial sea nor high sea.45
All marine data may be used for research, no matter what the means and location of collection. Therefore, in a broad sense, MSR could cover all forms of data-collecting activities. It can be very difficult not to include surveys as MSR: they bear a close relationship
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to other research activities, and it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish
between them. Without research concerning hydrographic data, it is basically impossible
to implement any provisions of UNCLOS.
The real concern is that the amount of “research” conducted by military vessels in the
name of “surveys” would increase, with the consequential possibility that more maritime conflicts or harassment will occur. Instead of blaming the problems inherent in the
existing international legal framework, it is wiser and more practical to strive for a collaborative operational framework—that is, to release tension, build trust, and cooperate.
The issue of the developmental imbalance among countries will continue to exist and
will inevitably influence the field of research and survey activities. This is the root cause
of the problem, but no solution can be offered at a time when the level of development
among states is yet to be balanced. It is obvious that some drawbacks exist in UNCLOS
regarding the MSR regime in the EEZ. It does not define MSR on the basis of the activity. Nor does it define the operational methods and means of conducting MSR. Neither
does it establish objective criteria to determine the purposes and motivation behind the
conduct of MSR activities. The MSR regime in the EEZ is largely undefined, leading to
conflicting positions regarding jurisdiction.
Eventually, common ground may be found to address the regulatory gaps and implementation concerns that are present in the existing MSR regime. However, there is still a long
way to go to build a practical and realistic MSR system, given the great variety of new
issues. Along with the development of science and technology, more and more marine
data-collection activities will be conducted in the world’s oceans. To protect the oceans
and their resources better, the lack of international law provisions regulating marine data
collection, including hydrographic and military surveys, will have to be resolved.
It is necessary for coastal states to develop national legislation to enhance EEZ management and improve enforcement in the area of marine data-collection activities.46 For
the international community it is also essential to resolve the major issues regarding
the MSR regime. Among these issues: Should all marine data-collection activities be
subject to coastal-state regulation in the EEZ? Are there means to capture diversified
MSR activities, including surveys, in terms of processes, operations, characteristics, and
motives? Should advances in technology, changed circumstances, and emerging issues
be incorporated into the MSR regime? Can cooperation be promoted through faithful
implementation of the MSR regime, with goodwill, without taking advantage of this
general framework? Can a code of conduct or practical guidelines for MSR and surveys
be developed to diminish the existing disagreement and potential for conflict? Advances
of knowledge and skill also make it necessary to update the MSR legal regime of
UNCLOS to close legal loopholes.
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These challenges can best be addressed through cooperative action that promotes
the peaceful use of the oceans instead of confrontation. For the purpose of peaceful
exploration and exploitation of the oceans, coastal states should make every effort to
reach consensus by enhancing communication and strengthening cooperation. A proper
way to make full use of the oceans without abusing the right to conduct MSR granted
by UNCLOS may also include the development of practical guidelines to govern such
particular forms of MSR activities as hydrographic and military surveys.
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C HAPTER EIGHT

Playing by or Playing with the Rules of UNCLOS?
Alan M. Wachman

T

he United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) each piously claim to
abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but each
accuses the other of playing with the rules to advance parochial interests. The dissensus
manifests itself in conflicting interpretations of what activity UNCLOS permits in the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Narrowly conceived, this is a dispute about law. Viewed
from a broader vantage, the dispute is one of a lengthening roster of issues in which the
PRC and the United States are jostling for dominance over international regimes, reflecting an intensifying geostrategic friction that arises from mutual insecurity and mistrust.
Whether one perceives the PRC as a rising hegemon challenging U.S. primacy because
of an abiding dissatisfaction with the norms and rules of an international system over
which Washington exerts a disproportionate influence, or whether one prefers a less
breathless depiction of the PRC as merely resentful of U.S. actions that seem to degrade
China’s security, it is evident that Beijing is prepared to contest Washington’s view of
what is permissible in the EEZ.1 The putative source of controversy—how to interpret
UNCLOS—is merely a symptom of a more pervasive malady in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Probing farther, one discerns the PRC and the United States engaged in a broader
contest about access to and control over maritime space, which itself reflects an even
deeper anxiety about how the evolving capacity of each to project military power affects
the national security of the other. Ultimately, how the United States and the PRC manage these nested controversies affects the well-being of the international system, which
Beijing and Washington each seek to influence.
If the only thing at stake were the question of what activities might be conducted in the
EEZ, there are ways by which Beijing and Washington might modify their behavior to
forestall conflict while resisting any erosion of the sense of national security. To date,
neither has had the will to dismount from its high horse to compromise. That neither
has done so does not mean that it is impossible or inconceivable.
Progress toward a modus operandi with respect to the EEZ has been impeded not for
lack of opportunity or institutional mechanisms through which accommodation might
be established but because the opposed postures concerning UNCLOS that Beijing
and Washington have adopted grow from more than conflict over the EEZ. Beijing and
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Washington are both working to ensure that their respective views of propriety are
established or consolidated as customary international law where maritime activity
is concerned. This may reflect the ambition each has of exercising leadership in other
arenas where developed and developing states are characterized as viewing the world
through different lenses.
In sum, there is much more at stake in the dispute about UNCLOS than an enumeration
of what activities may be permitted in the EEZ. At issue is how the United States and
the PRC will address mutual grievances within the boundaries of inherently imperfect
international regimes and what implications their responses will have for the international system.

Looking beyond Law
Law generally, and UNCLOS in particular, has become one means of contestation but
not one that addresses the source of underlying political friction between the United
States and the PRC.2 The Sino-U.S. impasse arises from a conflict of strategic ambitions. Jousting over the definition of what activities may be permitted in the EEZ, the
United States and the PRC mask (or refrain from acknowledging) their fundamental
assumptions and, equally, hesitate to articulate the insecurity and indignation that each
provokes in the other.
Each side devises elaborate argumentation to justify a position by reference to terms and
passages from UNCLOS, implying a common acquiescence to the primacy of international law generally and to the UNCLOS regime specifically. Neither side challenges
the legitimacy of international law in general or UNCLOS in specific. That the two
disputants contend in such civil, legalistic discourse might encourage one to conclude
that reason has surpassed passion, except that vessels from each state, dispatched by
authorities determined to defend a principled position, meet in defiant encounters at
sea, jeopardizing maritime harmony, menacing bilateral relations, and endangering the
lives of duty-bound sailors. Thus, it provides only modest comfort that conversation
about the EEZ is possible, even if it is through dialogue that both sides prefer to resolve
the present controversy.
A resolution of the EEZ issue is unlikely to emerge from a discussion of law, because
the law is not really the problem. Sino-U.S. relations are strained because of the ways
in which the strategic aims of Beijing and Washington collide and chafe against one
another during a period of rapid transition of stature and perceived power.
Simply put, the PRC—reflexively anxious about its comparative weakness in the face of
far more robust U.S. military power—worries about how the United States and its allies
may undermine those assets that the PRC has managed to develop to offset the existing
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military asymmetry between them. Beijing seems committed to expanding strategic
depth by raising the cost to the United States of operating close to the PRC’s shores.
In line with this objective, the PRC evidently resents U.S. intelligence and surveillance
activities. It hopes to push foreign forces as far from shore as is possible, especially those
with prying eyes capable of gathering information about assets Beijing prefers to keep
secret.
One PRC military official present at the U.S. Naval War College conference that gave rise
to this volume expressed Beijing’s irritation and disquiet, explaining that its reason for
seeking to deny the United States and other foreign vessels unfettered access to the EEZ
has everything to do with the PRC’s perceptions of U.S. intentions. The official said that
just as a person looking out from the front door of his home develops intuition to know
whom to welcome into his house for tea and against whom to slam the gate, so too does
the PRC respond intuitively to what it perceives as America’s hostile strategic intentions.
Casting the PRC attitude about foreign military activities in the EEZ as a self-evidently
rational reaction by Beijing to Washington’s unreasonable expectations and questionable intentions, the PRC official made plain his view that the controversy—including,
one presumes, the incidents at sea—results from flawed American policies. The rhetoric
most often invoked in this context is an assertion by Chinese commentators that the
United States seeks to “contain China.”3 This concern is particularly acute with respect
to the South China Sea and extends not only to the actions of the United States but also
to those of Japan and India. Without making explicit what precisely it means to contain
China or how the United States would accomplish this objective, the implications of a
distinction between a guest one invites in for tea and a menacing presence one works
to exclude is that if the United States were to adjust its posture to conform with Beijing’s preferences, the source of friction would disappear and the controversy would be
resolved.
During an August 2009 special session convened under the 1998 Sino-U.S. Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), a PRC Ministry of Defense official made a
comparable point, stating, “China believes the constant U.S. military air and sea surveillance and survey operations in China’s exclusive economic zone had led to military
confrontations between the two sides. . . . The way to resolve China-U.S. maritime
incidents is for the U.S. to change its surveillance and survey operations policies against
China, decrease and eventually stop such operations.”4 In this case, as in so many others
where the PRC finds itself in dispute with foreign states, the Chinese frame the controversy as one in which fault rests entirely on the other side. From Beijing’s perspective, as
its spokesmen are wont to observe, the PRC has been pushed by the other state into the
unwelcome position of having no option other than the one to which the foreign state
now objects.
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For its part, the United States, which has long defined its own national security in terms
of sustaining access to waters and airspace half a world away, views charily any erosion
of its freedom of navigation or overflight.5 In 1979 the United States established the
Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to challenge claims by coastal states that they be
permitted to restrict freedom of navigation or overflight beyond those standards more
widely endorsed by the international community. According to the U.S. Department of
State, the United States pledges to
exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis
in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Law of the Sea
(LOS) Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of
other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in
navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.6

To achieve these ends, the United States engages in a range of diplomatic and consultative activities but also authorizes “operational assertions by U.S. military units,” which
target states—including the PRC—seeking to impose greater restrictions on movement
than are embodied in UNCLOS.7
It is worth observing that the American policy regarding freedom of navigation is not
an outgrowth of concern only about the PRC but is implemented globally. Indeed, at
least until the end of the administration of President George W. Bush, the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy published on an annual basis what were known
as “FON assertions”—lists of all states that sought to restrict freedom of navigation and
the particular manners in which they sought to do so. Since then the U.S. Department of
Defense has affirmed its intention to authorize “deliberate and calibrated assertions of
our freedom of navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels.”8
So, for the United States, navigation through and overflight of the EEZ—even where
military activities are undertaken—is an essential right of all states. As to the inclination
to engage in surveillance and intelligence gathering in a region that the PRC perceives
as sensitive, one American conference participant observed that American strategic
planners seem to be perpetually anxious about assaults on their domain emerging as
strategic surprises—an apprehension triggered by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
in 1941 and reinforced for a new generation by al-Qaeda’s attacks of September 11, 2001.
Consequently, the very idea that the PRC hopes to prevent scrutiny of submarine and
related assets arouses suspicions and prompts American resolve to ensure that it not be
caught unaware of newly devised capabilities or incapable of responding to them.
For both American and Chinese strategists and statesmen, then, the controversy about
what is allowable under UNCLOS is not a simple question of how best to interpret the
convention but is the outgrowth of geostrategic competition under conditions of a security dilemma. Both defend their positions as matters of principle.
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This, though, is not the manner in which disagreements about activities in the EEZ are
commonly addressed. Instead, in Beijing as in Washington, the focus is on what
UNCLOS permits and why it is therefore obvious that the other side is in violation of
clearly stated precepts. As the chapters of this volume suggest, efforts by American and
Chinese commentators to convince each other of views they proffer as unassailable have,
thus far, failed. Indeed, Americans and Chinese advocates frequently “talk past” one
another.9 Where the EEZ is concerned, statesmen, scholars, soldiers, and other commentators advance assertions that flow from premises that are simply not shared by nationals
in the other state. As prima facie evidence of this, consider that none of the American
authors who have contributed to this volume question the legal right of the United
States to conduct military activities in the EEZ, just as none of the Chinese authors who
have contributed question the legitimacy of the PRC’s effort to exclude such activities
from the EEZ.
Fundamentally, each side deploys legal reasoning to justify actions it feels compelled
to take for the enhancement of its security. As neither side is prepared to debase itself
by relinquishing its pretense of equanimity—divulging how menaced the other makes
it feel—each behaves as an aggrieved party, deprived of rights that it claims are plainly
stated in UNCLOS, rights that it believes it could yet enjoy if only the other side would
recognize the proper interpretation of the law. For both Americans and Chinese writing
on this matter, fault rests squarely on the shoulders of the other nation. Neither is prepared to acknowledge or “own” the means by which it exacerbates underlying suspicions
by actions it takes.

The High Horse of Principle
In resorting to UNCLOS, Beijing and Washington each claim the moral high ground.
Chinese advocates have adopted the perspective with respect to the EEZ that the PRC
has taken in other international controversies involving powerful states. The PRC assumes the mantle of the underprivileged developing state confronting harassment from
the far stronger, developed state. Li Xingguang, president of the PRC’s Military Court of
the Navy, said in an interview published in Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily):
A handful of maritime powers, as represented by the United States, advocates that maritime scientific research in EEZs should not fall under the jurisdiction of littoral states,
although most other countries uphold the principle of prior agreement . . . [and] third
world countries generally hold that naval and air force military reconnaissance activities in
EEZs must be conducted with the agreement of littoral states.10

The PRC position is rife with implications of American hegemony reflecting, consciously or not, the well-trod narrative of China’s sufferings at the hands of Western
imperialism.
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By choosing this tack the PRC locates its dispute with the United States less in law than
in the international equivalence of populism. That plays not only to the sympathies of
its own population—explaining by reference to the asymmetry of power between itself
and the United States why it cannot defend its interests against incursions into a maritime domain that Beijing claims should be its own to regulate—but also to the global
bleachers. In this way China seeks to arouse the sympathies of less powerful “developing”
nations, which feel themselves at some disadvantage in confrontation with the United
States or other large states that act in self-interest, disregarding the preferences of the
weaker state. In this sense, the controversy concerning UNCLOS may be seen as one
battle in the Sino-U.S. war for moral primacy and influence over global institutions.
As a signatory to UNCLOS, the PRC occasionally implies that its interpretations should
trump those of the United States, which has yet to ratify the convention that Washington nevertheless employs as a bludgeon against Beijing’s claims that UNCLOS permits
limitations by coastal states on foreign military activities in the EEZ. The message is that
even though the United States asserts its compliance with UNCLOS, because it has not
undertaken to be formally bound by the convention it has no standing to impose its selfregarding interpretations of the regime on those states that have ratified it.
For instance, Zhang Haiwen cites passages from an essay by Scott Borgerson to make
the point that there is a “strong political force which is scornful of the Convention in
the United States. They like to take advantage of the Convention but do not respect it.”11
Zhang writes, “It is unfair . . . that the United States, which has yet to ratify the Convention, is raising an argument on the interpretation of the Convention.”12 Reacting to what
she views as Washington’s selective compliance with UNCLOS, Zhang highlights the
following from Borgerson’s piece: “Opponents of the convention [UNCLOS] argue that
there is no need to join the treaty [UNCLOS] because, with the world’s hegemonic navy,
the United States can treat the parts of the convention it likes as customary international
law, following the convention’s guidelines when it suits American interests and pursuing
a unilateral course of action when it does not.”13
In these sentiments Zhang is not alone. Chinese observers have framed the dispute about
UNCLOS as illustrative of U.S. hegemonic tendencies. “America’s failure to cooperate with the international community on UNCLOS is not an isolated phenomenon,”
writes one commentator, “but is one element in its strategy to dominate the world and
monopolize the oceans.”14
In a vigorous denunciation of the U.S. position on UNCLOS, Shen Dingli, the vice dean
of the Department of International Studies at Fudan University, comments that for a
long time the United States has been acting as the world’s primary maritime power,
seeking to limit the rights and interests of littoral states but all the while penetrating
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their maritime space in ways that are “hegemonic and offensive.” He asserts that the
United States, which has thus far refused to ratify UNCLOS, nevertheless regards itself
as if it were among those states that have ratified the convention, censuring states that
genuinely have. Shen writes that the United States often interprets the convention from
the vantage of its own interest rather than according to the stringent standards it claims
are demanded of a world leader. If this persists, Shen cautions, it will be difficult for
the United States to maintain its image as a moral and legal exemplar. Instead, it will be
perceived as a state that is always scheming and seeking to profit at the expense of other
states.
Shen writes that the United States must realize that the days when America could be
insufferably arrogant and take advantage of other states have passed. The PRC, he writes,
does not have the intention—and, at present, lacks the means—to “run to America’s
front door” to challenge the U.S. coast and maritime regulations, and, he submits, the
United States ought not challenge the PRC’s laws on the EEZ. He urges mutual regard
for the convention that both sides claim is operative and concludes, menacingly, by
threatening, “The U.S. should consider: as a state which cannot manage to put Iraq in
good order and is certainly unable to treat Afghanistan fairly, it should, in the face of a
great country with a population of 1.3 billion, restrain itself a bit.”15
One way to interpret the challenges emanating from the PRC is that Beijing resents a
legal regime that appears to favor American security at the PRC’s expense. Unable to
change the words of UNCLOS, the PRC argues—laboriously, at times—to persuade
the United States that the spirit of the law clearly supports Beijing’s interpretation, even
where the word of the law may be insufficiently precise.
Hence, Chinese and American analysts of UNCLOS dicker about the meaning of article
58(3), which reads: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted
by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules
of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”16 PRC analysts
point to the “due regard” clause as evidence of the obligation of foreign states to abide
the laws of coastal states and the right of coastal states to restrict military activities in the
EEZs off their coasts. American analysts tend to view this conclusion as smuggling into
the article a privilege that was explicitly rejected by the drafters of the convention.
It is conceivable, of course, that advocates writing on behalf of the PRC offer interpretations of UNCLOS that are in fact meant to reopen and extend negotiations about
issues that have, apparently, been settled. By challenging the understanding of what is
permissible in the EEZ, the Chinese analysts may be hoping that other states will follow
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suit, adjusting what would then be seen as customary international law and hoping that
the legal justifications they offer will likewise become the new norm. This, indeed, is
precisely why some American proponents of UNCLOS argue that the United States must
ratify the convention. For example, Rear Adm. Arthur E. Brooks, commander of the
Seventeenth Coast Guard District, has said, “While reliance upon customary international law has served us well for many years, it does not adequately protect our interests.
Customary international law is based on the evolving practice of States; it can and does
erode over time. The Law of the Sea Convention provides the legal certainty and stability” that the admiral believes would assure U.S. interests for the long term.17
Notwithstanding the imperfections in PRC arguments made about the American disregard for UNCLOS, it takes only a modicum of empathy to understand why Chinese
view U.S. actions as they do. After all, the United States does have the military means to
enforce its will and, up to a point, continues to press its claims by engaging in operations
it knows to trespass Beijing’s stated limits of tolerance.18
Beyond that, the United States persists in an unacknowledged expectation that operating a massive armada in the waters of the western Pacific is both a right to which it is
entitled and an obligation for American national security. Americans have become so
habituated to unfettered operation in the Pacific that few question the legitimacy or
ethical propriety of doing so. Americans on both sides of the ideological divide seem to
support, without reflection, the notion of this entitlement.19
Americans may assume that such dominance is self-evidently in the interests of other
states because the United States defends the “global commons.” One consequence is that
Americans may refrain from reflecting on how the U.S. naval presence appears in the
eyes of the PRC. The Chinese, though, by no means share the certainty that an American naval presence in the western Pacific is, ipso facto, consistent with Beijing’s notions
of national security. Consequently, even well-considered and conceptually grounded
explanations of the sensibility of the U.S. presence coupled to well-intended invitations
for Sino-U.S. cooperation are likely to be perceived by Chinese readers as self-serving
justifications for the sustenance of American primacy. After all, leaving aside nonstate
actors that might pose threats to the security of PRC land or seaborne commodities, the
state that Beijing looks to as the most likely source of harm is the United States.
The authors of a document intended to lay out the PRC’s worldview, strategic concerns,
and military response—China’s National Defense—survey the strategic situation around
the world. Turning to the Asia-Pacific region, they write, “The Asia-Pacific security situation is stable on the whole.” However, in a paragraph listing what are euphemistically
called “many factors of uncertainty,” the document states that “the US has increased
its strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its
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military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and enhancing its military
capabilities.”20
It elaborates, “China is faced with the superiority of the developed countries in economy,
science and technology, as well as military affairs. It also faces strategic maneuvers and
containment from the outside while having to face disruption and sabotage by separatist and hostile forces from the inside.”21 The frequency with which the PRC press and
Chinese academics write of what are perceived as U.S. efforts to contain China makes it
highly likely that references to developed countries and to “strategic maneuvers and containment” mean almost assuredly the United States and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Japan.
Naturally, Washington avers that its actions in the EEZ are legitimate, and when PRC
vessels have challenged those claims at sea, the United States has refrained from escalating, while arguing with vehemence and—like a fouled player on a basketball court—
exaggerated indignation about the infringement of its rights by the PRC. American analysts assert that rather few states concur in Beijing’s view of the EEZ as a region where
foreign military activities are excluded. Moreover, Americans hammer at the PRC’s
notion that foreign military vessels must secure the permission of the PRC to conduct
certain activities in the EEZ extending from the Chinese coast. Americans argue that
UNCLOS does not endorse the view preferred by the PRC that the EEZ is an extension
of each littoral state’s coast and particular domestic laws but instead argue that UNCLOS
casts the EEZ as a single oceanic realm in which a single legal regime applies.
This view flows from conviction that there is a single, global system governed by rules
that operate as the United States claims they do. Actually, the PRC does not contest the
singularity of the international system. Both the United States and the PRC understand
that there is a single international system, but both Beijing and Washington are struggling to ensure that it reflects values they each prefer.

Implications
The contretemps of the early twenty-first century regarding the EEZ did not emerge
only when the PRC rapidly became more wealthy and powerful. That is, the conflict
is not the by-product of the “rise of China.” The posture Beijing now advances reflects
preferences that the PRC staked out in the process of negotiating UNCLOS in the 1970s.
Indeed, as the chapter by Andrew Williams in this collection observes, the PRC was
among those states that sought during the negotiation of UNCLOS to have “security
interests” of coastal states protected in the EEZ and military activities by foreign parties
prohibited.22 These efforts failed.
What may, however, be the outgrowth of the “rise of China” is a newly emerging indignation within the PRC and self-confidence that it can, and should, confront unwelcomed
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foreign vessels as a way of underscoring its determination to protect what it perceives
to be its rights. In this, the PRC manifests two potentially risky behaviors. The first is
to base its notion of rights on its own interpretation of a convention, in disregard of
the prevailing interpretation of a preponderance of signatory states. Beijing could, one
supposes, withdraw from UNCLOS and insist that it has a right to extend sovereignty
out to whatever distance from shore it chooses. After all, there are instances when a state
believes it has the capacity to defend a claim not otherwise protected by law and simply
snubs the law so as to do what it wills. For example, Japan in 1933, in the face of Western
condemnation and efforts to constrain the expansion of its foothold in Manchuria,
withdrew from the League of Nations, citing “a wide divergence of view” between itself
and the League regarding the implications of its support for the “independence” of
Manchukuo.23 Germany withdrew seven months later. Should the PRC reach a stage
of development at which a surfeit of national self-confidence outweighs a capacity for
level-headed self-restraint, it could defect from UNCLOS and, like the United States,
claim adherence in its own manner, without being a signatory.
An even more risky behavior manifested by the PRC, in its confrontational maneuvers at
sea, is an apparent expectation that by employing obstructive means short of violence—
principally harassment of U.S. vessels—it can persuade the United States to alter its
operations to conform with PRC preferences while avoiding calamity. There is no need
to wonder what lessons the PRC has taken from the 1 April 2001 collision of the Chinese
F-8 and the American EP-3. Wang Wei’s death has not prompted reflection about the
advisability of exercising greater restraint in expressions of displeasure at U.S. operations
or of expanding the MMCA to establish a bilateral code of conduct aimed at preventing
incidents at sea.24 Rather, the PRC not only acknowledges no responsibility for its part in
these confrontations but justifies its response.
Equally, the United States continues to goad the PRC without recognizing how doing
so contributes to hostility it otherwise claims interest in overcoming. It behaves as if
fault for the incidents at sea resides solely in Beijing’s wanton disregard for the safety of
American sailors and airmen. Washington insists that beyond the specific intelligence it
may seek from operations conducted in the EEZ, its deployments reify the principle of
freedom of navigation and therefore should be seen as defending a common good from
which all states—the PRC included—stand to benefit.
Accustomed as it is to see itself as the defender of liberty and the enforcer of order, the
United States is not attuned to the perceptions of insecurity and indignation it arouses
in weaker powers. Americans have become so used to possessing an asymmetric advantage of power that in dealings with less powerful states they assume that the benignity of
their actions will be self-evident. Were the situation reversed—were the eyes of a much
more powerful foreign power peering all too intently from much too near at regions
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of the U.S. coast that Washington considers strategically sensitive—Americans might
understand more viscerally the alarm U.S. activities provoke off China’s coast.
The United States believes itself to be playing by the rules. By exploiting far more powerful resources against a far weaker target, it may lose sight of—or perhaps it cares little
about—how the imbalance affects perceptions of its actions by the other. Pursuing its
FON operations, the United States may also be playing with the rules to “score points.”
During the Cold War, the cat-and-mouse, tit-for-tat, thrust-and-parry competition with
the Soviet Union was a rivalry between two more or less evenly matched opponents. Applying the same norms and harboring expectations that its relations with the PRC ought
to follow the same pattern, Washington either overlooks or revels in the asymmetry.
From Washington’s vantage, so long as it abides by UNCLOS there is no reason why
it should restrict its own activities simply because China is made to feel vulnerable by
them. Just as the PRC justifies its challenges to U.S. activities in the EEZ, so the United
States justifies those very activities. Feeling their actions legitimated by law and flowing from more fundamental principles, both the United States and China persevere in
risky displays of determination rather than devising mutually acceptable limits that will
safeguard the interests of both. Should this pattern persist, one should be unsurprised if
defiance leads, once again, to miscalculation, conflict, and loss. Like teenage hot-rodders
bolstered by bravado, overconfidence, and a sense of invulnerability to physics, the
United States and the PRC are embarked on a protracted game of maritime “chicken”
that may, with little warning, turn horribly wrong.
The possibility of a bilateral compromise is clear but would demand that both sides be
prepared to give up something in exchange for self-restraint by the other. For example,
Beijing could reserve what it perceives as its right to interdict foreign vessels that did not
seek prior permission for military activities within the EEZ while allowing as a matter
of sovereign courtesy those that provided advance notice to pass unhindered. Washington could reserve what it perceives as its right to conduct military activities in the EEZ
without seeking prior permission from the coastal state while agreeing as a matter of
sovereign prerogative to provide prior notification to the PRC. Having received advance
notification, the PRC could “shadow” foreign vessels conducting military activities in the
EEZ so as to evaluate better what data were being gathered, and the United States could
refrain from remarking on or thwarting that countermeasure.
By reserving maximal rights so as not to compromise on principle while acting with less
rigidity so as to avoid conflict, both sides could—by mutual accommodation—contribute to a reduction in hostility and the cultivation of greater trust and mutual regard.
Naturally, Beijing and Washington could adapt existing international codes of conduct
for encounters at sea to suit better their mutual needs, or they could devise one anew.25

118

china maritime studies

That way, if a shift in political mood causes either to revert to their maximal claims, a
clash might still be avoided by reference to formal protocols—such as the COLREGS—
devised to prevent conflict.
So long as either side believes that it is entirely within its rights to continue on its present
course, however, compromise and self-restraint are unlikely. To date, both sides have
manifested an intention to remain astride their high horses, yielding little reason to
expect rapid change from either.
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air-defense identification zone
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air traffic services

CDEM
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International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

FIR

flight information region
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Freedom of Navigation (Program)
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[IMO Sub-Committee on] Flag State Implementation
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International Civil Aviation Organization
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International Maritime Organization
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U.S.-USSR Prevention of Incidents on and over the Seas
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IOC

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission

JMSDF

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

LOSC

Law of the Sea Convention [also UNCLOS]
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International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
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Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
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Military Sealift Command
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MSR

marine scientific research
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
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Office of Naval Research
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North Pacific Marine Science Organization

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC

People’s Republic of China

PSSA

particularly sensitive sea area

R/V

research vessel

SAR

[International Convention on Maritime] Search and 		

		

Rescue [1979]

SMS

special-mission ship

SOA

State Oceanographic Administration

SOLAS

[International Convention for the] Safety of Life at Sea
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[1974]
[International Convention on] Standards of Training, 		
Certification and Watchkeeping [for Seafarers, 1978]

TMT

transfer of marine technology

UN

United Nations

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [also
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Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
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UNESCO
		

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 		
Organization

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

USNS

United States Naval Ship

W WMO-IOC

World Meteorological Organization–Intergovernmental

		

Oceanographic Commission
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